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Beyond Dichotomy: Dynamics of Choice in
Compositional Space
Greg Jensen
The quantitative study of choice under conditions of uncertainty dates back to the earliest applica-
tions of probability to games of chance. Over time, theories of choice have transitioned away from
the ‘oughts’ of rational econometrics toward more face-valid descriptions of observed behaviors.
Throughout this period, the problem of subjective probability has posed a consistent difficulty for
theories of choice. The most successful approach for modeling these distortions is use of ‘log-odds,’
which provides a powerful description of two-alternative choice as a power law function of relative
outcome probability. The log-odds approach can be generalized using the framework of ‘composi-
tional analysis.’ The core statistical methodology of this framework is introduced and described,
with an eye towards developing models of choice across any number of alternatives. The viability
of these models is demonstrated on several previously published datasets.
A series of experiments with rats explored the effect of changing the number of alternatives.
Power-law models continued to provide an effective description of behavior, but subjective prob-
abilities were also found to be less distorted when subjects made choices among a larger number
of alternatives (eight at once) than among smaller numbers (four or six). This effect was robust
against controls for age, order of experience, chamber configuration, and schedule richness. A work-
ing hypothesis is put forward based on an analysis of responses as a dynamical process: Subjects
succeed at complex tasks by limiting their transitions between response alternatives to a highly
stereotyped ‘default transition matrix,’ making only slight deviations in order to adapt to changing
task demands. This strategy is computationally efficient. However, severe mismatches between the
schedule and a subject’s default transition matrix are much more likely to occur when fewer alter-
natives are available, and behavior under such conditions is necessarily insensitive. Implications
for other choice models are considered.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 A Summary of Contents
This dissertation examines a range of theoretical propositions, analytic methods, and experimental
results that inform our understanding of what it means to make repeated choices from among many
alternatives. The general aim is to provide a comprehensive account of these topics, but this has
resulted in a somewhat sprawling document. In order to help readers approach this material in
an efficient manner, the following roadmap outlines the dissertation’s contents, and each section’s
function in service of the document as a whole. The reader is encouraged to use this summary to
roam a bit more freely in the text.
Throughout the text, a large number of equations are presented, with a correspondingly broad
range of notation. Many of these, particularly those associated with compositional analysis, will be
entirely unfamiliar to most readers. To facilitate comprehension, Appendix A provides a glossary
of important mathematical notation and reprints every numbered equation, along with a brief
description and the page number of its original appearance. Readers who read the dissertation in
an order of their choosing are encouraged to use this appendix liberally to keep from losing the
mathematical thread.
1.1.1 Introducing Choice
This introduction begins with a brief description of ‘compositions,’ a fundamental mathematical
object central to the problem of choice. Although this same information is provided in greater
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detail at a later point, it is introduced from the outset to provide a lens through which to consider
the many quantitative models proposed in the literature.
Subsequently, the introduction provides a historical backdrop to the quantitative study of choice
and preference. Two major threads are considered, neither of which has interacted with the other
until very recently. The first of these is the comparative work of learning theorists, such as the
radical behaviorists. These models were developed primarily using data collected from animals in
controlled experiments, in the hope of identifying the ‘universal laws’ of learning and behavior. The
other literature is that of human decision making, developed in the traditions of econometrics and
game theory. Much of the foundational work in economics relies more on mathematical axioms than
on experimental evidence. These two threads come together in the modern study of ‘behavioral
economics.’
The experimental methods and results presented later in the dissertation do not depend directly
on this historical backdrop. Nevertheless, understanding this historical context allows the experi-
ments to be examined with an eye toward the often incompatible assumptions that have informed
past models, and their resulting limitations.
1.1.2 Compositional Analysis
Part I of the dissertation is entitled ‘Analytic Methodology’ and provides a comprehensive overview
of the basics of compositional analysis. ‘Compositions’ (briefly introduced in the following section of
this introduction) are mathematical objects that share properties with both vectors and fractions,
and they are the backbone of all subsequent analysis performed in this dissertation.
Several key points are meant to be taken from the chapters in Part I. The first is that composi-
tions are necessarily constrained to a Non-Euclidean sample space, a fact with subtle but damning
implications for many quantitative models of choice and preference. The second is that, despite
being unfamiliar, this sample space is completely consistent as a vector space and host to a set of
mathematical operations that make its analysis tractable. The third is that, using a generalization
of the log-odd transformation, data of a compositional nature may be converted into a Euclidean
vector space with no loss of information, permitting the full range of traditional statistics to be
implemented.
Because compositional analysis is not limited to any particular discipline or topic, the chapters
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
in Part I are written in abstract terms, without extensive application to the topics of choice,
preference, and subjective value. A reader with a strong applied focus may find it more compelling
to skip Part I initially, returning once the experiments and their analyses begin to make the nature
of the problem more concrete.
1.1.3 Experiments & Results
Part II makes use of the tools of compositional analysis to study behavior when many choice
alternatives are available. This is done using data collected from animals in laboratory contexts,
both in previously published data and in experiments performed for this dissertation. The data
from many of these experiments could not have been rigorously analyzed using earlier models,
and the compositional paradigm provides a first look at how behavior adapts to changing task
complexity.
Although compositions make the analysis of these data possible, the initial results are highly
surprising and are not easily explained by extant theories of choice. A working hypothesis is put
forward to explain these results, and its development requires the introduction of two other quan-
titative tools: change-point analysis (used to study the behavior as a time series) and information
theory (used to measure the efficiency of behavioral strategies). These are introduced as the need
arises in the Results section of Chapter 9. Because the change-point algorithm employed is some-
what involved, it is described at greater length in Appendix B.
Through the study of behavior as a process, Part II assembles these data into a working hy-
pothesis regarding the way in which response structure and task structure interact. This yields
a heuristic that scales very efficiently as the complexity of the task increases. Not only does this
provide a plausible strategy used by subjects to perform complex tasks, but also makes a coherent
prediction for what circumstances are necessary for that strategy to fail.
1.1.4 General Discussion
Part III examines the implications of the working hypothesis put forward to explain the experi-
mental data. Although a summary of the results is provided, a full appreciation of the proposed
mechanism depends on a clear image of the way in which the conditional probabilities of responding
(as characterized by Markov chains) relate to the information-theoretic measures described in Part
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II (particularly the ‘divergence rate,’ described as Equation 9.7).
A detailed consideration of the implications of compositional analysis and responding as a pro-
cess are presented as they relate to existing models of decision making. Particular attention is given
to finding a happy medium between radical behaviorism (in which the environment is dominant and
the organism nearly vanishes) and representational cognition (which places the complete burden
of simulating the world on the organism). This dissertation’s working hypothesis is that although
subjects initially make use of computationally costly strategies, these quickly crystalize when the
layout of the environment is static, allowing successful behavior to persist and adapt to changing
schedules of reward with minimal cognitive costs.
Several lines of research are proposed to flesh out the working hypothesis. In addition to further
validation of the basic claim by studying animal behavior, experiments are also proposed to examine
the question in human decision making (using simple games) and in neuroscience (by enhancing
existing accumulator models).
1.2 Compositions: A Rigorous Approach to Relative Value
The proposal that ‘value is relative,’ in both figurative and mathematical terms, is hundreds of years
old. Inspired by the theory of measurement put forward by Stevens (1946), many modern social
scientists might frame the proposal as ‘value is measured on a ratio scale.’ However, Stevens’ differ-
ent scales of data (nominal, ordinal, scalar, and ratio) have been controversial among statisticians
from the outset (Velleman & Wilkinson, 1993), and many rigorous quantitative problems do not
conform to any of the classical categories (Chrisman, 1998). Far from being exotic or specialized,
many familiar varieties of data fail to fit any of Stevens’ categories.
Perhaps the most widely studied variety of non-standard data are ‘proportions,’ which include
probabilities. Although ‘relative odds’ are often considered, suggesting that a ratio scale may
be appropriate, proportions have both a true zero and a true maximum, since no single item can
represent more that 100% of the total. As a result, proportions are fundamentally constrained data,
giving them characteristics not commonly attributed to ratio scales. Understanding the nature of
this constraint is essential to the sensible development of both analysis and theory.
We commonly represent ratios of two alternatives as fractions, and because the properties of
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these objects are taught to us in elementary school, they seem natural and obvious. We understand,
for example, that 14 and
10
40 represent identical values. How one generalizes this principle of ‘relative
value’ to sets of more than two measurements is not obvious, however, and most analysts are
unfamiliar with a class of mathematical objects that might correspond to a ‘many-sided fraction.’
Such an object would automatically encode that the ratio (1 : 5 : 14) is identical in relative terms
to the probabilities [0.05, 0.25, 0.7].
This object is the composition, which consists of some set of D alternatives that are only
meaningful relative to one another1. This strictly relative property arises as a consequence of the
closure constraint (denoted by C (·)), which converts a vector of observations B = [B1, · · · , Bn] into









The closure constraint results in several counterintuitive properties, because it confines the data
to a finite sample space whose geometry is non-Euclidean. This can be conveyed visually for three
alternatives using a ‘ternary diagram,’ as depicted in Figure 1.1. Here, the three vertices of the
equilateral triangle, p1, p2, and p3, each correspond to 100% of one of three alternatives, and any
point within this triangle represents some other set of proportions. The gray point in the center, for









, which is the ‘barycenter’ of the triangle. Drawn
in 3D Euclidean space, this triangle would lie diagonally with respect to the axes, connecting the
points (0,0,1), (0,1,0), and (1,0,0). This leads to the two most obvious properties of compositional
data: Points are confined to a finite domain, and that domain has one fewer dimensions than the
number of alternatives (in this case, a 2D triangle embedded in 3D space). This finite domain is
called a ‘simplex’ (the n-dimensional generalization of an equilateral triangle).
A less obvious characteristic of the closure constraint is that the space within the simplex is non-
Euclidean. Since everything within the simplicial geometry is relative, it is multiplication (rather
than addition) that acts as the basic arithmetic operation (see Equation 3.3). When working
with compositions, although multiplication and division are consistent mathematical operations,
1Compositions are very closely related to, but distinct from, multinomial vectors. For example, the multinomial
vector (1, 5, 14) encodes both relative and absolute information. The vector that encodes the parameters of the
multinomial distribution, however, qualifies as a composition, and is the form that analysts are most likely to have
encountered compositions in the past.
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p3
p2 p1
Figure 1.1: A ternary plot comparing three proportions p1, p2, and p3 (whose sum is 1.0, due to
closure). The gridlines represent two compositionally orthogonal sets of compositionally parallel
lines, representing a possible orthonormal contrast. No single vertex has priority over the others,
and the non-Euclidean geometry is fully symmetric.
addition and subtraction are not. It is for this reason that the compositional sample space is
inconsistent with Stevens’ ‘ratio scale,’ as the latter permits both addition and multiplication. The
inconsistency of simple addition in compositional data has profound implications for hypothesis
testing, because the arithmetic mean and its corresponding variance also become inconsistent.
The result of these constraints is an unfamiliar (but internally coherent) form of vector geometry.
For example, Figure 1.1 depicts two sets of ‘compositional lines,’ defined according to a non-
Euclidean vector space within the simplex. Although some lines appear curved while others do
not (according to a Euclidean definition of curvature), every one of them is linear with respect
to the (non-Euclidean) geometry of the simplex. Furthermore, each of the depicted lines is either
‘compositionally parallel’ or ‘compositionally perpendicular’ to every other line drawn. The lines
belong to two groups, each following the contours of the contrast between p3 and a composite of p1
and p2 (in the case of the vertical lines) and the contrast of p1 vs. p2 independent of p3 (in the case
of the horizontal lines). Because this geometry is fully symmetrical, no single vertex has priority,
any other orthonormal contrast not depicted could in principle be drawn.
Another non-obvious property of closure-transformed data is that even when three independent
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random variables A, B, and C are unrelated, the covariance of C ([A,B,C]) will automatically be
negative, because more of one alternative necessarily means less of the others. At the same time,
the covariance matrix will be singular (as a result of the insufficient degrees of freedom in the
geometry). This can render the behavior of compositional data perplexing in the event that its
compositional character is not recognized.
Thanks to techniques pioneered by Aitchison (1986) and subsequently refined by Egozcue &
Pawlowsky-Glahn (2006), this unfamiliar geometry can be transformed into a sample space that
has all the properties traditionally associated with a Euclidean sample space. Using non-standard
mathematical operators, the contents of Figure 1.1 may be represented as a consistent vector space2,
within which familiar hypothesis testing tools may be applied.
Interpreting the relative selection of alternatives using compositional methods (reviewed in
Pawlowsky-Glahn & Buccianti, 2011) offers substantive advantages. From a theoretical perspec-
tive, the most important of these is the recursive character of the simplex: Each (n)-simplex is
composed of a set of (n − 1)-simplexes, which ensures that the relationships between alternatives
are undistorted by arbitrary analytic decisions. For example, in a symmetrical model, the param-
eters estimated for each (n)-simplex will be consistent with parameters estimated from data that
only include a subset of the alternatives. This is particularly important because the analyst may
not know what the organism considers to be its alternatives (for example, ‘go to sleep’ may be
one of the alternatives from which a rat chooses). A model that yields consistent parameters given
subsets of the data can also be expected to be consistent if the analyst lacks sufficient information
to encode every possible alternative. If, on the other hand, behavior displays asymmetries, these
can be studied in terms of compositional covariance, which relaxes the assumption that every al-
ternative Bi must be entirely discriminable from every other alternative Bj . A case in which this
solution is effective is described in Chapter 8.
From a practical perspective, compositional transformations permit proportional data to be
examined in Euclidean terms, enabling the full range of parametric statistics to be brought to bear
on problems of choice.
2This domain may also be transformed into a Euclidean space with no loss of information using either the ‘centered
log-ratio’ transformation (Equation 4.3) or the ‘isometric log-ratio transformation’ (Equation 4.5), which will be
discussed in detail henceforth (see also Egozcue et al., 2003; Egozcue & Pawlowsky-Glahn, 2006).
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1.3 Classical Accounts of Choice
Prior to the 17th century, choice was a predominantly philosophical topic, limited to considerations
of ethics and dogma. However, the foundational work by Pascal, Fermat, and Huygens in the study
of probability (Ore, 1960) hinged on a dilemma about which traditional ethics appeared mute: If
a game of chance was believed to be governed by random events, and the game ended early (that
is, while money was still on the table), what would be the ‘fair’ way to distribute the money to
the participants? Framed in broader terms: Given uncertainty about future outcomes, how should
some resource (such as money or effort) be distributed in order to represent those outcomes in a
fair way? This question led to the formulation of expected value as a ‘mathematically fair’ means
of understanding games of chance. In the context of a lottery A with D different outcomes, the
expected value LA is defined as the sum of products between the magnitudes Mi of each outcome





This very basic formulation carries both a scalar and an ordinal implication. From a scalar perspec-
tive, LA is a value in the same monetary units as each of the outcomes Mi,A, such that expected
values and concrete monetary amounts are treated interchangeably. From an ordinal perspective,
expected values may be used to specify preference orderings3, for example A  B if LA ≥ LB.
Notice that both implications fail to take the uncertainties of LA and LB into consideration.
1.3.1 Expected Utility Theory
In its historical context, expected utility provides an elegant solution to what was once considered
a thorny problem: Why won’t people pay an exorbitant amount to play a game whose expected
value is infinite? More generally, why do some gamblers favor risk, while others avoid it? Bernoulli
3The symbols  and ≺ correspond to ‘succeeds’ and ‘precedes,’ respectively. Rather than comparing two relative
measures (as the > and < symbols do), successions and precession are prescriptive. The statement X  Y can be
read as, “X should always be favored over Y.” Analogously,  and  indicate the possibility of indifference, such
that X  Y can be read as, “X may be favored over Y, or the two may be considered equivalent.” Rounding out this
notation, X ∼ Y denotes that X and Y are similar under transformation, X ' Y denotes that X and Y are either
similar or exactly equivalent, and X ≡ Y denotes that X and Y are identical.
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(1738|1954) proposed that, rather than using expected value, gamblers might instead experience
some different subjective function of utility, which could capture the experience of diminishing





Here, the exponent β distorts the magnitude of each outcome in the lottery, and these distorted
values are used in computing the utility. Note that the expected utility is not presented in the
original units (e.g. dollars), but rather in some subjective units, due to the transformation imposed
by β. These subjective units are typically denoted by u (for ‘utility’) and are sometimes called
‘utils.’
Bernoulli’s proposal made an early distinction between value and odds of occurence, noting
the potentially subjective quality of the former. Although the power-law formulation would be
revived as the Cobb-Douglas production function (Cobb & Douglas, 1928), the full mathematical
implications of expected utility would not be realized until the codification of the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility theorem (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). This theorem laid out four
axioms that were necessary and sufficient for ‘subjectively rational’ behavior under the non-linear
functions of value. This transformative work led to an explosion of theorizing arising from the
principles of game theory. However, it was observed almost immediately that participants routinely
violate these rationality axioms. This was most famously argued by Allais (1953) in what is now
termed the ‘Allais paradox.’ Such paradoxes arise whenever two lotteries with identical expected
values yield different preferences. For example, being given a guaranteed $50 will be seen as
favorable relative to a gamble that has a 0.75 probability of paying $60 by some participants, an
econometrically reasonable outcome because $50 > 0.75 · $60. However, of those participants, a
further subset will prefer a 0.75 probability of winning $60 to a 0.25 probability of winning $200,
even though 0.75 · $60 < 0.25 · $200. Participants whose preference flip in this way are, according
to Allais, considered to violate the axioms of rationality, and hence be ‘paradoxical.’
The implied limits of these rationality axioms have been widely misunderstood. It is far from
clear that von Neumann and Morgenstern intended for their axioms to have a prescriptive quality
(i.e. that people ‘’ought’ to be rational); instead, their original theorem merely states that if a
decider were ‘subjectively rational’ (according to the classical sense of the word rational), then their
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behavior should conform to the axioms (Fishburn, 1989).
In their original treatment, Von Neumann and Morgenstern speculate that a subjective prob-
ability function could be introduced to the model, but they do not rigorously derive the set of
theorems that would result from such a model. The first such subjective function was specified by
Pfanzagl (1967), but was limited to two alternatives. The first complete generalization to arbitrar-
ily large sets of outcomes was provided by Luce & Krantz (1971) as ‘conditional expected utility,’
also termed ‘subjective expected utility’ (Luce, 1969).
The proposal that subjective probability may be represented as a conditional probability dis-
tribution carried with it the implication of the closure constraint. Simply put, transformed prob-
abilities must still sum to 1.0 or else they fail to be probabilities in the first place. Although this
is not given prominent treatment (presumably because it was taken to be a trivial consequence of
working with probability), closure is built into the axioms specified by Luce & Krantz. A simple
implementation of this is ‘subjective weighted expected utility’ (SWEU), which explicitly invokes
closure when transforming the probabilities:








Here, the parameter β retains its original role as an exponent, distorting the magnitude of the reward
outcomes. The new parameter, α, provides a corresponding exponential distortion to the subjective
probabilities. As in expected utility, the subjective expected utility is measured in some subjective
units u rather than in the objective units originally specified by the problem. Equation 1.4 can be
attributed to Karmarkar (1978).
In both Equations 1.3 and 1.4, interpreting the resulting ‘utility’ measures is made difficult by
the subjective units u. Returning the results to their original units simply required reversing the












Note that this construction includes sure-thing payouts, which take the form of ‘lotteries’ with a
single outcome whose probability is 1.0: since β and 1β cancel each other out, a no-risk objective
outcome of $10 has a subjective value of $10, without needing to make reference to a participant’s
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 11
(presumably private and implicit) units of utility u. Consequently, other risky-choice scenarios may
be evaluated in terms of the original ‘objective’ units, substantially facilitating interpretation.
To understand what it would mean for both value and probability to be subject to transforma-
tions, consider the visualized example in Figure 1.2. In each case, the same two lotteries A and B
are presented, and the total area in gray for a lottery is proportional to its experienced value. The
top pairing presents the expected values, as specified by Equation 1.2. In strictly objective terms,
these two lotteries should both be valued4 at $5.2.
In the second row, the expected utilities for each lottery are presented, assuming the power law
in Equation 1.3 and a coefficient of β = 0.5. This corresponds to a somewhat risk-averse individual:
Not only is lottery A ($4.59) preferred over lottery B ($4.16), but a flat payoff of $5.2 would be
favored over both lotteries5 . Another way to consider this hypothetical individual is that they are
relatively insensitive to the contrasts between the outcomes, such that larger dollar amounts seem
less different from smaller amounts than is objectively true.
In the third row, the subjective expected utilities (per Equation 1.4) are presented with an
additional subjective probability parameter of α = 2. Note that β = 0.5, as in the middle row.
Despite this, the preference reverses to favoring lottery B ($5.76) over lottery A ($3.78). Such an
individual would be insensitive to outcome magnitudes but hypersensitive to outcome probabilities.
This yields the somewhat surprising behavior that lottery B is favored6 over both lottery A and a
flat payout of $5.2.
Although Equation 1.4 follows naturally from a simple implementation of operations proposed
by Luce & Krantz, almost all subsequent modeling of choice and preference has marginalized or
ignored the closure constraint on probabilities. Among this dissertation’s objectives is to show
that formally acknowledging closure yields intuitive models whose parameters are straightforward
to interpret. At the same time, a failure to accommodate closure (particularly when attempting to
simulate its characteristics indirectly) can lead to considerable theoretical confusion.
4Or, more formally, if LA = LB = $5.2, then the ‘objectively rational’ preference should be that LA ∼ LB ∼ $5.2.
5Or, $5.2  LA  LB .
6Or, LB  $5.2  LA.
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Figure 1.2: Visualization of expected value (Equation 1.2, top), expected utility (Equation 1.3,
middle), and subjective expected utility (Equation 1.4, bottom) between two lotteries, A and B.
The two lotteries have identical expected values LA = LB = $5.2, but given a subjective magnitude
parameters of β = 0.5, the expected utility of lottery A exceeds that of lottery B. However, if a
subjective probability parameter α = 2 is also applied, the resulting subjective expected utility for
lottery B exceeds that of lottery A. Notice that in all cases, the probabilities px must sum to 1.0,
which is ensured by the closure operation C(px).
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1.4 Choice and Learning Theory
1.4.1 Generalized Matching
The behaviorist tradition has a long history of studying choice. Its most influential formal theory
is undoubtedly Herrnstein’s matching law (reviewed in Herrnstein, 1997), which takes two closely
related forms:
B1
B1 +B2 + · · ·+Bn
=
R1










Equation 1.6 is Herrnstein’s original matching law (Herrnstein, 1961). It is sometimes simply called
‘strict matching’ because it predicts a one-to-one relationship between ‘response strength’ Bi and
the corresponding frequency of reinforcement Ri. Equation 1.7 is sometimes called ‘Herrnstein’s
hyperbola’ and predicts response rate (i.e. responses Bi per unit time t) as a function of the asymp-
totic response strength k and competing reinforcement re (de Villiers & Herrnstein, 1976). These
two formulations are arithmetically equivalent when all ki are equal. The implicitly compositional
character of Equation 1.6 is obvious, as it is equivalent to the statement C (B) = C (R).
Although Herrnstein’s matching law remains influential in a wide range of fields, (e.g. Sugrue et
al., 2004; Sakai & Fukai, 2008), and although Equation 1.7 fits certain kinds of data exceptionally
well, the general premise of strict matching has been invalidated by extensive experimentation (re-
viewed in Davison & McCarthy, 1988). Most notably, consistent deviations from strict matching are
observed in schedules with two concurrently available alternatives whose outcomes are probabilistic.
Most of strict matching’s failures to explain empirical results (at least in molar terms) can be













Here, the ratio of responses B to two alternatives 1 and 2 (typically levers in rodent experiment or
wall-mounted keys in pigeon experiments) are predicted as a function of the ratio of reinforcers R
earned from each. This reinforcer ratio is raised to an exponent s (the ‘sensitivity’) and multiplied
7Remarkably, the original treatise on expected utility by Bernoulli (1738|1954) predicted that models similar to
strict matching were likely to fail, and its model of expected utility (Equation 1.3) is almost identical to Equation 1.8.
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by the ratio k1k2 (the ‘bias,’ often simply identified as k in the literature). Since B and R belong to
ratios in which units cancel out, this equation ignores the absolute frequencies of occurrence and
makes a prediction solely on their relative rates.
The variable ki plays a similar role in Equation 1.7 to that of the ratio
k1
k2
in Equation 1.8, in
that both represent unitless measures of ‘value.’ The bias ratio introduces a systematic skew to
the subjective value of obtained rewards. If, for example, a subject was presented with a schedule
in which RX = RY , then any deviation from equal response allocation is explained in terms of
the bias ratio skewing the subject’s preference. The broader implication is that the multiplicative
nature of bias should be consistent across reinforcer ratios.
It is sensitivity, however, that sets Equation 1.8 apart from preceding models. This exponential
parameter describes, in terms of curvature, how the contrast between the two outcomes influences
their relative frequency of selection. If s = 0.0, then the subject is indifferent to the relative
frequency of payoffs, and bias will be the only factor predicting how often an alternative is selected.
If, on the other hand, s = 1.0, then behavior will adjust on a 1:1 basis relative to the ratio of
rewards, and if s > 1.0, shifts in reward will result in exaggerated shifts in responding, skewing
responding toward exclusive selection of the ‘subjectively better’ alternative. As a shorthand,
s ≈ 1.0 is called ‘matching,’ s < 1.0 is called ‘undermatching,’ and s > 1.0 is called ‘overmatching.’
Importantly, there does not appear to be a ‘universal’ sensitivity parameter: Human participants
show considerable individual differences (Kollins et al., 1997), and different species show dramatic
difference in their range of likely values (Baum, 1979).
Note that, strictly speaking, neither bias nor sensitivity constitutes a subject’s preference.
Instead, preference is a function of both parameters. A major motivation for the form given

















Provided the bias ratio is treated as a single parameter, estimates can easily be obtained using a
linear regression8, where the bias corresponds to the intercept and the sensitivity corresponds to
the slope on log-log coordinates.
8Note that, in practice, regressions of log-transformed relative proportions display considerable heteroscedasticity.
As a result, OLS parameter estimates should be interpreted with caution, and robust methods, such as weighted least
squares (Jacquez et al., 1968) should be favored when applicable.
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1.4.2 Compositional Geometry and the Barycentric Matching Model
On the one hand, the hypothesis that probabilities are perceived as log-odds ratios has received
considerable support in recent years, with some going so far as to describe the relationship as
‘ubiquitous’ (H. Zhang & Maloney, 2012) because such ratios reliably describe a wide variety of
psychological phenomena. On the other hand, although strict matching is demonstrably false, it
retains one clear advantage over Equation 1.8, which is the ability to make a prediction for more
than two alternatives. In order for a matching model to be fully generalized, the log-odds approach
should make reasonable predictions given an arbitrary number of alternatives. Unfortunately,
modifying Equation 1.9 to accommodate additional alternatives is an ambiguous proposition with
multiple solutions.
The most obvious generalization is accomplished by adding a constant to both sides of the
equation (Goldstein & Einhorn, 1987). Unfortunately, because of the widespread use of k instead










This formulation is, in a limited sense, identical to Equation 1.8, but only if k is divorced from its
functional role as a ratio of relative bias. Indeed, when more than two alternatives are included in
the equation, the values of k and s will change as a function of which alternative i is the ‘reference
item’ (i.e. singled out by the numerator) for any value of s other than one. This inconsistency is the
result of a phenomenon called ‘symmetric approximation by leading term’ (or SALT) (Natapoff,
1970). Consequently, although best-fitting parameters for k and s can be obtained numerically
for any given pre-determined reference item, the resulting parameters are neither consistent nor
interpretable unless all bias values ki ≈ 1. This parametric inconsistency is sufficient grounds to
reject Equation 1.10 as being malformed. Despite this, Equation 1.10 is surprisingly widespread
(Lattimore et al., 1992; Tversky & Fox, 1995; Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Trepel et al., 2005; Abdellaoui
et al., 2005).
In order to preserve both the theoretical interpretability of the parameters and their internal
symmetry, consistent generalization benefits from representing a set of options using vector nota-
tion, such that B = [B1, · · · , Bn]. Given this notation, a more effective general form of the matching
law invokes the centered log-ratio (or CLR) transformation, which relates each alternative to the
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 16
geometric mean of all the alternatives:



















Since B◦ denotes a set of log-ratios, this notation can be used to describe a highly general form of
the matching law in the following succinct way:
B◦ = k◦ + s ·R◦ (1.11)
Here, each alternative Bi is considered as a relative value (as in Equation 1.8), but uses the geo-
metric mean as the ‘barycenter’ of the observations. These are then interpreted on a log scale (as
in Equation 1.9). Originally proposed by Aitchison (1986), the CLR transformation is one of the
backbones of ‘compositional’ data analysis, which considers the statistical properties of the relative
proportions (rather than absolute values) of related sets. The first empirical demonstration linking
the CLR transformation to the generalized matching law was provided in principle by S. M. Schnei-
der & Davison (2005), in a study of response sequences. It was subsequently framed explicitly as
the ‘barycentric matching model’ by Jensen & Neuringer (2009), with the following formulation:
k1 · (R1)s
B1




This formulation is arithmetically identical to Equation 1.11, but conveys the intuitive relationship
between responses B and outcomes R in a straightforward fashion. Unlike Equation 1.10, this
formulation retains the compositional symmetry of the model, giving no special preference to one
alternative over the others.
1.4.3 Dynamics of Choice
Although Equation 1.11 provides an effective description of stable asymptotic distributions of be-
havior (i.e. behavior at the ‘molar’ level of analysis), it provides no information about either the
learning process or about response-by-response dynamic processes (i.e. the ‘molecular’ level of anal-
ysis). In general, analysts whose theories emphasize molar features have a competitive relationship
with those interested in ‘molecular’ processes, and the integration of the two has been limited until
relatively recently (Hineline, 2001).
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In some cases, molar analyses may provide insight into the sequential regularities in behavior.
For example, S. M. Schneider & Davison (2005) studied two-alternative choice in terms of the
four possible two-item pairings. By embracing a full compositional approach, their two-operandum
data can be represented as a four-alternative scenario. This can be represented in hierarchical
terms, such that the ratio Pr(B1)Pr(B2) can be considered simultaneously with the conditional probability
ratios Pr(B1|B1)Pr(B2|B1) and
Pr(B1|B2)
Pr(B2|B2) , each corresponding to a different orthogonal factor in a compositional
transformation. Such an approach can also be used to examine the degree to which behavior acutely
changes in response to individual outcomes (Baum & Davison, 2004).
An important question, however, is whether the steady-state equilibrium of stable behavior
differs in kind from the process by which subjects adapt to substantial shifts in schedules. Recent
studies have eroded the foundation of ‘reinforcement learning’ models, both by demonstrating pre-
cise modifications of behavior in the absence of detectable differences of reinforcement (Kheifets &
Gallistel, 2012) and by bringing into question reinforcement as a theoretical construct (Baum, 2012).
Furthermore, the shortcomings of contiguity-based models of learning, relative to contingency-based
models, are becoming increasingly evident in neuroscience (Loewenstein & Seung, 2009; Gallistel &
King, 2010). In light of these developments, a promising alternative approach is to use information
theory to study how subjects discover contingent relationships between outcomes and behavior
(Jensen et al., 2013; Ward et al., 2013).
Given these developments, it is increasingly clear that characterizing how patterns of choice
adjust in light of feedback will depend on developing a more sophisticated understanding of how
choice scenarios are represented by organisms. When outcomes are uncertain and depend in part
on the distribution and timing of responses, organisms must effectively make inferences about
conditional probabilities.
One promising possibility is to model the subjective accumulation of evidence and subsequent
prediction in terms of Bayesian updating (Vilares & Kording, 2011). The Bayesian approach is par-
ticularly attractive given the compositional formulation of outcome frequency and value, because
these can be linked the Bayesian study of psychophysical functions (e.g. Sun et al., 2012). The
proposal that subjective probability and value might be best understood in terms of psychophysical
functions is not a new idea (Berlyne, 1970; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), but the Bayesian hypoth-
esis provides a much more sophisticated approach to the problem of how ‘experienced value’ might
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be updated as a function of experience. Provided the relative value of alternatives can be assessed
in compositional terms, decision trees based on information criteria can be used to implement
Bayesian updating both for gradual and sudden shifts in behavior (Gallistel et al., 2014).
This is not to say that organisms have objectively accurate machinery for computing posterior
odds. There is substantial controversy over whether brains literally engage in Bayesian computa-
tions, or whether those models instead provide a better approximation than traditional approaches
to cognition or association; dissociating between these two accounts is exceptionally difficult given
our current tools for understanding neural circuits (Knill & Pouget, 2004).
1.4.4 The Scheduling of Outcomes
Another prominent feature of the animal literature is a focus on the behaviors that arise under
different schedules. When an organism represents its expected outcome in a complex task, that
representation must take into consideration the interaction between the responder and the environ-
ment. How organisms come to represent these interactions is of central importance to the topic of
choice, because decisions are never made in the absence of some assumptions about the outcome.
Consider, for example, the ‘gambler’s fallacy.’ If one gamble has a fixed 10% probability of
yielding a reward, while another has a fixed probability of 20% of yielding an identical outcome, a
‘rational’ player should favor the 20% option exclusively, all else being equal. However, when many
people are exposed to games of chance, they have a strong sense that the future odds depend in
some way on past events, such that rare outcomes that have not appeared recently might feel as
though they are ‘due to appear any time now.’ This subjective experience is obviously fallacious
when applied to a die roll, which is necessarily ‘memoryless’ and thus independent of past rolls.
This same feeling is not inappropriate in many real-world contexts. For example, if someone
waiting for a bus has learned from experience that busses typically arrive every ten minutes, they
will begin to feel that the bus is ‘due’ as the ten-minute mark approaches. Whether this feeling is
inappropriate or not depends entirely on the distribution of intervals between busses. In practice,
this expectation may be called a fallacy only if the interval between busses is randomly drawn
from an exponential distribution; otherwise, the expected wait time changes as a function of time
elapsed. If the interval between busses is Gaussian, for example, then a bus genuinely will be
due after a lot of time has passed. Consequently, representing the distribution of intervals between
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events is essential to making choices, and there may be mechanisms that, by default, treat uncertain
circumstances as more closely resembling the bus scenario than a gambling scenario.
The distribution of expected intervals often depends not merely on the passage of time, but
also on behavior. Consider, for example, the contrast between ‘variable ratio’ (VR) schedules and
‘variable interval’ (VI) schedules. Both schedules operate by setting some precondition on which
a reward is contingent; in the VR case, an uncertain number of responses is required before the
next response is rewarded, whereas in the VI case, an uncertain interval must elapse before a
response is rewarded. In both cases, a response must be made to earn a reward. However, in the
VI case, a single response is sufficient, provided it occurs after the interval has elapsed. Effectively,
this means that the VI schedule has a memory (for time elapsed), whereas the VR schedule is
memoryless. Consequently, although superficially similar, these two schedules have fundamentally
different hazard functions: The gambler’s fallacy remains a fallacy in the VR case, but is not a
fallacy in the VI case. Indeed, unless a schedule is entirely memoryless, it ceases to be a fallacy
altogether and becomes an effective strategy (Fiorina, 1971). Rather than a ‘gambler’s fallacy,’ the
feeling of being due for a reward is sometimes an ‘actuary’s wisdom.’
This contrast gives rise to very different optimal strategies. In the VR case, the best approach
is to respond exclusively to the next alternative, whereas in the VI case, an effective approach is to
treat Equation 1.11 as prescriptive and ‘match’ proportions of responses to proportions of rewards.
Most organisms (including humans) do not assume by default that schedules are memoryless.
Instead, extensive training on VR schedules is required before near-exclusive behavior is observed
in humans (Vulkan, 2000) and other species (Jensen & Neuringer, 2008).
Schedules in which the probability of a reward are fixed for every response (e.g., typical VR
schedules) are routinely described as being qualitatively different from those schedules whose odds
of rewarding a response to a particular alternative grow over time (e.g., typical VI schedules). How-
ever, these two categories are merely the end points of a continuum. Just as intermediary schedules
between these extremes may be engineered, functionally appropriate intermediary behaviors are
exhibited by subjects under those conditions (for more detail, see the discussion of ‘reinforcer hold’
in Jensen & Neuringer, 2008). Baum & Aparicio (1999) also report an example in which two con-
current schedules display very different hazard functions. Given these results, it is reasonable that
a general framework for predicting behavior can be constructed that applies across all scheduling
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paradigms whose uncertainty can be formally specified.
1.5 Human Decision Making
It is immediately obvious to the most casual observer with the meanest intelligence
that people do not think at the margin. Nobody goes to a grocery store and thinks, “I’m
going to buy an orange. I’m going to buy another orange. I’m going to buy another
orange.” But if people don’t think at the margin, and if, as Mankiw says, rational
people do think at the margin, we are led to a most unhappy conclusion.
–Yoram Bauman, presenting at AAAS, February 16, 2007. Adapted from
Bauman (2003).
Although some of the early pioneers in human decision making, such as Luce and Herrnstein,
had their work informed by the study of animal models, the vast majority of recent work on the
topic has been pursued by economists and cognitive psychologists who are unfamiliar with the non-
human literature. For example, because non-human subjects cannot be given verbal instructions,
all schedules of reward must instead be learned through experience; human studies, on the other
hand, have chiefly consisted of giving participants explicit instructions about the odds of various
outcomes. Only recently have studies of human decision making struck upon the possibility that
knowledge of reward schedules learned through feedback may differ from those learned through
verbal instruction, yielding a ‘description-experience gap’ (Hertwig & Erev, 2009). Studies of this
gap in humans routinely make no reference to the animal literature, and as such do not benefit from
that literature’s rich history of comparing different reward schedules. In general, normative accounts
drawn from classical economics (particularly ‘rational choice theory,’ a prescriptive variation on
expected utility) provide a poor description of actual decision making (Herrnstein, 1990), and
the development of more accurate descriptive and predictive models has been an area of active
development only since the 1970s.
1.5.1 Prospect Theory: A Break From Rationality
One of the major triumphs of cognitive theory over classical economics is the demonstration that
participants violate even the ‘subjectively rational’ utility functions implied by Equation 1.4 when
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questions are framed in different ways. For example, framing otherwise mathematically identical
lotteries in terms of gains or losses can reliably engender reversals in preference. The first adequate
mathematical model of this behavior was achieved by Kahneman & Tversky (1979), who dubbed
it ‘prospect theory.’
The premise that gains and losses needed to be treated differently is not original to Kahneman
& Tversky. This was a dominant theme in the ‘theory of the firm’ put forward by Shackle (1949,
1970), whose schematic representation of a concave utility function anticipates that of prospect
theory (see also Shackle, 1958). However, it is instructive to consider why mainstream economics
did not take the gains/losses contrast seriously:
The exposition [of Shackle’s theory] is greatly complicated by his insistence on dif-
ferentiating between gains and losses. It is completely unclear to me what the meaning
of the zero-point would be in a general theory; after all, costs are usually defined on an
opportunity basis only.
–Arrow (1951, p. 432)
Despite this mainstream skepticism, Shackle’s justification for treating losses differently is entirely
reasonable. Putting decisions into their proper context (where the consequences of current decisions
impact the availability of future decisions), the long-term consequences of gains and losses are not
symmetrical. A firm incurring a crippling loss, for example, enjoys fewer subsequent opportunities
than one that enjoys a corresponding gain, and loss aversion can be seen under these conditions as
a reasonabe strategy for increasing marginal profit over the long term.
Refinements were made to prospect theory over the following decade, with models shifting to a
rank-dependent framework (discussed below). These efforts culminated in a general form described
by Luce & Fishburn (1991), which was subsequently rebranded as ‘cumulative prospect theory’
by Tversky & Kahneman (1992). Strictly speaking, however, neither consists of a specific model
of choice; instead, a placeholder function is specified for subjective magnitude, denoted by V(·),
and subjective probability, denoted by W(·). Thus, a lottery (termed a ‘prospect’ by Tversky &
Kahneman) is divided into its gains A+ and its losses A−, and the subsequent subjective expected
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utility is determined by their corresponding sum:












Here, pA+ and pA− correspond to the probabilities associated with positive and negative outcomes,
respectively, such that the probabilities associated with gains and losses may be transformed ac-
cording to different parameters.
Prospect theory’s standing in economics remains contentious in part because of disagreement
about how W(·) and V(·) should be defined. According to models building on the foundations
of classical economics, well-documented problems for expected utility theory can be explained by
concavity in one or both of these functions (Starmer, 2000). The contrasting ‘non-conventional’
view put forward by prospect theory is that an abrupt discontinuity exists demarcating gains from
losses, and that the position of this discontinuity can be influenced by framing effects.
One of the consequences of this segregation is that rather than representing the uncertainty of
outcomes as subjective probabilities (which are subject to closure), they are instead represented as
‘weights’ that are not subject to closure. Curiously, Tversky & Kahneman acknowledge the efficacy
of closure briefly:
The weighting scheme used in the original version of prospect theory and in other
models is a monotonic transformation of outcome probabilities. This scheme encounters
two problems. First, it does not always satisfy stochastic dominance, an assumption
that many theorists are reluctant to give up. Second, it is not readily extended to
prospects with a large number of outcomes. These problems can be handled by assuming
that transparently dominated prospects are eliminated in the editing phase, and by
normalizing the weights so that they add to unity. Alternatively, both problems can
be solved by the rank-dependent or cumulative functional, first proposed by Quiggin
(1982) for decision under risk and by Schmeidler (1989) for decision under uncertainty.
Instead of transforming each probability separately, this model transforms the entire
cumulative distribution function. The present theory applies the cumulative functional
separately to gains and to losses.
–Tversky & Kahneman (1992, p. 299)
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Here, “normalizing the weights so they add to unity” plainly denotes applying the closure con-
straint, as presumably can be attributed to Karmarkar (1978). Despite this admission, no further
exploration of a compositional approach is considered, because rank-dependent theories are effec-
tively ordinal. In a treatment of the problem by Luce (1988), whose rank-dependent function under
uncertainty predates that of Schmeidler (see also Luce & Narens, 1985), the need to transition to
a rank-dependent approach is motivated by the need to assemble complex and multi-stage lotteries
from their component parts in a fashion that does not result in trivial intransitivity. These concerns
can be successfully accommodated in the compositional framework because, as will be shown in
Part I, the compositional sample space has a recursive structure that permits de- and recomposition
without loss of information.
1.5.2 Prospect Theory, or Prospect Theme?
The formal flexibility of cumulative prospect theory is at once the key to its enduring popularity and
its greatest theoretical shortcoming. Although Tversky & Kahneman (1992) argue strongly that
framing has the power to dramatically impact choice, they propose no rigorous model for framing,
which is presumed to unfold during their unspecified ‘editing’ phase. Furthermore, although they
specify forms for W(·) and V(·), they do so in an ad-hoc manner based on the convenient features
of those functions, and they make no commitment to any given form:
The estimation of a complex choice model, such as cumulative prospect theory,
is problematic. If the functions associated with the theory are not constrained, the
number of estimated parameters for each subject is too large. To reduce this number,
it is common to assume a parametric form (e.g., a power utility function), but this
approach confounds the general test of the theory with that of the specific parametric
form. For this reason, we focused here on the qualitative properties of the data rather
than on parameter estimates and measures of fit.
–Tversky & Kahneman (1992, p. 311)
Consequently, cumulative prospect theory is only a theory in a loose sense. Although it provides
an explanation for many violations of rationality axioms, it is not sufficiently precise to make
novel predictions that could differentiate it from other, similar proposals. Instead, cumulative
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prospect theory has been credited for redescriptions of the original empirical results using a variety
of placeholder functions. This ‘anything-goes’ approach has resulted in an explosion of functional
forms. In a review of published variations, Stott (2006) studied eight functions for W(·) and eight
for V(·), as well as four ‘decision functions’ D(·) (considered in the following section), which could
be combined to form 256 distinct variations9 of the model. Most of these forms (either in their
original published form or in the resulting recombination) have little or no justification beyond
either fitting the data or satisfying rationality axioms that are assumed a priori. Unsurprisingly,
this functional menagerie collectively yielded substantially divergent predictions.
Additionally, most attempts to identify the ‘functional form’ for cumulative prospect theory
make the assumption that all individuals should be described by the same parameters. Conse-
quently, parameters for this zoo of functional forms are routinely fit to data pooled across groups
of participants, without much interest in determining what the population range for the parame-
ters might be. This assumption of parametric uniformity within participant pools is particularly
strange given the applied focus of human decision making research: Presumably, if different groups
of people make decisions differently, those differences would be of interest to scientists trying to
shape and predict those decisions.
Despite these ambiguities, cumulative prospect theory does place a number of specific and
testable constraints on the forms that the data can take. As previously noted, one of these is the
preservation of stochastic dominance (for which ample evidence to the contrary is available). More
interesting is the selection of whether W(·), V(·), or both should be parametrically discontinuous
with respect to gains and losses. In principle, because W(·) and V(·) necessarily take on different
functional forms (if only because probabilities and outcome magnitudes reside in sample spaces
with different properties), the choice of which approach to take should yield divergent predictions.
However, because the choice to make W(·) discontinuous is largely a consequence of preserving
stochastic dominance, identifying the optimal functional form on the basis of evidence remains an
open question.
9Additionally, four other forms for V(·) and three other forms for W(·) are cited but not considered, increasing
the range of potential models to 528.
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1.5.3 Stochastic Dominance: When Axioms Attack
In a previously quoted passage, Tversky & Kahneman raise the issue of stochastic dominance,
and this is a topic of sufficient importance to econometric models of decision-making that it mer-
its special consideration. A core axiom of ‘rational choice’ theories of decision making is that
the subjective utility (Equation 1.4) must rise monotonically as a function of the expected value
(Equation 1.2) (Levy, 1992). That is, if LA > LB then any rational model must also conclude
that LA > LB. Whereas a specific case in which A  B may be interpreted as ‘A dominates
B,’ the more general case in which A  B regardless of the free parameters in the model may be
read as ‘A stochastically dominates B.’ To the degree that a model violates this assumption, it is
fundamentally incompatible with a generalization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, and
thus is not ‘rational’ even in a weak sense. Because of this, a sizable body of economic theorizing
remains ideologically wedded to the axiom (e.g. Blavatskyy, 2011). In fact, the assumption is so
strongly held that it provides the basis for formal statistical testing in applied contexts (e.g. in the
definition and measurement of poverty by Anderson, 1996).
Despite this, there is considerable experimental evidence that participants routinely violate
stochastic dominance, often to a considerable degree (Birnbaum & Navarrette, 1998; Birnbaum et
al., 1999; Charness et al., 2007). The most obvious manifestation of this violation is that risky
choices engender not only different behaviors than riskless ones, but also different preference order-
ings, collectively called ‘gambling effects’ (Deicidue et al., 2004). Another is the ‘endowment effect’
whereby ownership of an object distorts the subjective utility function, thereby reversing which
of two items is valued more greatly than the other (Knetsch, 1989). These patterns of violation
are sufficiently consistent that they cannot be attributed to ‘errors arising from stochastic deci-
sion rules’ (Birnbaum, 2008). Given that stochastic dominance does not appear to be a consistent
feature of human decision making, it is unclear why it should be a constraint on psychological
models of risky choice, beyond some assumption of ‘rationality’ made prior to an examination of
the evidence.
In order to reconcile the reactionary opposition to models that violate stochastic dominance
with the evidence that such violations occur routinely, it is important to draw a distinction between
the kinds of phenomenological violations that participants routinely make, and those theoretical
violations that only arise mechanically from deeper assumptions in the model. In practice, these

















































































Figure 1.3: Two lotteries, each of which have an identical expected value, are depicted on the
left. When a single 0.25 probability of $8 (top) is compared to five 0.05 probabilities averaging
$8 (bottom), applying Equation 1.4 with the parameters {α = 0.2, β = 0.5} results in wildly differ-
ent expected values. Given a sufficiently low value for α, subdividing a low-probability event will
consistently swamp the much more likely outcome of receiving $0.
theoretical violations of stochastic dominance can be severe, and a viable model should mitigate
their effects in such a way that does not preclude the milder violations for which there is empirical
evidence.
Crucially, participants must somehow represent the lotteries, and these representations are un-
likely to be entirely discrete. For example, consider the three lotteries in Figure 1.3. In the first
two, each of the outcomes is defined in entirely discrete terms. Consequently, when the probabil-
ities are distorted according to Equation 1.4 (given an extreme α of 0.2), the six-outcome lottery
(bottom) becomes dominated by the non-zero payoffs, leading to a much larger expectation than
in the single-outcome case. These two cases assume, however, that the participant is representing
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each of the outcomes with no ambiguity, as well as treating them as qualitatively distinct (rather
than displaying a degree of exchangeability).
Because individuals are not routinely cheated out of vast sums of money by grifters who present
them with subdivided lotteries, it is reasonable to conclude that the behavior predicted by Figure 1.3
is a poor model. However, the unreasonableness of this prediction arises from its assumptions of
exact precision and nominal segregation of outcomes, not from its violation of stochastic dominance.
Participants who do not use mental arithmetic for a living (as well as non-human subjects) routinely
violate stochastic dominance without engaging in pathological financial behavior. A much more
reasonable approach to the problem, then, is to try to model the fuzziness of mental representation,
rather than insisting that the absence of pathological behavior on behalf of participants somehow
proves the face-validity of the von Neumann-Morgenstern axiom.
In the end, the need for a more psychologically valid approach to decision making is best
demonstrated by the behavior of economists themselves. In an encounter described by Weber &
Camerer (1987), economists Jimmie Savage and Maurice Allais (of the ‘Allais paradox’ described
above) argued over lunch about whether a theory of economics could be a valid reflection of the
real world if it required assuming that economic agents were strictly rational. Savage pressed Allais
with a number of hypothetical lotteries, and showed in short order that, rather than being rational,
Allais was himself a ‘paradoxical’ individual who violated the prescriptions laid down by the axioms.
If ostensibly irrational preference reversals can be expected of even the mathematical sophisticates
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Chapter 2
Introduction to Compositions
Compositions lie at the heart of every aspect of this dissertation. Consequently, an extensive
overview of their basic properties and formal applications is provided in the following four chapters.
Some material is presented redundantly with the brief summary provided in the introduction in
order to ensure that readers are given a complete treatment of the main topics.
In Chapter 3, the simplex is described as the fundamental sample space for compositional data.
Näıve treatment of compositional data is routinely suboptimal because of a failure to understand
this “simplicial” geometry, which is both bounded and non-Euclidean in nature. Chapter 3 also
describes operators in the simplex that mirror arithmetic operations used in Euclidean vector space.
In Chapter 4, the geometry of the simplex is linked with Euclidean vector space using trans-
formations that overcome troublesome properties of simplicial space. These transformations are
lossless and reversible, allowing data to migrate from one sample space to another at will.
Chapter 5 applies the techniques described in the preceding two chapters to specify statistical
models with practical applications, while Chapter 6 addresses how to deal with problematic data.
These chapters introduce an extensive array of specialized symbols and operators. Additionally,
they define a wide range of variables whose interpretations are used consistently in subsequent
sections. A glossary of all notation used in the dissertation is provided in Appendix A.
Although these chapters are concerned with compositions as abstract objects, their abstract
properties both inform and constrain theoretical models. Consequently, attention is periodically
drawn to topics with empirical relevance. These asides are not intended to be exhaustive, and their
implications are examined in greater detail in Part III.
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Chapter 3
Basic Operations and Geometry of
Compositional Space
Compositional analysis, first systematically described by Aitchison (1986), considers datasets in
which observations are represented as ratios of other observations, without regard for their ab-
solute values. In other words, a compositional analysis is an analysis of relative proportions, as
opposed to an analysis of absolute values. Correspondingly, any data in which observations must
sum to some fixed total (1.0 for proportions, 100.0 for percentages, and so forth) can be consid-
ered compositional. Data properly represented on a ratio scale may also be interpreted as having
compositional properties, under certain circumstances.
Compositional data can be found in every scientific discipline. Examples include:
• Astrophysics: Proportions of regular and dark matter in galaxies.
• Biology: Allele frequency in gene pools.
• Economics: Distributions of discretionary consumer purchasing.
• Geology: Compositions of geological strata.
• Neuroscience: Receptor over- and under-expression as a function of psychopathology.
• Political Science: Electoral voting patterns.
• Psychology: Relative psychophysical intensity of stimuli.
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• Sociology: Population shifts in age, gender, and other demographic variables.
Alongside this wide range of measures, distributions of choice (long analyzed in relative terms) are
also prime candidates for compositional analysis.
Despite this ubiquity, compositional data are challenging to analyze using traditional statistics.
Compositional data reside in an unusual sample space governed by non-standard mathematical
operators. When analyzed with respect to the wrong sample space, the data appear to violate the
assumption of statistical independence, because the value of every variable is scaled relative to the
value of all the others. Below, the basic properties of this sample space are outlined.
3.1 Compositions and Closure
Suppose a vector x consists of D elements, all of which have positive values. If an analysis is
concerned with only the relative values of these elements, as opposed to the absolute values, the
values of each element in the vector can be rescaled relative to a constant ð, using an operation










Each component xi of x is divided by the sum of the vector, then multiplied by ð. Values for
ð are arbitrary, and common values include 1.0 (for proportions) and 100.0 (for percentages); all
subsequent discussion will assume that ð = 1.
Any vector that has been scaled in this way is a composition, which by definition has a fixed
sum, and as such conveys only the relative information about the components that make it up:




xi = ð > 0 (3.1)
In addition to being the operation used to convert a vector to a composition, closure should be
understood as a constraint on the sample space of the composition. As such, the values of the
components can approach either zero or ð, but may never move beyond them.
Because compositions must always be rescaled to the closure constant ð, simple vector concate-
nation causes the absolute values of all components to be rescaled. For example:
z = C (ðx · C (x) ,ðy · C (y)) (3.2)
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Here, a composition z is assembled from the vectors x (of length i) and y (of length j). Closure is
applied to both vectors, which are scaled by factors of ðx and ðy. Because a composition encodes
only relative information, this concatenation results in no loss of compositional information. For
example, z1 and x1 both correspond to the first component of x, and zi+1 and y1 both correspond
to the first item in y, despite the fact that, in absolute terms, z1 6= x1 and zi+1 6= y1. Since only







Subdivision of a composition (that is, decomposition) may also be performed within the con-
straints of closure. Since x = C (z1, . . . , zi), the original compositions that went into the concate-
nation in Equation 3.2 can easily be restored. Thus, x is considered a subcomposition of z, defined
as a subset of the components of z that contain the compositional information about x.
The closure constraint renders the standard operation of arithmetic addition inconsistent. For
example, if x, y, and z are compositions (and thus subject to closure), then C (z + C (x + y)) 6=
C (x + C (y + z)) unless x = z. Even more dramatically, scalar multiplication ceases to have any
meaning, as C (α · x) = x for all positive values of α, and is undefined if α ≤ 0. This undermines
the interpretability of basic descriptive statistics like the arithmetic mean, and thus all inferences
built upon the properties of those statistics.
Untransformed compositional data also give rise to illusory statistical relationships. Consider a
dataset in which three variables are produced by a random number generator, but are recorded as
relative proportions rather than as absolute values. A correlation matrix calculated from untrans-
formed proportions will show negative correlation among the items (because gains in one proportion
must be balanced by losses in the others), despite there being no true correlation in their origin.
All of the problems described above arise from mistakenly treating a composition as a Euclidean
vector. Compositions do reside in a vector space, but one with a different geometry. Building
up from the fundamentals of that geometry permits a direct connection to be drawn between
compositional operations and their Euclidean counterparts.









Figure 3.1: A ternary plot depicting the coordinates of the simplicial geometry S3 as a two-
dimensional triangle. Here, the composition x is located at C (1, 1, 1), which is the barycenter
of the simplex. The composition y is located at (0.5, 0.3, 0.2), assuming the closure constant ð = 1.






In order to develop intuitions about compositional data, it is essential to understand that the
geometry of the compositional sample space is simplicial; that is, it resides within a simplex. A
simplex is a d-dimensional polytope in which D vertices are all equidistance from one another,
where d = D − 1. Hereafter, the internal geometry of a simplex defined by D vertices will be
denoted by SD. Any simplex SD will have D facets, each of which will be a simplex with geometry
Sd. A 1-simplex with geometry S2 is called an edge.
The triangle depicted in Figure 3.1 is a ternary plot where each vertex represents one of three
alternatives, v1, v2, and v3. If a composition x = C (x1, x2, x3), then every possible vector x must
correspond uniquely to a coordinate within this ternary plot, that is, x ∈ S3. In Figure 3.1,
x1 = x2 = x3 =
1
3 , positioning x at the barycenter of the triangle, whereas y lies at an offset
position at (0.5, 0.3, 0.2).
Each edge in Figure 3.1 is itself a simplex with geometry S2, containing only the information
relating the two connected vertices. Consider the line passing through the vertex v2 and y. The








Figure 3.2: The geometry S4 plotted as a tetrahedron. The facet (v1, v2, v3), denoted with solid
edge lines, is identical to the simplex in Figure 3.1, including the positions of the compositions x
and y. The composition z is located at (0.2, 0.12, 0.08, 0.6), and intersects the line connecting y
and v4.
point where this line intersects the edge (v1, v3) divides that edge into two segments, whose relative
lengths are specified by C (y1, y3). So long as y lies on any point along this line, then y1y3 =
0.5
0.2 ,
regardless of the value of y2.
This logic extends arbitrarily to higher dimensions. Figure 3.2 depicts a S4 simplex (i.e. a
tetrahedron) that introduces a fourth alternative, the vertex v4. Implied by this S4 geometry are
four facets, each of which is a simplex with geometry S3. In this case, the facet (v1, v2, v3) in
Figure 3.2 is identical to the simplex in Figure 3.1 (including the positions of x and y). Further,
if z = C (0.4 · y, 0.6), then the position of z must lie along the line projected from the vertex v4 to
the opposing facet (v1, v2, v3), and the point z will subdivide this line into segments whose lengths
conform to the ratio 0.40.6 . Because of this, C (zi, z4) = (0.4, 0.6) for all (i 6= 4).
3.2.1 Perturbation and Powering
Because of the closure constraint, the arithmetic operations of addition and multiplication are
not well-behaved in simplicial geometry. Instead, an operation called perturbation is analogous to
addition, while powering is analogous to item-wise multiplication. These operations, introduced
CHAPTER 3. BASIC OPERATIONS AND GEOMETRY OF COMPOSITIONAL SPACE 35
by Aitchison (1986) and described at length by Egozcue et al. (2011), are the basic operators of
simplicial geometry.
Perturbation, denoted by the ⊕ operator, consists of item-wise multiplication between two
compositions, followed by closure:
x⊕ y = C (x1 · y1, x2 · y2, . . . , xD · yD) (3.3)
Powering, denoted by the  operator, raises all components of a composition by an exponent,
followed by closure:
α x = C (xα1 , xα2 , . . . , xαD) (3.4)
In the interest of notational efficiency, anti-perturbation is denoted with the 	 operation, which
reverses perturbation:
x	 y = x⊕ ((−1) y) (3.5)
Perturbation and powering allow the simplex to be navigated as a vector space because these
operations have the appropriate properties to do so:
1. (associative) x⊕ (y ⊕ z) = (x⊕ y)⊕ z
2. (commutative) x⊕ y = y ⊕ x
3. (distributive) (α x)⊕ (α y) = α (x⊕ y)
The full properties of the operators are described by Egozcue et al. (2011).
3.2.2 Basic Metrics
In addition to basic geometric operations, an analysis of the simplex requires some basic metrics.
These metrics, also introduced by Aitchison (1986), describe analogs to the inner product and
to distance. In his honor, these are called the Aitchison inner product and Aitchison distance,
respectively, and are indicated with a subscript a.
The Aitchison inner product, denoted by 〈·, ·〉a is specified in terms of the Euclidean properties









= 〈clr (x), clr (y)〉 = 〈x◦,y◦〉
(3.6)
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The Aitchison inner product is equal to the Euclidean inner product 〈·, ·〉 of CLR-transformed
compositions. This leads naturally to defining the Aitchison norm as follows:
‖x‖a = 〈x,x〉a (3.7)
The subscript a distinguishes this from the Euclidean norm ‖·‖.
Aitchison distance, denoted by da (·, ·), arises naturally from the anti-perturbation operator
specified in Equation 3.5.
da (x,y) = ‖x	 y‖a
= d (clr (x), clr (y)) = d (x◦,y◦)
(3.8)
Note that the Aitchison distance between compositions is equal to the Euclidean distance d (·, ·)
between the CLR transformations of those compositions.
The Aitchison inner product (Equation 3.6) and the perturbation operation (Equation 3.3)
are sufficient to interpret the geometry of the simplex as being an internally consistent Hilbert
space whose properties are isomorphic to those of a Euclidean space consisting of real (i.e. non-
compositional) coordinates (Aitchison, 1986).
3.2.3 Simplicial Lines and Orthogonality
A simplicial line (also called a compositional line) is defined by the following equation:
y = κ⊕ (α x) (3.9)
Here, the composition κ acts as the intercept, while the parameter α plays the role of the slope.
Four compositional lines are depicted in Figure 3.3.
Compositional lines are, strictly speaking, geodesics confined to the geometry of the simplex.
For practical purposes, they behave exactly like straight lines, albeit in terms of simplicial geometry.
These lines may be parallel or orthogonal with respect to the Aitchison distance (Equation 3.8) and
the Aitchison inner product (Equation 3.6), just as lines plotted in real geometries are considered
parallel or orthogonal with respect to Euclidean distance and inner products.
On occasion, there is need to perform a perturbation-linear combination, which is denoted by
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v3
v2 v1
Figure 3.3: A ternary plot of the geometry S3, with the barycenter indicated by a gray point. Four
compositional lines are depicted. The two solid lines in this figure are compositionally orthogonal
from one another, as are the two dashed lines, as determined using the Aitchison inner product
(Equation 3.6). Additionally, the two lines originating at v3 are considered compositionally parallel,








= (α1  x1)⊕ (α2  x2)⊕
· · · ⊕ (αD  xD)
(3.10)
This operator is a compositional equivalent of linear combination as it traditionally is performed
in a real geometry (Egozcue & Pawlowsky-Glahn, 2006).




Compositional and Real Geometries
Although the sample space within which compositions reside is a fully consistent vector space
with its own fundamental operations and measures, it is beyond the means or interest of most
analysts to rebuild the tool of statistics using the these operations. As a vector space, it necessarily
follows that compositions within the simplex can be ‘made Euclidean’ by transformation. Three
such transformations are described below. Once an analyst becomes comfortable moving from one
transformation to another, standard statistical tools may be used to interrogate the data with all
the depth and sophistication normally associated with scalar data.
It may not be clear to the reader why understanding three different transformations are neces-
sary. After all, if a set of compositions may be transformed with no loss of information from one
vector space to another, what difference does it make which coordinates are used? The answer
is that although the coordinates translate from one condition to the next without a loss of infor-
mation, each transformation carries with it different assumptions about the uncertainty of these
measurements. Thus, although a purely descriptive comparison of the data in each sample space
is isomorphic, the appropriate calculation of test statistics and confidence intervals may not be
possible in all cases. In each case, the limitations of each transformation is described in explicit
terms. Of the three, the ILR transformation (p. 43) permits the most sophisticated statistics,
limited only insofar as it is more abstruse than the others, and thus somewhat more difficult to
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discuss.
4.1 Compositions and Log Odds
Log-transformation is central in all of the operations described below. Because perturbation is a
form of multiplication, and powering a form of exponentiation, log transformation converts these
operations to ordinary addition and multiplication, making the linear analysis of the transformed
data straightforward.
All of the transformations below can be seen as variations of log odds transformations. However,
while traditional log-odds analyses compare only two values (typically p1−p given some probability
p), compositional transformations are general to any number of alternatives. Consequently, in an
important way, all transformations below provide ways to generalize the idea of a log-odds analysis
to more than two alternatives. That there are several different transformations should be taken as
a clear sign that, when more than two alternatives are considered, an analyst must display some
discernment in selecting a transformation that serves the specific statistical questions they wish to
investigate.
4.2 The Additive Log-Ratio Transformation
One way to convert compositional data into more familiar terms is to use the additive log-ratio (or
ALR) transformation, identified by Aitchison (1986) and denoted by alr (·):












Here, a vector x, consisting of D elements, is transformed into a vector consisting of length1
d = (D − 1), summarized using the shorthand x@. The ALR transformation reveals that, when
considering ratios of values, one fewer degree of freedom is needed to describe the data. Put another
way, the ALR transformation permits information about the D items contained in x to be encoded
(with no loss of information) in the real geometry Rd.
1We will assume d = (D − 1) in all subsequent calculations, borrowing this notation from Aitchison (1986).
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Although the reduction in dimensionality brought about by the ALR transform is compelling,
its use is fraught with difficulties because the resulting geometry is asymmetrical. The best-fitting
parameters depend on the “reference category” xD, which is given a privileged status in the de-
nominator of Equation 4.1. The selection of this denominator is arbitrary in principle (Kwak &
Clayton-Matthews, 2002), and in practice it influences obtained parameter estimates. The magni-
tude of these distortions becomes increasingly problematic as the dimensionality of the data grows
(N. Changizi & Hamarneh, 2010). Despite decades of work considering the implications of this
transformation, no standard rule for selecting a reference category has been agreed upon (Egozcue
et al., 2012). Even under perfect circumstances, comparing parameters obtained across different
studies is complicated by the ad-hoc selection of reference categories.
4.2.1 The Generalized Matching Law
Recasting the generalized matching law (Equation 1.8) in compositional terms using the ALR
transformation (Equation 4.1) gives the following:
alr (y) = alr (κ) + α · alr (x)
y@ = κ@ + α · x@
(4.2)
Although this notation has not been previously used in descriptions of generalized matching, it is
nevertheless arithmetically identical to how matching analyses have almost always been performed





in the two-alternative case). In addition to fully capturing the
computation described in Equation 1.8, there is no requirement that Equation 4.2 be limited to
compositions with two components: Given D different component behaviors, the vectors x@, y@,
and κ@ will each consist of d log-ratios.
As noted above, although this form of matching is intuitively straightforward, it is statistically
problematic for all cases besides the two-alternative case. It is presented here mainly to show
the connection between the traditional two-alternative approach and the broader compositional
paradigm.
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4.3 The Centered Log-Ratio Transformation
Aitchison (1986) also identified the centered log-ratio (CLR) transformation, denoted by clr (·):












Here, g (x) denotes the geometric mean of x. Unlike alr (·), the vector resulting from clr (·) is
symmetrical. However, both x and x◦ have D elements.
The CLR transformation may be reversed using the closure operation:
x = C (exp (x◦)) (4.4)
Because the data in the composition x have d degrees of freedom, but the CLR transformation
embeds the data in a geometry with D dimensions, the covariance matrix associated with x◦ is
singular, a substantial statistical shortcoming. This constraint is hereafter referred to as equilibrium
and corresponds to the following relationship:
For any composition x,
∑
x◦ = 0
Consequently, although x◦ is a vector whose coordinates may be any real number, their sum is
constrained.
Like closure, equilibrium limits the permitted range of values that may appear within the vector.
Conceptually, equilibrium forces CLR-transformed data to lie along a diagonal cross-section of the
real geometry RD, such that the true sample space belongs to a subspace with the geometry Rd. For
example x◦ = (1,−1) is a legal vector in CLR-transformed space, and corresponds approximately
to x = (0.88, 0.12). However, the vector x◦ = (1, 1) is not a legal vector in CLR transformed space,
because it does not fall on the plane specified by equilibrium. This plane is responsible for the
singular covariance matrix identified by Aitchison.
Although equilibrium and closure are both constraints on the legal values that data may take,
they arise independently from one another. Equilibrium is a consequence of using the geometric
mean g (·) to normalize the data in the CLR transformation, and it is expected to arise whether or
not the transformed data were originally subject to closure.
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4.4 The Isometric Log-Ratio Transformation
This point comes up quite often vector analysis. The fundamental proofs of things
require the elegant equations in general and make nice elegant proofs, but in making
various calculations and analyses, it’s always a good idea, and there’s no harm in it,
in taking axes in some convenient way... The point of writing the vector equations is
to demonstrate in the beginning that the equations are independent of the coordinate
system. And that means you’re allowed to choose any coordinate system you want! The
answer will be the same. So why bother with some complicated one where everything is
at some complicated angle when you can choose a neat one for the particular problem.
Provided that the equations are vector equations, that means they’re independent of
the coordinate system, and that means that you can choose any coordinate system you
want. So by all means take advantage of it.
–Richard Feynman, the Feynman Lectures on Physics, the California In-
stitute of Technology, October 15, 1962.
Most published analyses of compositional data implicitly use either the ALR transformation or
the CLR transformation without fully considering the impact doing so has on the sample space.
Given the choice between these two admittedly imperfect transformations, Aitchison (1986) favored
the ALR transformation because an asymmetrical sample space was less problematic for inferen-
tial statistics than a singular covariance matrix. More recently, however, Egozcue et al. (2003)
developed a compromise between these two transformations called the isometric log-ratio transfor-
mation, denoted by ilr (·). This transformation combines the reduced dimensionality of the ALR
transformation with the symmetry of the CLR transformation. This approach not only puts many
existing analyses on a more firm statistical footing, but it also creates a foundation for developing
new models that allow easy resolution of many previously thorny problems.
The ILR transformation is achieved by applying a matrix rotation to data already transformed
using the CLR transformation (Equations 4.3). Since the CLR transformation results in a symmet-
rical geometry Rd embedded at an angle in a higher space RD, rotating the data by any orthonormal
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basis U achieves the ILR transformation, which is denoted by x∗:
x∗ = [U (x◦)ᵀ]ᵀ
x◦ = (x∗) U
(4.5)
Here, ᵀ signifies matrix transposition. That is, the orthonormal basis U may be matrix multiplied
with ilr (x) to produce clr (x), and the process may also be easily reversed. These operations allow
lossless translation between the CLR and ILR transformations, so long as the orthonomal basis U
is consistent.
Despite being a simple modification, this matrix rotation entirely resolves the tension between
the ALR and CLR transformations. When compositional data are ILR-transformed, the explana-
tory factors being analyzed are symmetrical, and genuinely orthogonal effects may be identified as
such through an analysis of covariance. The challenge is to approach selecting the orthonormal
basis carefully. Doing so correctly has the potential to yield very powerful inferences.
4.4.1 The Orthonormal Basis
In standard parlance, an orthonormal basis U is a square matrix of size D in which each row ui is
a vector whose norm equals 1 (that is, ||ui|| = 1 for all i), and in which the inner product of every
pair of rows is zero (that is, 〈ui,uj〉 = 0, i 6= j). As it relates to the ILR transformation, however,
the term is used slightly differently, because we know in advance that any data x◦ necessarily has
one fewer dimensions than the space in which it is embedded, and thus has a singular covariance
matrix. Consequently, U is hereafter defined as being a matrix of size (d ×D), whose purpose is
















u1,1 · · · u1,d u1,D


||u1|| = · · · = ||ud|| = 1
〈ui,uj〉 = 0, i 6= j
(4.6)
Any orthonormal basis that conforms to this description is a viable candidate for the ILR trans-
formation (Egozcue & Pawlowsky-Glahn, 2006). However, as we will see, different orthonormal
bases can be used to ask different questions about the data. No single orthonormal basis is the
‘canonically correct’ basis, as the data are symmetrical and will tolerate any rotation that does not
introduce distortion.






















Figure 4.1: The geometry S3 on the left is ilr-transformed to the geometry R2 on the right. The
points w∗, x∗, y∗, and z∗ lie at (-1,-1), (1,-1), (1,1), and (-1,1) respectively in R2. The barycenter
of S3 is marked with a gray point, and corresponds to the origin in R2. The dashed lines have also
been transformed.

























Here, the first row, u1, compares only alternatives 1 and 2, ignoring alternative 3. Then, u2
compares alternative 3 to a composite of alternatives 1 and 2. Each comparison is orthogonal from
the other, permitting them to be interpreted as lying on independent axes in two-dimensional space.
Figure 4.1 depicts the relationship between four compositions and the four ILR-transformed points
that uniquely correspond to them using the basis U defined in Equation 4.7.
In many empirical applications, being able to specify particular contrasts (e.g., alternative 1 vs.
alternative 2) is necessary to isolate interesting effects, so being able to specify a set of contrasts
and construct the appropriate basis U is important.
4.4.2 Orthonormal Basis Specification Using The Gram-Schmidt Process
In their original specification of the ILR transformation, Egozcue et al. (2003) present a ‘default’
orthonormal basis, obtained through the Gram-Schmidt process for orthonormalizing vectors (Hef-
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Here, each row ui conforms to the requirements laid out above in Equation 4.6, such that each
corresponds to a vector that is orthogonal from the rest, and has a unit length of 1.0. This is
accomplished by setting the first row as a symmetrical contrast between u1 and u2. Next, the
second row merges u1 and u2, setting both in contrast to u3. The third row pits the first three
elements against u4, and so on.
The resulting orthonormal basis is entirely arbitrary, merely representing a convenient operation
for rotating CLR-transformed data in such a way as to eliminate the extraneous dimension of the
data. For models wherein the data are expected to display sphericity with respect to the various
response alternatives, any U is as good as any other. However, if sphericity is not an assumption
one wishes to make (for example, because some choice alternatives are more easily confused than
others), then careful selection of a particular orthonormal basis permits specific comparisons to be
made, as described below.
4.4.3 Orthonormal Basis Specification Using A Bifurcation Matrix
If an analyst has a particular set of contrasts that they wish to examine, they may build the
corresponding basis manually. First, a bifurcation matrix B (Egozcue & Pawlowsky-Glahn, 2005)
must be specified. In a bifurcation matrix, each element may have a 1, 0, or -1. Elements omitted
from a particular contrast are assigned values of zero, and the rest are grouped into either those
coded as positive or negative. For example, the basis in Equation 4.7 can be obtained by beginning












Here, the first bifurcation splits vertex v1 from vertex v2 to form b1, whereas the second dimension
b2 sets the vertex v3 apart from the other two.































Figure 4.2: Example of a bifurcation matrix B subdividing eight alternatives into seven bifurcation
vectors bi. Here, bi+ indicates the positive elements of bi, while bi− indicates the negative elements;
all other elements have a value of zero. In addition to providing an alternate way of visually depicting
the bifurcation matrix, this also provides the reader with an algorithm for generating such a matrix.
A more complex example in which eight alternatives are being compared is described by the














1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 1 1
1 1 0 −1 0 0 −1 −1
1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 −1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 1 0 −1 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0


Here, the vector b1 begins by subdividing the space into two groups: (12478) and (356). The
group (12478) is the further subdivided by rows b2 through b5, while the group (356) is further
subdivided by rows b6 and b7. Figure 4.2 shows this matrix as a binary tree, subdividing the set
of alternatives until only single-alternative ‘leaves’ populate the ends of all the branches. As this
example should make clear, there is no requirement that the groups be of equal size. However,
when converting B to U, scaling factors (described below) are necessary to ensure that groupings
are scaled correctly, in order to meet the requirements specified in Equation 4.6.
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The translation of a bifurcation matrix B into an orthonormal basis U begins by identifying
the scaling factors for each row bi:
$i =
∑
{j ∈ bi|j = 1} , $i > 0
ωi = −
∑
{j ∈ bi|j = −1} , ωi > 0
(4.9)
Here, $i is the count of the positive elements in row bi, and ωi is the count of the negative elements
in that row. These scaling factors are essential because they permit each row to be normalized to a
common unit length of 1.0. The values of each element in ui is then computed based on the value













if bi,j = −1
0 otherwise
(4.10)
Note that, if the bifurcation matrix is not constructed properly, the matrix U resulting from
applying Equation 4.10 will fail to meet the requirements of an orthonormal basis (in terms of
its norms and inner products). The most reliable method for creating contrasts is to designate
groups using a tree diagram like Figure 4.2, then assign values to B accordingly before proceeding
to Equations 4.9 and 4.10.
4.4.4 Orthonormal Basis Specification Using Principal Component Analysis
Another approach is to perform a principal component analysis (PCA) on the dataset X◦:








Here, X◦ denotes the CLR transformation of X and W denotes a matrix of the first d eigenvectors
of the covariance matrix X◦ [X◦]ᵀ (Jolliffe, 2002). Although PCA will produce a matrix of D
eigenvectors, the last eigenvector may be discarded because X◦ necessarily has a singular covariance
matrix, so the final eigenvector contains no information. W is thus a special case of U, and
Equation 4.11 is effectively identical to Equation 4.5.
PCA is a good strategy for selecting an orthonormal basis if (1) there are sufficiently rich
data to accurately estimate covariance, (2) it is reasonable that the alternatives might not be
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wholly independent of one another, and (3) there are no over-riding theoretical reasons to examine
particular contrasts. Under these circumstances, PCA is likely to reveal the relationships that
explain the preponderance of the variance. When there is sufficient power, this approach also
permits factor analysis of the resulting orthogonal factors.
On the other hand, many compositional datasets are not sufficiently rich to provide a robust
characterization of covariance. Under these circumstances, Equation 4.11 will still yield a usable
orthonormal basis, but its contrasts may be idioscyncratic to the available data, or otherwise
arbitrary. If the ILR transformation is required (e.g., for hypothesis testing), or if the data are
relatively sparse, using the ‘default basis’ or manually constructing a basis using bifurcation are
both more transparent analytic methods.
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Chapter 5
Applications for Modeling and
Inference
Because transformation makes it possible to obtain unbiased parameter estimates using familiar
parametric tools, the way is open for testing various models of choice and behavior. This chapter
provides several simple examples of models that might be tested. The emphasis is both on providing
a sense of how to interpret the resulting parameters, and also how to structure data matrices in
order to obtain parameter estimates using regression methods.
5.1 The Barycentric Matching Model
Armed with these tools, the barycentric matching model (Equation 1.12) may interpreted as a
compositional linear model (Equation 3.9), to which the ILR transformation may be applied:
y∗ = κ∗ + α · x∗ (5.1)
Note that despite its similarity to Equation 1.11, there is as much information contained in Equa-
tion 5.1 despite reducing the complexity of the space by one dimension. This is because although
Equation 1.11 represented the data in D dimensions, the constraint of equilibrium demands that
those data be confined to a d-dimensional manifold. The ILR transformation serves to rotate that
manifold into alignment with the axes, such that the extraneous dimension is omitted from the
analysis.
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Typically, studies of choice consist of presenting a series of different schedules to an organism and
observing the proportions of responding to each. Subsequent analyses will employ an explanatory
matrix X∗ of c different “configurations” (typically, different payout schedules) and a matrix Y∗
of responses to those schedules. Each row of these matrices corresponds to a vector of d elements,





























Hereafter, single elements in composition matrices will be identified using the notation x∗i,j to
identify item j from composition i in the matrix X∗.
Estimating the parameters for Equation 5.1 given data of this kind can easily be accomplished
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Here, %dj denotes a vector of length d in which element j is a 1 and all others are zero.
Despite the potentially high dimensionality of compositional data, the form of Equation 5.1
dramatically constrains the permitted range of predicted values. Figure 5.1 shows the positions of
normative behaviors x∗i and of observed behaviors y
∗
i . The arrows connecting each x
∗
i to the origin
are the normative vectors, in that they correspond to the operation ⊕xi and serve as the point of
reference for the independent variable. Given the model specified by Equation 5.1, the dashed line
passing through y∗i must be parallel with the normative vector, because the parameters κ
∗ and α
may only reposition and rescale the normative vector; they may not rotate or distort it.






















Figure 5.1: Given the normative vector x∗i , Equation 5.1 requires that the point y
∗
i lie along a line
parallel to the vector x∗i , with all such lines converging at the point κ
∗.
If Equation 5.1 is true, then given any two or more normative vectors, there must be a point
on which the lines of possible response must converge, and that point must equal κ∗. Note that
this is true even in three or more dimensions, where arbitrary skew lines need not intersect.
A more subtle assumption is that the scalar value of α must be uniform across all compositions
x∗i . This limits the possible outcomes of the regression, a problem originally identified as “symmetric
approximation by leading term” by Natapoff (1970). This assumption is one of the great traps of
traditional studies of choice, because it ensures that most data will appear to be well-represented by
a single α value even when the underlying phenomenon does not obey the assumption of sphericity.
When choice proportions are influenced by multiple orthogonal factors (such as the reward rate
R and the reward magnitude M), the barycentric model may be extended as a simple multiple
regression:
y∗ = κ∗ + αR · x∗R + αM · x∗M (5.3)
Here, each factor makes a contribution according to its own α parameter, and these factors are
not assumed to interact (although adding an interaction term is straightforward). As discussed
in Chapter 8, meta-analysis of a collection of animal studies suggest that treating these factors as
linear and orthogonal in ILR-transformed space is supported by the bulk of the data.
One way in which α might fail to be uniform is that the value might shift gradually over time
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Choice Models
matching free parameters equation
model κ∗ α
barycentric d 1 (5.1)
multi-κ∗ ≤ c · d 1 (5.4)
multi-α d ≤ c (5.5)
discriminability d d (5.6)
multivariate d d2 (5.7)
Table 5.1: Complexity in choice models described in this chapter. Here, c indicates the number of
compositions in the dataset, and d corresponds to the dimensions of the Euclidean geometry Rd
derived from the simplicial geometry SD. In the multinomial case, m corresponds to the number
of explanatory variables. The data are presumed to be divided into q lotteries, where q = 1 unless
otherwise specified.
(as a result of aging, for example). Another is that α might be consistent over time but might differ
with respect to each of the contrasts specified by the orthonormal basis.
In the event of any of the above assumptions being violated, a more sophisticated model from
the following subsections can be employed. Table 5.1 summarizes the different extensions of the
barycentric matching model in terms of their parametric complexity, discussed in the following
subsections.
5.2 Violation of Scale Invariance
One of the hallmarks of power laws in general is that they are scale invariant. That is, such models
predict relative changes regardless of the scale. Because of the constraints of closure, it initially
appears as though all compositional models will consequently be power laws, as closure’s purpose
is to ‘cancel out’ the scale information.
Although power laws are very popular, however, they are also very rarely appropriate in practice.
For most phenomena, scale invariance is a property that is strictly limited to particular scale ranges,
and most experimental examinations fail to test phenomena over a sufficiently wide range of scales
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(Stumpf & Porter, 2012). The consequences of this can be seen quite clearly in the study of
psychophysics. For example, although power laws describe the acuity of human hearing over a
range of volumes that might be called ‘conversational,’ pronounced departures from power laws
are nevertheless observed at extreme volumes, as well as at normal volumes in hearing-impaired
patients (Marozeau & Florentine, 2007). Similarly, studies examining the subjective experience
of the passage of time have identified scale invariance in many species over a range running from
seconds to tens of hours (dubbed the ‘interval timing’ range) but breaking down for very short
intervals (‘ballistic timing’) and intervals near 24h (‘circadian timing’) (Buhusi & Meck, 2005).
Given the possibility that model parameters might change as some function of scale, it is
important to test the blind spot that compositions display with respect to scale. In keeping with
the principles behind the ILR transformation, it is crucial that any scale data introduced into the
model be orthogonal to the compositional contrasts. Consequently, a covariate that consists only
of the information lost during closure is a suitable covariate for measuring the effects of scale.
Figure 5.2 provides a visual sense of how information regarding scale adds a new dimension
to the data. Unlike the values in a composition (which are subject to the closure constraint),
scale information is a proper ratio variable as per the taxonomy of Stevens (1946). In order to
remain entirely consistent with the principle that independent variables should be orthogonal to
one another, the only appropriate measure of a composition’s scale is the geometric mean of its
observed components. Any other value (such as the arithmetic mean) will produce a distorted
model.
The emphasis on the geometric mean, as opposed to the arithmetic mean, is surprising to many
analysts, particularly those who are accustomed to dealing with monetary rewards. The proposal,
for example, that a coin toss with outcomes ($10 vs. $12) is on the same scale as a different
cointoss with outcomes ($5 vs. $24) seems unusual given that the arithmetic mean is so much
higher in the second pair than in the first. This, however, is a direct consequence of the way in
which orthogonality is defined for compositional systems. Because power laws become linear under
log-transformation, a model that seeks to examine scale in similar terms is limited to the geometric
mean because, when log-transformed, this becomes an arithmetic mean and thus consistent with
the Euclidean operations of the resulting sample space.
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Figure 5.2: Although C (40, 5) and C (80, 10) correspond to the same composition, they differ by a
factor of 2 with respect to their absolute scale. This scale variable may be included by using the
geometric mean of the outcomes as an orthogonal dimension.















Figure 5.3: An example of non-convergent values of κ∗. Given that each of the dashed lines (indicat-
ing possible positions for the dependent variable) must be parallel to one of the solid lines (indicating
the normative vectors associated with the independent variable), there is no single point κ∗ where
the dashed lines meet.
5.3 Non-Convergent Bias
In traditional matching, the bias vector κ is interpreted as an organism’s “point of indifference.”
That is: If an organism is entirely insensitive to shifts in the proportions of outcomes (i.e. if α = 0),
then they are presumed to chose with the proportions κ regardless of the values of x. However,




1 + (α · x∗1)
y∗2 = κ
∗
2 + (α · x∗2)
κ∗1 6= κ∗2
Figure 5.3 graphs a similar scenario, with the potential consequence that specifying a single point
κ∗ is no longer justified. When a standard barycentric matching model (Equation 5.1) is fit to such
data, both the κ and α parameters have the potential to be distorted.
A straightforward solution is to modify Equation 5.2 to permit each composition to set its own











 [κ∗1, . . . ,κ∗c , α]ᵀ (5.4)
This approach is only advisable, however, when c is small and when such a distinction appears
theoretically motivated, as the resulting model will have (c · d) + 1 free parameters.
Another approach is to think of κ∗ as a decomposable entity. The traditional treatment of
κ∗ as “bias” recognizes that an organism may be biased along many dimensions. A man may be
left handed, and may also have a phobia of the color red. If these two biases are compositionally
independent, then each will act as an independent perturbation, along with any additional influences
(i.e. κ = κhand ⊕ κred ⊕ κother). Given proper experimental design, each of these biases could
be included as explanatory variables in the regression model.
5.4 Inconsistent Sensitivity
While κ has largely been treated as an error variable, the sensitivity parameter α is frequently
of experimental interest (Davison & McCarthy, 1988). This enthusiasm to cause variation in α is
at odds with the simultaneous analytic assumption that it otherwise be invariant across time and
scenario. Figure 5.4 presents an example in which each composition has its own value for α.
Equation 5.2 may easily be modified by specifying a vector α = (α1, ..., αc) that gives each











This analysis will produce a single uniform bias across the c configurations, as well as a discrete α
for each configuration. More compact models may be designated as well; α may be a vector of any
length from 1 to c.
In many circumstances, this is a economical solution, as it increases the number of free pa-
rameters from d + 1 up to a maximum of d + c. Furthermore, variations in α already represent a
familiar theoretical construct for many researchers, and the more flexible deployment of multiple
α parameters in mixed model analyses may actually reduce the overall parameterization of data
by allowing multiple experimental conditions to be intermixed into a single dataset. For example,
if experimenters are contrasting choice performance in well-rested vs. sleep-deprived individuals,















Figure 5.4: An example of inconsistent values of α. Here, despite each of the normative vectors (solid
lines) being equal in length, the values of the dependent variable are such that each composition is
a different distance from the point where the lines converge. Such inconsistency corresponds to a
model in which the α parameter associated with each dependent composition has a different value
by which it rescales the normative vector.
and determine that the evidence does not justify giving each condition its own bias parameters,
the overall model complexity across the full experiment would drop from (2d + 2) to (d + 2) free
parameters.
5.5 Nonuniform Discriminability
A notable failure of Equation 5.1 was reported in experiments manipulating the discriminability
of response alternatives (Davison & Jenkins, 1985; Davison & Nevin, 1999). These studies argue
that both the general matching law (Equation 1.8) and its more recent extension as the barycentric
matching model (Equation 1.12) conflate an organism’s ability to distinguish between the sched-
ules responsible for determining outcomes and their ability to distinguish between the alternatives
themselves. This problem is exemplified by the data introduced in Chapter 8 using data published
by Davison & McCarthy (1994).
Figure 5.5 shows an example of how relative discriminability might manifest in ILR-transformed
data: The contrast between v1 and v2 (represented by the horizontal axis) is much wider in the















Figure 5.5: Non-uniform discriminability of the objective conditions x∗i (white points) and the
subjective choices y∗i (black points), such that discriminations corresponding to the x-axis contrast
are subjectively more difficult than those corresponding to the y-axis contrast.
objective case (white points) than in the subjective one (black points). If the model is constrained
such that the subjective composition lines lie parallel to the normative composition lines, as in
Equations 5.2, 5.4, and 5.5, the pattern of results in Figure 5.5 could be mistakenly interpreted as
evidence for both non-convergent bias and inconsistent sensitivity.
A simpler account arises when the objective symmetry of the orthonormal basis is contrasted
with the observed asymmetry of subjective experience. If one axis represents a difficult discrim-
ination for subjects, while another represents an easy one, then the orthonormal basis adopted
during the ILR transformation does not correctly capture the subjective differences experienced by
subjects. In other words, one unit of movement along the x-axis in Figure 5.5 is not necessarily
equal to one unit of movement along the y-axis.












Nonuniform discirminability here plays a role similar to that of eccentricity in the definition of an
ellipse. Equation 5.6 effectively splits the analysis into a simple linear regression along each of the
dimensions, so in d dimensions, the model has 2d free parameters (d from the parameters of κ∗ and
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d from the values for α).
The judicious selection of the orthonormal basis is crucial to this discriminability analysis, and
should be approached with care. For an example of this, see Chapter 8.
5.6 Isometric Covariance
Although non-uniform discriminability increases model complexity considerably by treating each
axis of the isometric transform as an independent linear regression, it cannot adequately account for
interdependent linear effects that arise as a result of covariance. Doing so requires a full multivariate
regression:








h = (1, . . . , 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n ones
αi = (α1, . . . , αd)
(5.7)
Here, ℵ represents a full d×d design matrix, consisting of sensitivity vectors αi. With the inclusion
of the bias parameter κ∗, Equation 5.7 has (d ·D) free parameters. However, if ℵ is a diagonal
matrix, the model effectively collapses to Equation 5.6.
The covariance matrix then arises from Equation 5.7 is presumed to be multivariate-normal.
When translated back into the geometry of the simplex, the resulting probability distribution is a
logistic-normal distribution (Aitchison & Shen, 1980; Egozcue et al., 2012).
Although this multivariate analysis can robustly represent a very wide range of possible effects,
it does so at the risk of being exceedingly overparameterized for any but the most exhaustive
datasets. In practice, many patterns of choice can be represented by simpler models, and full-
covariance models are more likely to serve as the due diligence for model validation than they are
to emerge as persuasive theoretical constructs in their own right.
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Chapter 6
Considerations & Troubleshooting
Applying compositional methods to a broad range of data will inevitably pit the analyst against the
limitations of the method. In some cases, these require that analysts make explicit assumptions,
which must then be validated empirically.
Two potential complications are addressed in this chapter. The first, and most likely to arise,
is the question of how to move forward if one component in a composition has a value of zero
(seemingly putting the composition at odds with the constraints of closure). The other is the topic
of the degree to which compositional models can be reconciled with multinomial logistic models,
which make use of very similar but not quite identical model assumptions.
6.1 Dealing with Zeros
A common problem in dealing with choice data is that, occasionally, one of the alternatives will
not get selected within the period being observed, compromising the requirement that all values
in a composition be positive. It is important to distinguish between a missing value (about which
nothing is known) and a recorded zero. This dissertation does not address the topic of missing
values (for details, see Mart́ın-Fernández et al., 2003), focusing instead on recorded zeros, which
may be either rounded zeros or structural zeros.
A structural zero (also called an “essential zero”) is a value that is known with confidence
to represent a null value. Compositional analysis can still be applied to such data that contains
structural zeros, by working with subcompositions confined to a facet of the full simplex. With a
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correctly-selected orthonormal basis, problematic dimensions may be singled out. However, struc-
tural zeros are theoretically challenging because their “zeroness” is itself informative, especially in
studies of choice. Because the absolute refusal to choose a particular alternative is very different
from the incidental avoidance of that alternative, structural zeros cannot be lightly ignored (for
further discussion, see Mart́ın-Fernández et al., 2011).
Contrastingly, a rounded zero may refer to a datum whose true value lies below the precision
of the recording instrument (making it a “censored” datum). While structural zeros can often be
planned for prior to the beginning of an experiment, rounded zeros may appear at any time in
studies of choice (provided a subject simply does not choose a given alternative). In these cases, it
may be advisable to substitute the observations β with a replacement vector r, such that if βi = 0,
then ri = δi.
Mart́ın-Fernández et al. (2011) recommend that the replacement vector r be computed using
a “multiplicative replacement strategy” that otherwise preserves the compositional relationships
within the data:




δi if Bi = 0
Bi if Bi > 0
(6.1)
The vector Br is an unscaled replacement vector of the observed data, to which the closure operation
is performed to produce r. Because the nonzero observations are unmodified, the compositional
metrics associated with the subcomposition consisting only of those values will be unaffected by
the replacement.
The amount of distortion resulting from a replacement corresponds directly to the degree that
substitution fails to preserve the metric properties of the observed data. Sanford et al. (1993)
recommend δi = 0.55 · δr, where δr represents the maximum rounding-off error. Choice data
typically take the form of integer counts, making the minimum observable value for βi = 1; hereafter,
δi = 0.55 is assumed to be suitable.
There is unanimity in the field that all substitutions must be accompanied by an analysis that
measures how much distortion is introduced by any substitution and to validate the resulting model
parameters (Aitchison & Egozcue, 2005; Mart́ın-Fernández et al., 2003; Mart́ın-Fernández & Thió-
Henestrosa, 2006). These “sensitivity analyses” consist of examining distributional metrics for
different putative values of δi. Aitchison (1986) specifies that suitable test values fall in the range
CHAPTER 6. CONSIDERATIONS & TROUBLESHOOTING 62
δr
5 ≤ δi ≤ 2δr. A straightforward approach to these validation tests is to use bootstrap methods
(Wehrens et al., 2000) to compare the compositional geometric mean and total compositional
variance (defined in terms of perturbation and powering rather than addition and multiplication)
of the full dataset (for various values of δi) to those metrics in subsets of the data that exclude the
replacement compositions.
6.2 Multinomial Logistic Regression As An Alternate Approach
In econometrics and public health, the multinomial logistic regression has become the standard
approach for dealing with proportions of choice distributed among more than two alternatives
(Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000; Kwak & Clayton-Matthews, 2002). This approach is powerful, but a
close examination reveals that it not only suffers the same difficulties noted above, but introduces
others as well.
In practice, two forms of multinomial logistic regression are commonly employed: those that
use d log-ratios of probabilities, and those that use D log-ratios comparing each probability to a
“centered” composite value. These two approaches are therefore isomorphic to the ALR and CLR
transformations respectively, differing only with respect to whether the model is interpreted as
transformed-log-linear or logistic. Importantly, these two varieties of multinomial logistic regression
have the same problems as their log-linear counterparts: The d log-ratios require the specification
of an arbitrary “reference” category, while the D centered log-ratios produce an over-parameterized
model with a singular covariance matrix. In most cases, the ALR-equivalent approach is used. De-
spite extensive application, there remains no canonical method for specifying the reference category
(Egozcue et al., 2012), and comparisons across studies remains challenging.
Another prominent concern in multinomial logistic regression is that it requires “independence
of irrelevant alternatives” (Hausman & McFadden, 1984). That is, for choices to be successfully
modeled by this regression, each alternative must be perfectly discriminable from every other
alternative, with no interaction between alternatives. This means that, despite its widespread
use, this regression requires analysts to make assumptions that are objectionable, especially in
human populations.
In addition to these problems, which are already of central concern to compositional analysis,
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fitting the parameters of a multinomial logit may require numerical procedures, a shortcoming
shared by multinomial probit models.
In short, multinomial logistic regression should not be viewed as a panacea to the problems
discussed in the preceding sections, as it does not change the problems Aitchison identified regarding
geometry of the sample space. Fortunately, it also benefits from the same eventual solution to those
problems.
6.2.1 Applying Compositional Ideas To Multinomial Models
Centered multinomial logistic regressions make use of a linear predictor function that relates M
explanatory variables to N outcomes, defined as follows:
κn,i = κn + (α1,n · x1,i) + . . .+ (αM,n · xM,i) (6.2)
Here, the function’s value for observation i of outcome n is given by a linear sum consisting of an
intercept coefficient κn and parameter coefficients αm,n that associate the m
th explanatory variable
to the nth outcome. These seek to explain the observed compositions in the matrix Y, with one
row per composition i and N columns (outcomes).
The centered multinomial logistic regression is an application of the softmax function, a popular







yi,n = 1 (6.3)
The requirement that the probabilities for the various outcomes sum to 1 is a form of closure, but
the denominator (which plays the role of ð in the closure operation) is the sum of all of the linear
predictor functions in the model. The value of this denominator is typically estimated numerically.
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Because all items in yi have the same denominator, the geometric mean g (yi) necessarily also has
it, and the ratio causes it to cancel out. However, as in other cases of the CLR transformation, the
resulting data is now subject to the equilibrium constraint (Equation 4.3).




(ui,n · κn,i) (6.4)
Finally, the original explanatory coefficients βm,n from the softmax function can be solved for using
partial differentiation.
It is important, however, not to lose sight of the original goal of such an analysis: To transform
compositional data in the geometry SN into the geometry RN−1, in order to describe it in terms
of linear estimators in an independent geometry RM . Unless the softmax function is central to the
analysis, an analyst could just as easily fit the following model:
y∗i,j = κj,i
This approach can be conceived of as examining the impact of the M explanatory variables on
a particular isometric logratio j, with a total of d ratios, doing so without asymmetry and with-
out requiring that a logistic function be invoked. This permits analysts to perform all analyses
previously undertaken using multinomial regression in a real geometry instead.
Using compositional transformation instead of multinomial logistic regression also bypasses the
problem of independence from irrelevant alternatives. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, these analyses
can successfully account for differential discriminability and covariance in compositional data, doing
so without need for numerical approximation.
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Part II
Experimental Methods & Results
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Chapter 7
Experimental Context
‘Choice’ and ‘decision-making’ are immense topics spanning many academic disciplines. Given such
a scope (and corresponding variety in technical vocabularies), miscommunication is all too easy.
The focus of the experimental data in this dissertation is choice behaviors that have the following
characteristics:
• The available choice alternatives are a discrete set present in a confined space. The studied
behavior is constrained to this domain.
• Apart from this constraint in the scope of the task, subjects are free to move and respond at
will.
• Subjects will make a large number of responses in any given experiment.
• The consequences of these choices are either a reward delivery or a null outcome. Acutely
aversive outcomes (such as electric shock) are not considered.
• Individual choices are uncertain, insofar as any choice may or may not, at any point in time,
yield a reward.
• Individual choices are not especially costly, with respect to the various kinds of costs (e.g.,
the expenditure of effort, the loss of time, and the loss of resources).
Superficially, imposing these restrictions on the present experiments enormously constrain the
scope of the research. However, because choice was an unmanageably broad topic to begin with,
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these constraints are necessary if a precise analysis is to be made. Naturally, each of these con-
straints may be relaxed, and doing so in each case would yield compelling research. However, there
are several reasons why these constraints provide the best starting point for a rigorous analysis.
All experimental paradigms rely on useful simplification. This is done for two reasons: To
minimize the random effects of factors outside of experimental control on obtained measurements,
and to observe whether changes in experimental conditions yield consistent fixed effects. Both
work in favor of capturing phenomena in isolation and measuring them with enough precision to
be able to build models and subsequently make predictions. Constraining a choice task to a small
space with unambiguous response alternatives works toward these objectives, as does collecting
large samples of data.
With respect to the other constraints listed, however, the main benefit is that these describe the
vast majority of choices made by most organisms under most circumstances. Large-scale choices
that are known in advance to have permanent effects on life direction (buying a house, choosing a
college major, adopting a child) are made very infrequently by any given human and are unheard
of in other species (who lack the capacity to dwell on questions like ‘Where will I be in five
years?’). Instead, most choices have low stakes, yield unremarkable outcomes, and are made almost
continuously. For the most part, these choices are so ‘micro’ that they lie below the criterion of
interest of microeconomics, and happen so automatically that they reside at the hinterlands of
philosophy’s debates about free will.
Despite being individually trivial, however, these very small decisions accumulate into substan-
tial effects as a result of their sheer volume. It is on the basis of the sum, and not of the individual
gambles, that the house always wins. Furthermore, these small-scale, frequent decisions are not
limited to domains that can be measured in simple econometric terms. For example, microaggres-
sions and other manifestations of prejudice may appear ‘harmless’ to the perpetrator, but can result
to ‘structural’ manifestations of racism or sexism, even among individuals who describe themselves
as being committed to an egalitarian view (Brooks & Purdie-Vaughns, 2007).
These many small choices are also crucial to voluntary behavior, and so to free will (Neuringer
& Jensen, 2010). Humans frequently make choices that are adaptive without using deliberative
strategies, and without being able to articulate how they were influenced by feedback. At the
same time, these choices are routinely characterized by a degree of randomness that renders them
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difficult to predict in exact terms. Consequently, in order to study voluntary behavior as a process,
it is essential to begin with the vast majority of those behaviors that are identified as voluntary,
even if they are not behaviors that appear individually to be of much consequence.
Finally, the decision to avoid paradigms in which choices are costly is merely a strategy to sim-
plify the experimental topic. The subject of aversive outcomes is clearly of substantial importance,
and may differ qualitatively from choices made in strictly rewarding scenarios. Nevertheless, a com-
prehensive understanding of a narrowly defined phenomenon is more productive than a superficial
understanding of a broad one. Extending the method to aversive outcomes will be a necessary
direction in future work, but is treated as lying beyond the scope of the present study in order to
achieve depth at the expense of breadth.
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Chapter 8
Previously Published Data
As previously described, Baum’s “generalized matching law” (Equation 1.8) is among the most suc-
cessful models for describing overall proportions of response in concurrent choice designs, despite
its parametric simplicity. Shortly after its publication, a review of available concurrent datasets
found that it was able to account for over 90% of the variance in most cases (Baum, 1979; Davison
& McCarthy, 1988). This success has not been limited to the study of concurrent choice, how-
ever. Equation 1.8 is effectively a log-odds function (Barnard, 1949), itself an extension of the
logistic function (Reed & Berkson, 1929; Berkson, 1944). Log-odds functions have been so suc-
cessful at modeling phenomena in every area of psychology that a recent review describes them as
“ubiquitous” (H. Zhang & Maloney, 2012).
Equation 1.8 is also a power law, which may seen as an extension of the “psychophysical law”
proposed by Stevens (1957) as a reinvention of the psychophysical functions developed by Weber
and Fechner. Furthermore, Equation 1.8 belongs to a set of identities observed by the barycentric
matching model, shown in Equation 1.12 (Jensen & Neuringer, 2009).
Contention persists regarding the theoretical viability of power laws in explaining psychophys-
ical phenomena. In some cases, tests that challenge model assumptions reveal scenarios in which
they yield incorrect predictions (e.g. Augustin, 2008), while in other, more sophisticated models
incorporate known difficulties into a more complete framework (e.g. Luce, 2002). In such endeavors,
it is crucially important distinguish between a model that may be incorrect and a model that may
be incomplete. Equation 1.8 is a mathematically convenient form of Equation 1.12 when dealing
with two alternatives, because it lends itself to linearization through the use of a logarithmic trans-
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formation. The full model proposed by Equation 1.12 has been difficult to test in part because it
does not follow a well-established parametric form.
Controversy also surrounds the theoretical importance of Equation 1.8 for explaining choice
under concurrent schedules. Because Equation 1.8 is a molar description of behavior (that is, a
general description of many observations; Baum, 2002), and because it presents prediction in terms
of scale-invariant ratios, its explanatory power for understanding behavioral processes has been
questioned (e.g. Navakatikyan & Davison, 2010).
Limits of Equation 1.8 have also been demonstrated empirically. Davison & Jenkins (1985)
propose an alternative model in which the stimuli that signal the different schedules of reward are
confusable to varying degrees. When this approach was extended to three alternatives by Davison
& McCarthy (1994), parameter estimates could not be made to reconcile with Equation 1.8 when
two of the schedules were highly confusable relative to a third alternative.
Rather than conclude that apparent empirical violations of Equation 1.8 invalidate it as a com-
pelling model of choice behavior, the approach described here favors the view that it is incomplete,
and that many of its shortcomings can be remedied without discarding the log-odds characteristics
that have made it such a powerful model of molar data. By reconceptualizing Equation 1.8 as a
relationship between mathematical objects called compositions, practical analysis of matching data
can include any number of alternatives. Furthermore, as described below, this approach clarifies
how to extend the model in ways that can accommodate both violations of scale invariance and
differential discriminability.
The following re-analyses are adapted from results reported by Jensen (2014).
8.1 Reward Frequency vs. Magnitude: Elliffe et al. (2008)
A multiple regression may take any number of factors into consideration, and this may be exploited
to contrast how different aspects of reward contribute to responding. Elliffe et al. (2008) reported
an experiment in which two concurrent variable interval schedules varied the frequency of reward
delivery between a (300s : 33s) to a (33s : 300s) ratio, and, upon reward delivery, dropped a
different number of food pellets for each lever, varying between a (1 : 7) ratio and a (7 : 1) ratio.
If frequency and magnitude are orthogonal manipulations, then each may be converted into a log-
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Figure 8.1: Estimated model parameters for Equation 8.1 from the re-analysis of data published by
Elliffe et al. (2008). Error bars correspond to 1 standard error.
ratio, as per the ALR transformation (which may be used without concern in the two-item case),
yielding the following equation:
B@ = κ@ + αR@ + βM@ (8.1)
Here, the ratio B@ corresponds to the ratio of responses log B1B2 , as per Equation 7. R
@, in turn
denotes the log-ratio of reward probabilities, while M@ denotes the log-ratio of reward magnitudes.
Figure 8.1 plots the estimated parameters in Equation 8.1 for each of the five subjects. Although
some individual differences are evident, the overall pattern is clear: a higher slope parameter
associated with the rate of reward than with the magnitude of reward, and little or no operandum
bias.
The goodness of fit obtained by Equation 8.1 is very high. Figure 8.2 plots the best fitting plane
described by Equation 8.1 for subjects 132 (the best-fitting subject) and 135 (the worst fit), as well
as the raw data. The lines drawn for each point show the residual distance from the best-fitting
plane.
Although Elliffe et al. argue that relative reward rates and magnitudes are interdependent,
their regressions do not include the interaction term that would test this proposal directly. Instead,


































































B@ = −0.22 + 1.06 ·R@ + 0.75 ·M@
Figure 8.2: The best-fitting plane for two subjects from Elliffe et al. (2008), as well as the raw data
used to fit those functions. Lines indicate the residual distance from the plane of the function to
each datum.
they rely on simple regressions applied to subsets of the data. Cording et al. (2011) test for
this interaction term as part of a residual meta-analysis of five studies that manipulated reward
magnitude. According to this meta-analysis, there is not persuasive evidence for non-linearity in
the studies examined.
In conclusion, a compositional reanalysis of the data published by Elliffe et al. (2008) yields
a model that accounts for nearly all of the variance and shows no indication of a departure from
linearity. Although this analysis is largely familiar, it nevertheless provides a bridge that analysts
can use to acquaint themselves with the basic concepts outlined in this paper.
8.2 Discriminability & Covariation: Davison & McCarthy (1994)
and Davison (1996)
As was emphasized in the discussions of compositional transformation in Chapter 4, the translation
from a two-alternative problem to an n-alternative problem is non-trivial, and observing linear
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functions in two-alternative log-odds plots is no guarantee that the model will generalize. As
the following example will demonstrate, the compositional perspective not only provides a way of
understanding when and why models of choice fail, but also provides a framework within which
more successful models can be built with a minimal increase in model complexity.
One of the most striking demonstrations of the insufficiency Baum’s Generalized Matching Law
(Equation 1.8) was a 3-alternative scenario reported by Davison & McCarthy (1994). In their study,
pigeons responded to three operanda using a switch key procedure, where each operandum was gov-
erned by a different concurrent variable interval schedule. The procedure was then extended using
the same subjects, with further data reported in Davison (1996). Throughout these experiments,
two of the operanda were identified by fixed colors: green-yellow (with a wavelength of 560 nm)
and orange-red (630 nm). The third alternative was assigned a different wavelength W, in order to
manipulate how easy it was to discriminate from the other two. In Davison & McCarthy (1994),
data was collected at W = 600 nm (an easy discrimination) and W = 623 nm (which was difficult
to discriminate from 630 nm). Davison (1996) then reported further data collected at W = 563
nm, 570 nm, 615 nm, 619 nm, and 627 nm.
The resulting data cannot be accounted for by Equation 1.8, which yields inconsistent predic-
tions depending which two alternatives are included in the ratio. For example, when comparing 560
nm to 630 nm using Equation 1.8, subjects appeared sensitive to the schedule; however, data from
the same session comparing 623 to 630 appeared insensitive. Because compositions are structured
in a recursive fashion (e.g. the ternary plots in Figure 2 are bounded by 3 edges), it follows that
Equation 5.1 is also unable to accommodate the reported patterns in the data. To understand
why, consider the effects of bias κ and sensitivity α in Equation 5.1. The bias term repositions the
barycenter of a set of points, and sensitivity rescales that set; however, neither parameter has the
means to distort a set of points in such a way that can explain the inconsistency in the pairwise
results. Another way to describe the problem is in terms of a violation of the assumption of spheric-
ity. In order for a model similar to Equation 6 to be successful in describing the data reported in
these studies, it must accommodate the ability to rescale the data differently along multiple axes.
However, given the constraints of SALT, described above (see also Natapoff, 1970), a matching
model cannot assign an independent sensitivity parameter to each response alternative.
On the basis of the inconsistency in pairwise sensitivity estimates, and the assumption that
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SALT forces Equation 5.1 to only have one global sensitivity, the results reported in Davison &
McCarthy (1994) and Davison (1996) were presented as support for the contingency discriminability




R1 − ρR1 + ρR2 − ω
R2 − ρR2 + ρR1 − ω
(8.2)
The λ parameter serves a role similar to the bias, while the ρ parameter is analogous to sensi-
tivity. The function of the ω parameter is less clear-cut, providing a background of “subtractive
punishment.”
Equation 8.2 is problematic for several reasons. To accommodate two-operandum data, it
introduces a third parameter, doing so because the model is otherwise unable to accommodate
overmatching (i.e. cases in which α > 1). Furthermore, although Equation 8.2 models varying
discriminability well for two operanda, there is no straightforward way to generalize to more than
two alternatives. Davison & McCarthy (1994) provide a three-operandum generalization, which
requires a different ρij parameter for every pair of operanda and quietly omits the λ parameter
(whose general form is far from clear). The resulting function can only be fit numerically.
In order to assess the validity of the Equation 8.2, N. P. Sutton et al. (2008) performed a
residual meta-analysis of 20 studies. Because Equation 8.2 made use of addition and subtraction,
it is expected to be non-linear when the data are log-transformed, so testing for non-linearity in
the residuals of the log-transformed data provides a robust test of Equation 8.2’s predictions. This
meta-analysis found no evidence of non-linearity on log-scaled data, suggesting that Equation 8.2
is unlikely to generalize.
Although the simplest incarnation of Equation 5.1 cannot be reconciled with these data, the
ILR transformation nevertheless provides a means by which the compositional qualities of Equa-
tion 1.8 can be reconciled with the differential discriminability in the data published by Davison &
McCarthy. In addition to eliminating the extraneous dimension responsible for SALT, the orthonor-
mal basis U in Equation 5.5 permits the analyst to specify the contrasts of interest as a multivariate
normal distribution whose length and breadth are described different sensitivity parameters. This
allows discriminability to be understood as a covariance matrix in the ilr-transformed sample space.
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Figure 8.3: Estimated model parameters from the re-analysis of data published by Davison &
McCarthy (1994) and Davison (1996). The points on the left-hand side of each plot are obtained
using a different orthonormal base than those on the right-hand side, as indicated in Equation 8.3.
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Subject 101, 623 vs. 630
Figure 8.4: Best-fitting lines for Subject 101 in the (600 vs. 630) and (623 vs. 630) conditions,
as reported by Davison & McCarthy (1994). The “hard contrast” refers to the uxz (left plot) and
uyz (right plot) contrasts in Equation 8.3, whereas the “easy” contrast compares the third, distinct
alternative (560 nm) to the composite of the other two. Solid lines were fit to the black points and
dashed lines were fit to the white points using entirely independent regressions.








































Here, the first column in each matrix corresponds to the 560 nm stimulus and the second column
corresponds to the 630 nm stimulus. The third column corresponds to the varying stimulus, whose
wavelength W was manipulate experimentally. The Uxz|y case was used for W = 563 nm, 570 nm,
and 600 nm. The first contrast is between the 560 nm operandum and the varying alternative,
while the second contrast compares 630 nm to a composition of the items in the first contrast.
The Uyz|x case was used for W = 615 nm, 619 nm, 623 nm, and 627 nm, because it contrasts the
longest wavelength with the varying stimulus. For convenience, the first pairwise contrast in each
case is hereafter labeled as “hard” (comparing the manipulated wavelength W to its closest fixed
counterpart), whereas the second composite contrast is labeled as “easy.” Since each contrast is
orthogonal to the other in ILR-transformed space, each was fitted with its own bias and sensitivity
parameters, resulting in four free parameters from two regressions. Parameters were assessed
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separately for each contrast.
Figure 8.3 plots the four free parameters for all six subjects, across all seven wavelengths. The
break in the lines between 600 nm and 615 nm signals that two different U matrices were used, so
parameters on the left side of each figure describe a different kind of distortion that those on the
right side. Overall, this analysis shows a decrease in the sensitivity of similar stimuli (αhard) as a
function of that similarity, without any lack of sensitivity in the composite contrast (αeasy). Bias
was generally minimal.
Parameters were estimated using standard regression techniques. Figure 8.4 shows the regres-
sion lines used to fit Subject 101’s parameters for the 600 nm and 623 nm cases. These lines, which
were representative of fits for all subjects, explain a considerable degree of the variance and do
not require numerical estimation techniques or specialized software. Furthermore, the data do not
show signs of non-linearity.
In conclusion, compositional analysis of choice can accommodate differential discriminability
with a minimal increase in model complexity. Once an analyst has grown comfortable with ILR
transformation, either traditional “single global sensitivity” models may be fit, or theoretically
compelling contrasts may instead be singled out using appropriate orthonormal bases.
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Chapter 9
Concurrent Choice: Four vs. Six vs.
Eight Alternatives
Although the consistent efficacy of compositional methods in existing datasets is encouraging,
many basic questions about choice remain unanswered in light of the insufficiencies of traditional
analyses. One of the most basic questions is, “How does changing the number of alternatives impact
behavior?” This chapter will show how the compositional approach facilitates the analysis of data
whose dimensionality is far greater than can be visualized easily. From these results, a series of
tools are described for understanding and characterizing that behavior.
The validity of matching models in realistically complex situations is at stake in this work.
If the orderly relationships observed in two-alternative experiments falls apart under these more
complex conditions, then the degree to which those models can be applied to understanding behavior
outside the lab will be minimal. There are, however, several ways in which orderly behavior might
be observed.
The initial focus is on the sensitivity parameter α in the barycentric matching model (Equa-
tions 1.12, 5.1), for which unbiased estimates are made possible by the compositional paradigm.
Changing the number of alternatives in the task might influence α in several ways. The näıve
prediction from a cognitive perspective is that lower estimates of α should be expected when more
alternatives are available, because adding alternatives increases the computational load that the
task imposes on the subject (and in particular, on working memory), and this in turn should make
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subjects less effective at processing task-related information (Ackerman, 1988). This intuition has
been popularized in the form of the “paradox of choice” (Schwartz, 2004). However, systematic
reviews of the literature suggest that this phenomenon is not consistently observed, and may be the
result of idiosyncratic confounds (including experimenter expectancy) (Scheibehenne et al., 2010).
Consequently a second plausible possibility is that the α parameter will remain relatively stable
across conditions.
In order to examine this question directly, ten rats were exposed to a series of concurrent
schedules in which either four, six, or eight alternatives were simultaneously available, each with
a differing degree of relative richness. The studies presented in this dissertation instead make
use of the ‘Turn-Based Foraging’ paradigm, in which each selection of an alternative ‘forages’ at
that location. Rewards are set up randomly (and in secret) at all locations, and rewards awaiting
collection are delivered whenever the animal forages at its location.
Although a handful of studies have used the Turn-Based Foraging paradigm (Lau & Glimcher,
2005; Jensen & Neuringer, 2008, 2009), it is not the standard paradigm in the study of choice. In
comparative animal studies, choices have more commonly been studied using ‘concurrent variable
interval’ schedules, in which reward availability depends on the passage of time rather than on
subject-initiated turns. Contrastingly, the dominant paradigm in behavioral economics is the use
of ‘repeated lotteries,’ in which participants are asked to make a series of independent gambles.
Each of these methods has shortcomings that the Turn-Based Foraging paradigm helps to address.
One difficulty with variable interval (VI) schedules is that there is considerable ambiguity in
the literature about what the word ‘variable’ entails; some studies sample from an exponential
distribution directly (the agreed-upon best practice), while others use discretized exponential ap-
proximations (e.g. Fleshler & Hoffman, 1962), and still others make use of non-exponential distri-
bution (e.g. Alsop & Elliffe, 1988). Problematically, these procedural differences impact behavior,
complicating comparisons across the VI literature (Taylor & Davison, 1983; Elliffe & Alsop, 1996).
VI schedules also increase the subjective complexity of the task, because a subject must track
not only the relative richness of the alternatives, but also their own overall response rate. If rewards
become available only once per minute (on average), then subject making one response per second
is ‘wasting’ considerable effort. Evidence suggests that subjects are sensitive to these temporal
dynamics (Nevin, 2003), which helps explain why VI schedules routinely elicit lower response rates
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than variable ratio (VR) schedules (Baum, 1993).
Turn-Based Foraging also permits very easy calculation of the objective probability of reward
on any given response. Given the logic detailed in Algorithm 1, the probability is a simple function
of the number of turns ti since the last response to the alternative Ci, which follows the cumulative
geometric distribution (Jensen & Neuringer, 2008):
Pr (Reward|Ci) = 1− (1− Pi)ti (9.1)
The more turns an organism spends away from an alternative, the more opportunities that alter-
native will have had to set up a reward. Thus, as ti becomes large, the value of (1− Pi)ti becomes
small and the cumulative probability of a reward approaches 1.0.
This simple relationship between the distribution of effort and the cumulative probability of
being rewarded provides Turn-Based Foraging with another of its strengths: Optimal behavior
consists of intermixing the response alternatives at an equilibrium point. This contrasts with the
repeated lotteries popular in behavioral economics, where ‘optimal’ consists either of exclusively
choosing one option over another, or displaying indifference (Vulkan, 2000). Because not all behavior
can be reduced to either exclusive preference or strict indifference, a methodology is required that
permits experimental investigation of the range between these alternatives.
9.1 Methods
9.1.1 Subjects
Subjects were 10 male albino Sprague-Dawley rats (Charles River, NY), weighing 450-650 g. Al-
though familiar with the operant chambers and trained to press a single lever on a continuous
reinforcement (CRF) schedule prior to running, they otherwise began näıve to the task. Subjects
were pair-housed and were given one hour of access to food following each day’s experimental
session, with additional time provided in the event that any animal began to lose weight. Addi-
tionally, subjects were given free access to food from Friday afternoon to Sunday afternoon during
each week.
CHAPTER 9. CONCURRENT CHOICE: FOUR VS. SIX VS. EIGHT ALTERNATIVES 81
Algorithm 1: The dependent concurrent variable ratio schedule (depVR), as implemented
in Rat Experiment 1.
Data: number of alternatives D, setup probabilities P
begin
F← Zeroes(D) /* Boolean array for storing rewards */
repeat
x← Response() /* Subject selects an alternative */
if F (x) == 1 then
F (x)← 0; /* If food is available, remove counter */
Reward(); /* Reward delivery */
for i = 1 to D do
if Rand() < P (i) then
F (i)← 1; /* If setup condition is met, set counter to 1 */
until 100 rewards earned or 60 minutes elapsed
9.1.2 Apparatus
Data were collected using four operant chambers manufactured by Med Associated (Model ENV-
008). Each chamber measured 30.5 cm x 24.1 cm x 21 cm, with a grid floor of evenly-spaced
stainless steel rods (4.8 mm diameter). The front and back walls were clear plastic, while the left
and right walls consisted of modular steel slots that could be reconfigured. Rewards were Bio-
serv-brand 45-mg food pellets delivered into a recessed trough positioned 2 cm above the chamber
floor in the center slot of the right wall. Between two and eight non-retractable levers were made
available during any particular session. The layout of the chamber, along with the positional indices
of the eight possible lever locations, are depicted in Figure 9.1. Additionally, each chamber had an
illuminated house light and a fan, and was enclosed in a sound-attenuating wooden box (75 cm x
61 cm x 38 cm). The operant chambers were collectively controlled by a PC running MedPC-IV
software.











Figure 9.1: Operant chamber layout for the eight-lever condition. Lever were fixed in place and
could not retract. In the six-lever phases, Lever 1 and Lever 2 were not available and were replaced
with a smooth steel wall segment . In the four-lever phases, Levers 1, 2, 7, and 8 were not available.
9.1.3 Procedure
In order to implement the Turn-Based Foraging paradigm, rewards were scheduled according to
a ‘dependent concurrent variable ratio’ (depVR) schedule. In such a schedule, rewards are made
available probabilistically every time the subject responds. However, depVR schedules differ from
traditional variable ratio schedules because a response to any alternative creates an opportunity
for rewards to set up on every alternative, and rewards that set up on other alternatives remain
available until collected. The schedule is described precisely by the pseudocode presented in Algo-
rithm 1. The probabilities of reward setup are described in Table 9.1.
Each phase consisted of ten sessions, which were run five days a week (Monday to Friday).
Sessions run until either 100 rewards had been earned, or until 60 minutes had elapsed, whichever
came first.
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Phase Lever 1 Lever 2 Lever 3 Lever 4 Lever 5 Lever 6 Lever 7 Lever 8
1 (Eight Levers) .0422 .0357 .0617 .0552 .0097 .0065 .0227 .0162
2 (Eight Levers) .0552 .0162 .0357 .0065 .0617 .0227 .0097 .0422
3 (Eight Levers) .0162 .0617 .0097 .0357 .0227 .0552 .0422 .0065
4 (Eight Levers) .0617 .0422 .0065 .0162 .0552 .0097 .0357 .0227
5 (Eight Levers) .0065 .0097 .0162 .0227 .0357 .0422 .0552 .0617
1 (Four Levers) – – .0178 .0417 .0774 .1131 – –
2 (Four Levers) – – .1131 .0774 .0417 .0178 – –
3 (Four Levers) – – .0417 .1131 .0178 .0774 – –
4 (Four Levers) – – .0774 .0178 .1131 .0417 – –
1 (Six Levers) – – .0759 .0134 .0580 .0491 .0223 .0313
2 (Six Levers) – – .0134 .0759 .0223 .0580 .0313 .0491
3 (Six Levers) – – .0491 .0223 .0313 .0134 .0759 .0580
4 (Six Levers) – – .0223 .0491 .0759 .0313 .0580 .0134
Table 9.1: Schedule probabilities in Rat Experiment 1
9.2 Results
Over the course of the experiment, each subject made between 60,000 and 64,000 responses across
the thirteen different phases. In order to characterize this substantial body of responses, both the
molar level of analysis (i.e. phase-level descriptive statistics) and the molecular level (i.e. changes
over time) must be considered. Molar effects are considered first, followed by molecular methods.
9.2.1 Molar Analysis
As described in Chapter 5, the barycentric matching model described proportions of behavior in
terms of an exponent α, called sensitivity, and a compositional vector κ, called bias (see Equa-
tion 5.1). To obtain parameter estimates, each subject’s responses to each alternative were summed
over the last seven sessions in each phase. A regression analysis (Equation 5.2) was then performed
using proportions of response (B, for “behavior”) as the dependent variable, while the reward setup
probabilities, listed in Table 9.1 were used as the independent variable, R.
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The data can be represented in a parsimonious fashion using the ILR transformation, but
making use of it requires specifying an orthonormal basis U (Equation 4.6). The molar analysis of
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Here, each column refers to a lever, while each row represents an empirical contrast. Row u1
estimates only how [lever 3 & lever 4] contrasts with [lever 5 & lever 6], while row u2 estimates
only the contrast between lever 3 and lever 4. Since the 4- and 6-lever cases used subsets of the
levers, the orthonormal bases for their transformations are subsets of this matrix: U4 consists only
of u1:3,3:6, i.e. rows 1 through 3 and columns 3 through 6, as these are the three contrasts devoted
to levers 3 through 6.
As noted in Chapter 4, there is no uniquely ideal orthonormal basis for analyzing compositions
of a given size. It is instead up the analyst to specify the contrasts that are interesting, doing so
in a principled manner. Importantly, because the present analysis makes use of the barycentric
matching model (Equation 1.12), any valid orthonormal basis will yield an identical estimate of α
and a precisely similar estimate of κ (that is, identical under rotation). Consequently, although the
contrasts specified by Equation 9.2 are interesting with respect to some of the obvious questions
regarding the factors contributing to relative bias, they are also in a sense arbitrary, and do not
bias the resulting analysis. Note that equivalent parameter estimates would be obtained using
CLR-transformed data as well.
Forming a complete picture of behavior at the molar level requires understanding both the bias
and sensitivity parameters. The sensitivity parameter is considered first, followed by bias.
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Figure 9.2: Plots of the sensitivity parameters for Subjects 105 and 106 in Experiment 1. Bias
parameters κ and sensitivity parameter α relating the CLR-transformed programmed probabilities
in Table 9.1 to the CLR-transformed proportions of responding summed over the last seven sessions
were estimated using Equation 5.2. The bias parameters were then factored out to provide a visual
sense of the sensitivity parameters. Sensitivity appears to be lower (i.e. a shallower slope is observed)
when there are fewer alternatives than when there are more alternatives.
9.2.1.1 Sensitivity
Because κ acts as a normalizing factor, a plot with (B∗ − κ∗) on the y-axis and R∗ on the x-axis
is expected to be linear and to pass through the origin. This provides a straightforward way to
visually compare the α parameter in each condition (where it corresponds to the slope of the line),
as well as to visually assess the variability accounted for. Figure 9.2 does this for Subjects 105 and
106, whose α parameters were typical.
For both subjects 105 and 106, estimates of sensitivity appear to increase as a function of the
number of alternatives (that is, α4 < α6 < α8). This pattern generally persists for the other eight
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Figure 9.4: Kernel density estimates (KDE) of distributions of sensitivity parameters α for all
subjects in all conditions. Markedly higher sensitivity was seen in the eight-lever condition than in
the four- and six-lever conditions. The KDE used a Gaussian kernel whose bandwidth was set using
the rule of thumb specified by Silverman (1986).
subjects, whose sensitivity is plotted in Figure 9.3.
The distributions of the sensitivity parameter across subjects are estimated in Figure 9.4 using
a kernel density estimate (or ‘KDE’, Silverman, 1986). The population density is obtained by
assigning a Gaussian distribution to each parameter estimate for each subject, whose standard









Here, the kernel σKDE is based on the estimated standard deviation for the sample, σ̂. This rule
of thumb is optimal if the underlying data are Gaussian, and is fairly robust in other cases. (see
Silverman, 1986, for details).
Based on Figure 9.4, there appears to be more overlap between the 4-lever and 6-lever conditions
than between the 8-lever condition. A non-parametric two-way analysis of variance (commonly
identified as the Friedman test; see Quade, 1984) found a significant difference among the sample
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means (χ2 (2) = 13.4, p < .002). However, post-hoc multiple comparisons test (Rhyne & Steel,
1965) only confirm a significant difference between the 4-lever and 8-lever conditions.
Because the KDE in Figure 9.4 suggests the data were approximately normal, a repeated-
measures analysis of variance was also performed. This parametric analysis yielded a highly sig-
nificant effect (F (2, 106) > 16.2, p < .001), and Holm-Šidák-corrected1 t-tests yielded significant
differences between the 8-lever condition and both the 4-lever condition (p < .02) and the 6-lever
condition (p < .03). The 4- and 6-lever conditions did not differ significantly (p = .12).
9.2.1.2 Bias
Figure 9.5 plots the bias parameters estimated for each lever using color-coded box-and-whisker
diagrams. Note that although Equation 5.1 was used to obtain parameter estimates (which relied
on the ILR transformation), Figure 9.5 instead uses the CLR-transformed parameters κ◦, to make
the per-lever effects clear (as opposed to using the ILR contrasts, whose interpretation requires
that the reader recall exactly which levers are being contrasted with which for every parameter).
Translation between CLR and ILR representations can be achieved without any loss of information
using Equation 4.5, so the two representations are equivalent.
Cursory examination of Figure 9.5 suggests that subjects displayed less bias in their responding
in the 8-lever case (the bias parameters associated with each lever appear generally closer to the
origin in that condition). However, whereas comparing sensitivity across conditions is relatively
straightforward, comparing bias is somewhat less so because of the differing dimensionality of the
conditions. A comparison of κL3 in the 4-, 6-, and 8-lever conditions is inappropriate because of the
closure constraint: κ is a composition, so κL3 is a relative measure, and its interpretation changes
as a function of what choice alternatives it is relative to.
This difficulty can be overcome by instead performing an analysis of κ∗. The ILR transformation
converts the composition κ into a set of orthogonal contrasts that isolate which operanda are being
compared. For example, in the orthonormal basis U defined by Equation 9.2, the contrast u2
contrasts lever 3 and lever 4, and only those levers, regardless of how many other alternatives were
included in that phase of the experiment.
1This is a correction for multiple comparisons that is uniformly more powerful than the commonly-used Bonferonni
correction. See Ludbrook (1998) for details.
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Figure 9.5: Box-and-whisker plots of the distributions of CLR-transformed bias parameters κ◦ for
all subjects in each condition.
Because u6 and u7 are only present in the 8-lever condition, they have no basis for comparison.
For the rest, comparisons were made using a separate repeated-measures analysis of variance of
the absolute deviation for each factor. Significant effects for condition were only observed for u1,
comparing levers 3 & 4 to levers 5 & 6 (F (2, 18) > 10.8, p < .001) and u4, comparing levers 3,
4, 5, & 6 to levers 7 & 8 (F (1, 9) > 10.8, p < .001). In post-hoc Holm-Šidák comparisons, the
8-lever condition is significantly lower than the other conditions in both cases, while the remaining
conditions do not differ from one another. Table 9.2 shows the mean absolute contrast for each
condition, as well as the standard error estimated from the repeated-measures ANOVAs.
9.2.1.3 Summary
These analyses paint an unexpected picture: Subjects appear to be more sensitive to the schedule
of rewards in the 8-lever condition than in either the 4- or 6-lever conditions, and also appear to
be less biased. Thus, by both metrics provided by generalized matching, subjects were closer to
optimal performance when the task was at its most complex. Some trends pointed toward the
6-lever conditions engendering more optimal performance than the 4-lever condition, but none of
these were significant.
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Contrast Levers Compared 4 Levers 6 Levers 8 Levers Standard Error
u1 (3,4) vs. (5,6) 0.6318 0.5788 0.3281 0.0492
u2 (3) vs. (4) 0.1016 0.0523 0.1862 0.0442
u3 (5) vs. (6) 0.0770 0.1055 0.0739 0.0170
u4 (3,4,5,6) vs. (7,8) N/A 0.9939 0.4598 0.0860
u5 (7) vs. (8) N/A 0.2593 0.1479 0.0496
Table 9.2: Mean ILR-Transformed Bias Contrasts (Absolute) in Rat Experiment 1. The ‘Levers
Compared’ column shows which alternatives are included in each contrast.
In order to examine the behavioral processes that gave rise to these parameters, an extensive
molecular analysis follows.
9.2.2 Molecular Analysis
While an analysis of steady-state patterns of responding show unambiguously that subjects adapted
their behavior to changes in the schedule (as evidenced by sensitivity parameters greater than zero),
these molar descriptions do little to illuminate what gives rise to these changes in behavior. This
approach also, by design, ignores data immediately following a transition to a new schedule. To
obtain a better understanding of the process by which decisions evolve over time, a time-series (or
‘molecular’) analysis was undertaken.
The primary tool used for the analysis was a form of change-point analysis called the CPR
algorithm (Jensen, 2014 (projected)). This method, which is summarized in Appendix B, assumes
that data arise stochastically from an underlying distribution, and that this underlying distribution
may change abruptly an unknown number of times. These ‘change-points’ are identified using a
Bayesian algorithm that weighs the evidence in favor of a more complex model that includes a
change vs. the evidence favoring a less complex model that lacks a change. This process unfolds
recursively, determining whether a change-point is justified in a segment of data, dividing the data
at the most appropriate point if a change is detected, and repeating the process on each resulting
subsegment. This process continues until the evidence is deemed to support no further changes.
An important feature of this approach is that it automatically corrects for model complexity,
subdividing the data only a much as the evidence supports. This, in turn, means that each segment
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Figure 9.6: Cumulative record of responses for Subject 104 in the four-alternative condition. A
change-point analysis using a multinomial distribution was performed to determine when proportions
of response changed. Vertical black lines indicate when the schedule of rewards changed, and the
dashed lines indicate when a change-point was detected.
can be treated as having been sampled from a steady-state process. The CPR algorithm is a general
approach that has been developed for many different distributions. In the present case, we assume
that the data in each steady-state segment is sampled randomly from a multinomial distribution
whose parameters we would like to estimate.
If the CPR algorithm is applied to a subject’s entire response history, relatively few change-
points arise. For example, Figure 9.6 depicts the cumulative record of responses made by Subject
104 in the 4-lever condition. In this case, exactly one change-point (dashed lines) is identified for
each change in the schedule (solid lines), often following so closely on the heels of the schedule
change that the two nearly overlap. The substantial bias favoring levers 5 and 6 over levers 3 and
4 are evident in their higher overall rates of selection, and the relatively shallow inflections at each
change-point are reflective of Subject 104’s low sensitivity in this condition. This result is typical,
but it is also misleading, because of the assumption that responses are sampled stochastically. An
examination of the conditional probabilities underlying the overall behavior reveals that behavior
is instead highly structured.
There are two substantial sources of structure in responding that render a simple multino-
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Unrewarded Response To L5



























Unrewarded Response To L6

























Rewarded Response To L3
























Rewarded Response To L4



























Rewarded Response To L5

























Rewarded Response To L6
Figure 9.7: Cumulative record of conditional responses for Subject 104 in the four-alternative condi-
tion. The top row consists of responses following an unrewarded trial, while the bottom row consists
of responses following a rewarded trial. Vertical black lines indicate when the schedule of rewards
changed, and the dashed lines indicate when a change-point was detected.
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mial model invalid. The first is that the conditional probabilities of selecting each operandum
given the prior choice deviate substantially from the stochastic expectation. The second is that
responses following the delivery of a reward differ substantially from those following unrewarded
trials. These criteria split Subject 104’s approximately 18,000 responses in the 4-lever condition
into eight categories. The cumulative plots and corresponding change-point analyses that result
from this subdivision are depicted in Figure 9.7.
As these plots reveal, Subject 104’s choices were substantially contingent on the preceding
circumstance. Following an unrewarded trial, the next response was often to the lever counter-
clockwise from the previous lever. Following a rewarded trial, responses were most commonly made
to Lever 6. Figure 9.7 also reveals that some conditional relationships changed more frequently than
others. For example, the choice made following an unrewarded response to lever 3 was invariant
across schedules, whereas responses conditional on lever 4 changed frequently.
The resulting behavior can be described by two first-order Markov chains (i.e. two conditional
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

Here, Ri is used as a shorthand for “reward earned as a result of a response to alternative i”,
while ¬Ri denotes “no reward earned as a result of a response to alternative i.” This formulation
also draws attention to the fact that each row in the table is a composition whose contents are
independent of the other rows.
At each point in Figure 9.7 when a change-point is identified, only the components in the
corresponding row change. The conditional probabilities themselves are estimated by the CPR
algorithm merely by computing the sum of the observations in each category, adding 0.5 to each
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Figure 9.8: Estimated stationary response proportions for Subject 104 in the four-alternative con-
dition, given the conditional matrices for unrewarded responding (B0) and rewarded responding
(B1).
score2, and then applying the closure operation.
A model of behavior consisting of Markov chains is straightforward to simulate. Figure 9.8 shows
the estimated overall response rate, taking both rewarded and unrewarded behavior into account.
These rates effectively provide a principled estimate of the slopes plotted in Figure 9.6, while also
displaying sensitivity to transitions in behavior too subtle for the CPR algorithm to detect at the
molar level. For example, although the transition from the first to the second schedule at around
trial 4,000 engendered an immediate shift in behavior, a period of further calibration is evident
over the next few thousand responses.
Furthermore, given any contingency table for which all states are positive recurrent, the sta-
















The stationary distribution may be calculated arithmetically using the following linear relationship,
2As in any Bayesian method, the CPR algorithm requires that the analyst specify the prior distributions for
each parameter. Adding 0.5 to each score corresponds to the Jeffreys prior (Jeffreys, 1946), which has the desirable
property that it is ‘minimally informative,’ meaning that its biasing influence on the posterior distribution for the
parameters is the smallest possible. See Jensen (2014 (projected)) for further details.
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Figure 9.9: Number of change-points detected per phase in Experiment 1.
thanks to the reduced degrees of freedom implied by the closure constraint:
π = πB
Since the vector π can be solved arithmetically, it can be used as the basis for applying the tools
of molar analysis previously described to much narrower windows of time.
These analyses do not speak to the degree to which this approach to describing the behavior
is consistent across animals. A simple summary statistic to examine is the number of change-
points detected in each phase of the experiment, plotted in Figure 9.9. This plot reveals that, very
consistently, subjects made detectable changes to their behavior frequently during the early phases
of the experiment (i.e. during the eight-lever phases), but made changes much less frequently in
the later (four- and six-lever) phases.
Performing the appropriate statistical test of these differences is complicated by (1) the clear
changes in variance from one phase to the next and (2) the nested characteristics of the data
(in which phase was subordinate to number of levers). To accommodate these complications, the
130 values were rank-transformed (Conover & Iman, 1981) and subjected to a mixed-model nested
ANOVA, in which lever count and phase were treated as fixed effects, phase was nested within lever
count, subject ID was treated as a random effect, and subject ID and lever count were permitted
to interact. The fixed effects were significant, with the effect of lever count being most pronounced
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Figure 9.10: Mean sensitivity parameter across subjects, estimated on a trial-by-trial basis assuming
consistent bias for each condition.
(F (2, 18) > 40.8, p < .0001), followed by the effect of phase (F (10, 90) > 5.4, p < .0001). Although
a significant interaction was seen between subject ID and lever count (F (18, 90) > 2.8, p < .001),
there was not a significant effect for subject ID (F (9, 18.06) = 0.95, p = .51).
9.2.2.1 Group Averaging
If B0 and B1 provide an adequate description of behavior at a given point in time, being able to
compute the stationary distribution of a behavior allows bias-corrected sensitivity estimates (of the
sort plotted in Figure 9.2) to be obtained at any time point. Because this ‘trial-wise’ estimate of
sensitivity does not require summing responses across multiple sessions, it allows an assessment of
the refinement of behavior over time.
Figure 9.10 plots the mean sensitivity across subjects of responses following unrewarded trials
in red and rewarded trials in blue (thin lines represent one standard error), tracking the first 3,500
trials in each condition. These suggest that, in general, subjects adapted their behavior over the
course of multiple sessions. Being group means, these ‘learning curves’ are not representative of
individual performance (which tend consist of much more abrupt transitions). Nevertheless, they
suggest that, in general, adjustments are made throughout each phase.
The benefits of these adjustments are generally quite small, as measured by rewards obtained.
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Figure 9.11: Mean reward rate across subjects, based on simulations using the programmed reward
probabilities and the response models described by each subjects conditional response matrices.
Figure 9.11 plots the mean reward rate across subjects, as determined from simulations of behavior
using B0 and B1 (with gray lines indicating one standard error). Across subjects and conditions, the
range of reward rates is narrow, nearly always falling between 0.19 and 0.21 rewards per response.
Following a period of adjustment to a schedule change, the reward rate tended to stabilize, even as
further refinements were made to the patterns of response (as indicated by the changing sensitivity).
9.2.2.2 Summary
Despite providing an excellent fit for proportions of behavior summed over time, the molar analyses
mask response structure that can be observed by considering first-order conditional probabilities.
When examined in these terms, patterns of behavior changed as a function of the preceding re-
sponse, as well as the receipt of a reward.
A change-point analysis was used to determine when the conditional probabilities of responding
changed, yielding the stationary Markov processes B0 and B1 as models of behavior following
unrewarded trials and rewarded trials, respectively. Since the stationary distribution of a positive
recurrent Markov process can be solved for arithmetically, these matrices enable the tools of molar
analysis to be deployed over short time scales.
Analyses of the estimated sensitivity and reward rate over the course of time series suggest
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that behavior underwent ongoing refinement. However, reward rates differed only slightly over this
period, suggesting perhaps that some other factor was driving the refinement of behavior.
9.2.3 Information-Theoretic Analysis
Individual differences in choice behavior can make it difficult to describe in general terms, much
less to theorize about. This is particularly true when evaluating conditional probabilities, which
are already awkward to visualize with four alternatives and become exponentially more so as
alternatives are added.
While sensitivity and bias provide descriptions of overall patterns of behavior, they do at the
expense of an understanding of the process by which behavior emerges. This motivates an addi-
tional analysis described below, in which measures from information theory were used to provide a
summary description of behavioral complexity.
9.2.3.1 Entropy Rate
Knowing both the conditional probabilities and the stationary distribution enables the calculation
of the entropy rate, which provides a measure of how much additional information, on average, is
transmitted by the behavior with each response (McMillan, 1953). This can be computed from the
model with the following equation:
H (B) = −
∑
i,j∈D
πi · Pr (i|j) · log2 (Pr (i|j)) (9.5)
Here, the information (or entropy) of each response as measured in bits (due to the use of a base-2
logarithm) is computed by calculating the entropy of each row, multiplying it by the stationary
distribution.
The entropy rate of a complex phenomenon provides a good summary of the cognitive load
associated with its processing. For example, the entropy rate of written English has been studied
both at the level of individual symbols (between 1.0 and 1.5 bits per character B. Schneider, 1996)
and word order (about 5.7 bits per word Montemurro & Zanette, 2011). Surprisingly, the entropy
rates of different natural languages appear similar, even when employing dramatically different
alphabets and grammar (M. A. Changizi, 2011). This surprising consistency has been present as
evidence of a basic cognitive limit in human language processing (Pellegrino et al., 2011). Similar
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Figure 9.12: Entropy rate of conditional responding for Subject 104 in the four-alternative condition.
arguments have been put forth for vision (M. A. Changizi, 2008) and music processing (Pearce &
Wiggins, 2004).
The entropy rate of Subject 104’s 4-lever responding (as estimated from the model consisting
of B0 and B1) is presented in Figure 9.12. This shows that although the overall frequencies of
responding changed as a function of the schedule (sometimes being close to equiprobable, and
other times clearly favoring one alternative over the others), the entropy rate of responding was
generally uniform. Furthermore, responses following reward delivery (B1) had a lower entropy
rate than the rest (B0), a pattern consistent with greater bias observed immediately after reward
delivery.
Analyzed across subjects and across conditions, the entropy rates clearly differ as a function
of the number of response alternatives. This was confirmed by rank-transforming each subject’s
mean entropy rate per phase (Conover & Iman, 1981) and performing a mixed-model ANOVA with
phase nested within lever count, subject ID treated as a random variable, and subject ID allowed to
interact with lever count. Entropy rates differed significantly as a function of lever counts in both
unrewarded trials (F (2, 18) > 223.4, p < .0001) and rewarded trials (F (2, 18) > 12.6, p < .0005).
An effect of phase was also significant in the unrewarded trials (F (10, 90) > 4.4, p < .0001), but
not in the rewarded trials (F (10, 90) = 1.11, p = .36). This effect appears to be driven by a gradual
decrease over the course of the 8-lever phase; the entropy rate appears otherwise stable over the
course of the 4- and 6-lever conditions that follow. Throughout, the entropy rate associated with
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Figure 9.13: Mean entropy rate across subjects, estimated based on the response models described
by each subjects conditional response matrices.
responses following rewards is lower than otherwise, consistent with the bias toward responses near
the food-delivery trough.
9.2.3.2 Divergence Rate
A distinction must be made between the complexity of a behavior and the cognitive load that it
demands of the organism performing the behavior. Because the experimental paradigm requires
that the subject displace itself in the operant chamber, each conditional probability reflects a
a choice made under different circumstances. This can yield conditional biases in behavior. For
example, because Lever 5 is positioned directly above Lever 1, it is plausible that a subject might be
much more likely to display a Lever 5→ Lever 1 transition than would be predicted from the overall
biases for Lever 5 and Lever 1 alone. This yields an increase in the informational complexity of the
behavior without any increased information processing on the part of the subject. Consequently, it
is essential to tease apart observed complexity that arises from a subject-environment interaction
from information that must be encoded and processed by the subject. Entropy rate provides a
measure of the former, but not of the latter.
A simple solution to this problem is to measure the entropy of each subject’s ‘divergence’ from a
baseline behavior. This can be accomplished using a metric called the Kullback-Leibler divergence
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Figure 9.14: Kullback-Leibler divergence rate of conditional responding for Subject 104 in the four-
alternative condition.










Here, P is an observed frequency distribution, and Q is a theoretical distribution. Both are pre-
sumed to have the same number of symbols, but those symbols do not necessarily appear with equal
frequency. KLD (P‖Q) measures the number of additional bits of information needed to transmit
a signal using the symbol set P that was originally composed using Q.
As an example, consider the 26 letters in the English language. These letters appear with a
particular distribution across the broad corpus of written English, in which E is the most common
letter (occurring 12.49% of the time) and Z is the least common (occurring 0.09% of the time),
according to a recent exhaustive analysis of the 743.8 billion words in the Google Books database
(Norvig, 2013). Let LEng be this theoretical distribution. Next, suppose that an artist wishes to
reproduce large passages of English using tiles from the popular board game Scrabble (Butts, 1938).
Although Scrabble tiles have a similar distribution of letters to English, it differs appreciably in
some respects. For example, the letter Z appears in the Scrabble letter set 1.02% of the time, over
100 times the rate it appears in long-form written English. Let LScr be the distribution of tiles
observed in Scrabble.
Because LScr and LEng are mismatched, the artist in this example will discover that buying
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Scrabble board games in bulk will yield a surplus of some letters and a shortage of others. The
resulting ‘wastage’ of tiles is the cost of translating a signal composed using LEng into a message
composed using LScr. By measuring KLD (LScr‖LEng), we can obtain a measure (in bits) of how
large this wastage is. Based on Equation 9.6, this amounts to 0.129 bits per character.
Equation 9.6 does not, however, take into account the response structure as a continuous mea-


















Here, Q is the geometric mean of the conditional probability matrix B at each time t in the time
series. For example, the geometric means of all transition probabilities derived from Figure 9.7




0.0112 0.5047 0.0183 0.4658
0.6307 0.0085 0.3617 0.0260
0.0374 0.6177 0.0098 0.3351






0.0135 0.0061 0.0288 0.9517
0.0202 0.0144 0.1511 0.8144
0.0227 0.0183 0.3943 0.5646
0.0079 0.0079 0.1682 0.8160


These provide an estimate of Subject 104’s ‘default’ behavior across conditions. Note that the
appropriateness of this estimation approach depends on thorough counterbalancing in the exper-
imental design. The default transition matrices for all subjects in Experiment 1 are presented in
Appendix C.
Figure 9.14 plots the divergence rate for Subject 104 in the 4-lever condition. In clear contrast
to the entropy rate (which differed as a function of reward delivery), the divergence rate was
consistently low. This indicates that Subject 104 not only employed strategies that maintained
relatively uniform levels of entropy, but further that these strategies were reliably similar to the
default patterns of transition.
This analysis was extended to all subjects in all conditions. The resulting mean divergence
rates are plotted in Figure 9.15. In some respects, these results are similar to the change over time
3Because these matrices represent conditional probabilities, each row of each matrix is also subject to the closure
constraint, and thus must sum to 1.0
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Figure 9.15: Mean Kullback-Leibler divergence rate across subjects, estimated based on the response
models described by each subjects conditional response matrices.
in the mean entropy rate: Some differences remain between conditions, and responses following
a reward continue to display less structure than others. However, a general effect of time is also
evident, with substantial divergence from the default pattern during the early configurations of the
schedule, and generally low divergence in the 4- and 6-lever conditions.
As in the case of the entropy rates, each subject’s mean entropy rate per phase was rank-
transformed (Conover & Iman, 1981) and subjected to a mixed-model ANOVA with phase nested
within lever count, subject ID treated as a random variable, and subject ID allowed to interact with
lever count. Divergence rates differed significantly as a function of lever counts in both unrewarded
trials (F (2, 18) > 15.3, p < .0002) and rewarded trials (F (2, 18) > 4.2, p < .04). A significant
difference was also as a function of phase during unrewarded trials (F (10, 90) > 8.2, p < .0001),
but not during rewarded trials (F (10, 90) = 0.88, p = .55).
9.2.4 Transitions and Schedule Configuration
In order to reconcile the relationship between trial-by-trial estimates of sensitivity (Figure 9.10) and
the proposal that behavior is best understood as deviations from the default transition matrices
Q0 and Q1, it is necessary to characterize what would constitute a mismatch between a particular
strategy and a particular schedule. Doing so provides some basis for determining whether or not a
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subject’s performance can be anticipated for some unknown schedule, given some known transition
matrix.
Conceptually, a mismatch is easy to imagine. In the four-lever phases, for example, subjects
tended to travel along the walls unless interrupted by a reward delivery, and they did so without
making many repeated responses. An example of this shown in Figure 9.7. Because these transitions
were much more common than other transitions, subjects could be expected to perform poorly when
the two best response alternatives were positioned at opposing diagonals from one another, because
the optimal approach to such a scenario would be to travel back and forth along the diagonal. This
was precisely the kind of scenario established by phase 4-4.
From this, a more general principle can be articulated: A response alternative may be considered
an “island” if it is associated with a rich schedule, so long as all transitions that are favored by a
subject from that alternative lead to poor schedules. Under these circumstances, the subject must
‘travel through’ a bad patch to get to another rich schedule, and this will lead to excessive sampling
of the poor alternatives relative to the rich alternatives.
Although this principle is intuitive, it is difficult to visualize for complex scenarios. Conse-
quently, it would be helpful to be able to quantify the degree of ‘islandness’ that arises from the
interaction between a transition matrix Q and a set of reward schedules R. Let this index be
denoted by Island, according to the following formula:
Island = D2 ·
D∑
i,j
Qi,j · πi ·Ri ·Rj given C (R) (9.8)
In this case, πi corresponds to the frequency of state i in the stationary distribution of Q. If the
transition Qi,j is associated with both a relatively rich schedule Ri and another relatively rich
schedule Rj , then the quantity Qi,j ·Ri ·Rj is expected to be relatively large. If, on the other hand,
either Ri or Rj are poor, then the quantity will be smaller. Note that this only provides a rough
approximation, as the reward dynamics of the schedule have a temporal component.
Figure 9.16 shows the relationship between the average Island index across subjects to the
average sensitivity (α), in each of the 13 phases. As in previous figures, the eight-lever case is
plotted in black, the six-lever case in gray, and the four-lever case in white. These sensitivities are
averages of the per-trial estimates from Figure 9.10, and as such exhibit considerable variability.
Nevertheless, there appears to be a trend that higher sensitivities are achieved when a better
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Figure 9.16: Degree of mismatch between transition matrices and schedules. Error bars correspond
to standard errors.
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correspondence between transition matrix and schedule are observed. A mixed-effects regression
model predicting sensitivity confirmed a continuous relationship with Island (F (1, 117) > 4.4, p <
.04), as well as a fixed effect for number of levers (F (2, 117) > 6.44, p < .003). The effect size
of these effects were η2 = .03 and η2 = .08, respectively, corresponding to relatively small effects
according to Cohen’s rule of thumb (Cohen, 1988). The random effect for individual differences
was not significant (F (9, 117) > 1.4, p = .19).
9.3 Discussion
Ten subjects earned rewards by pressing either 4, 6, or 8 fixed levers. Rewards earned from each
lever were governed by concurrent schedules. Under each configuration of levers (first 8, then 4,
then 6), subjects experienced different variations of the reward schedules. A series of analyses were
performed to assess the manner in which subjects adapted their behaviors to these changes.
A molar analysis of behavior was performed using the barycentric matching model (Equa-
tion 1.12), with parameter estimates obtained by conducting a linear regression on the ilr-transformed
data (Equation 5.1). The parameters resulting from this analysis were an overall ‘sensitivity’ to
the programmed probabilities of reward (denoted by α) and a composition of ‘bias’ parameters
(denoted by κ).
Surprisingly, subjects in the 8-lever condition displayed both a higher sensitivity and less bias
overall than they did in the 4- and 6-lever conditions. Additionally, although a significant difference
was not found between the 4- and 6-lever conditions, there were hints that a small effect might
exist, albeit one that Experiment 1 was underpowered to detect.
The direction of the observed differences in both parameters was unexpected. Under an
information-processing model, rising task complexity might be expected to increase the associ-
ated cognitive load, and thus to degrade the quality of task performance (Lavie, 2010). The perils
of ‘overload’ are taken seriously in domains as disparate as ecology (Sol, 2009) and business (Eppler
& Mengis, 2004), suggesting that the metaphor of the brain as an overtaxed computer is deeply
compelling.
Despite this intuition, however, there are other lines of empirical evidence suggesting that
operational models of cognitive overload (or at least, the interpretation of their experimental mea-
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surements) may be overvalued. For example, comparative work suggests that if the relationship
between reaction times and number of alternatives provides a means of measuring intelligence (or
at least, cognitive capacity), then it follows that pigeons must be more intelligent than humans
(Vickery & Neuringer, 2000). In practice, the information processing load of a task is determined
not by the task’s superficial characteristics, but instead by the way in which information about the
task is processed. With this in mind, the analysis turned to a more process-based approach, in
order to determine how the behavior emerged.
This process-oriented analysis began by using a change-point analysis (Jensen, 2014 (projected))
to model the behavior. An initial effort applied to the full time-series of behavior found few inflection
points. However, when change-point analyses were instead applied to the time series conditional on
the previous response and the previous reward outcome, substantial response structure emerged,
as did a more nuanced understanding of which aspects of behavior changed, and at which times.
This yielded a two-fold model, in which the contingency table B1 governed responses following a
reward, while B0 governed behavior otherwise. Rather than using change-points to segregate the
data into entirely isolated epochs, the change-points identified in the conditional time series were
used to update individual rows of B0 and B1 independently of one another.
Because both B0 and B1 represent positive-recurrent stationary Markov processes, their long-
term stationary distribution can be solved for arithmetically. These distributions, when normalized
using the overall bias vector κ, permit the sensitivity parameter α to be recalculated for any time
point. The means of the resulting ‘sensitivity over time’ estimates are plotted in Figure 9.10.
Although these averages are not representative of individual animals, they nevertheless reveal that
changes in behavior continue to occur throughout each phase.
Although the sensitivity parameters changed a great deal over the course of the 3,500 responses
plotted in each phase, the rate of rewards per response was confined to a fairly narrow band near
20%. This suggests that although the relative probability of reward continued to motivate behavior
(without which estimates of α would remain near zero), the overall reward rate was not the primary
signal being used to shape and refine that behavior.
In order to explore the computation underlying behavior, two metrics derived from information
theory were employed: the ‘entropy rate’ (Equation 9.5), which measures the additional Shannon
entropy provided by each trial (McMillan, 1953), and the ‘divergence rate’ (Equation 9.7), which
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measured the average Kullback-Leibler divergence (Kullback & Leibler, 1951) between each trial’s
estimated conditional probability matrices (B0 and B1) and the ‘default transition matrices’ (Q0
and Q1) derived across all conditions. Entropy rate measures suggested, unsurprisingly, that the
complexity of behavior was highest in the 8-lever condition and lowest in the 4-lever condition
(Figure 9.13). However, the divergence rate across conditions did not follow a similar pattern.
Although it was high in the early phases of the experiment, it tended toward toward a relatively
low rate that remained stable across conditions (Figure 9.15).
This contrast is important, because the complexity of behavior depends both on the processing
that takes place in the brain and on the complexity of the environment in which the behavior is
being measured. Many relatively simple strategies will result in more unpredictable behavior if
employed in a more complex environment. The default strategy described by Q0 and Q1 can be
considered a subject’s ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to a problem (whose cognitive load is likely small),
and the divergence rate measures how much additional information must be encoded to account
for changes in observed behavior over time.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the 8-lever condition yielded both higher divergence rates
and higher sensitivities overall. A subject with a low divergence rate has limited itself to only those
strategies that differ slightly from some default pattern, and this limitation is unlikely to permit
response proportions to exactly match relative reward probabilities. The two are not inextricably
linked, however. For example, the mean sensitivity in Phase 8-4 plateaued around 0.5, whereas
phase 8-2 reached a mean closer to 0.4. The mean divergence rate for Phase 8-4, however, was
merely 0.2 bits per trial, compared to the 0.4 bits per trial observed in Phase 8-2.
Thus, rather than interpreting sensitivity and divergence rate as reflections of the same phe-
nomenon, it is more useful to think of them as tapping into different aspects of the response process.
Sensitivity is a useful proxy for a subject’s behavioral efficacy, measuring ability to adapt to feed-
back provided by the environment. Divergence rate, however, is a useful proxy for computational
efficiency, measuring the extent to which subjects are able to minimize the cognitive load associated
with adapting to the current schedule by reconciling their own predispositions with the current task
demands.
The measure Island provides only a rough approximation of the degree of correspondence be-
tween a subject’s transition bias and the particulars of the current schedule, but using it as a
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basis for comparison (as in Figure 9.16) yields results consistent with the hypothesis that subjects
perform less well when schedules require them to deviate further from their behavioral baseline.
However, it remains unclear whether the degree of mismatch is adequate to explain the differences
observed, as a main effect of lever count was detected in the corresponding regression analysis.
9.3.1 Confounds
In order to validate the above interpretation of sensitivity and divergence rate, however, a number
of confounds must be addressed by subsequent experiments.
First, it is important to demonstrate that the barycentric matching model (which assumes a
single sensitivity parameter) is valid, relative to other models that make use of additional parame-
ters. As observed in Chapter 5, each isometric contrast of ILR-transformed data can be assigned its
own sensitivity parameter without violating the implicit geometry of compositional data. A more
completely counterbalanced 8-lever design is necessary to test this hypothesis effectively. This is
undertaken in Experiment 2, described in Chapter 10.
Next, it is essential to determine whether the effects observed in Experiment 1 would arise
given any configuration of levers, or whether the particular configuration of levers utilized had a
determining effect. To test this, Experiment 3 made use of different configurations of four levers,
as described in Chapter 11.
Another vitally important factor to counterbalance is the influence of order of experience, as it
relates to subjects’ age. The gradual decrease in the divergence rate observed in Figure 9.15 does
not seem to be mainly driven by number of choice alternatives, but rather by cumulative learning
history. The generally-lower sensitivity parameters observed in the 4- and 6-lever conditions may
have experienced a similar decrement. Chapter 12 will make use of counterbalanced order of
experience to determine the extent to which learning history, rather than number of alternatives,
might be responsible for the relative insensitivity of behavior in latter phases of Experiment 1.
Another confound addressed in Chapter 12 (in counterbalanced fashion) is that of the relative
richness of the schedule. A reward rate of one pellet per five responses is high relative to many
studies reported in the literature, and it is possible that the observed effects would fail to manifest
under leaner schedules. For example, if reward deliveries constitute information to be used by sub-
jects, then schedules that are overly lean may not provide sufficient information to discover effective
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strategies, while schedules that are overly rich may not necessitate any meaningful discrimination
among the alternatives.
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Chapter 10
Eight Alternative Replication
As surprising as the results of Experiment 1 are with respect to the sensitivity parameter, various
potential confounds must be addressed. The first of these is the concern that the failure to fully
counterbalance aspects of the design led to a distorted sense of the effects.
The most straightforward of these concerns is the failure to fully counterbalance the eight-lever
case (such that each alternative was sampled at each level of schedule richness). Although the com-
positional matching equation should in principle be robust against incomplete counterbalancing,
demonstrating consistent estimates in practice is straightforward to accomplish. Furthermore, repli-
cating the original design effectively double the size of the subject pool, which helps to effectively
characterize population parameters.
Additionally, a more fully counterbalanced design is better suited to testing whether a single
sensitivity parameter is a suitable assumption, as compared to a model with one parameter per
contrast (e.g. Equation 5.5).
10.1 Methods
Experiment 2 was very similar to Experiment 1, by design. Limited to the eight-lever case, the
first five phases of Experiment 2 presented subjects with conditions exactly identical to those
in Experiment 1. Then, three additional phases rounded out the counterbalancing of the lever
schedules.
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Phase Lever 1 Lever 2 Lever 3 Lever 4 Lever 5 Lever 6 Lever 7 Lever 8
1 (Eight Levers) .0422 .0357 .0617 .0552 .0097 .0065 .0227 .0162
2 (Eight Levers) .0552 .0162 .0357 .0065 .0617 .0227 .0097 .0422
3 (Eight Levers) .0162 .0617 .0097 .0357 .0227 .0552 .0422 .0065
4 (Eight Levers) .0617 .0422 .0065 .0162 .0552 .0097 .0357 .0227
5 (Eight Levers) .0065 .0097 .0162 .0227 .0357 .0422 .0552 .0617
6 (Eight Levers) .0357 .0227 .0552 .0617 .0422 .0162 .0065 .0097
7 (Eight Levers) .0227 .0065 .0422 .0097 .0162 .0357 .0617 .0552
8 (Eight Levers) .0097 .0552 .0227 .0422 .0065 .0617 .0162 .0357
Table 10.1: Schedule probabilities in Rat Experiment 2
10.1.1 Subjects & Apparatus
Subjects were a new set of 12 male albino Sprague-Dawley rats (Charles River, NY), weighing
450-650 g. As in Experiment 1, subjects were given preliminary training to press a single lever on
a continuous reinforcement (CRF) schedule prior to running, but were otherwise näıve.
Unless otherwise noted, subject care protocols and the experimental apparatus were identical
to those described in Experiment 1.
10.1.2 Procedure
As in Experiment 1, subjects were presented with an eight-lever Turn-Based Foraging paradigm
(Algorithm 1). Probabilities of reward setup in each of the eight phase are described in Table 10.1.
As in Experiment 1, each phase consisted of ten sessions, each lasting 60 minutes (or ending earlier,
after 100 rewards had been earned).
10.2 Results
As in experiment 1, use of the ILR transformation necessitated the specification of an orthonormal
basis U (Equation 4.6). The molar analysis of Experiment 2 made use of the following basis in the

























































































































































































As in the basis used in Experiment 1, each column refers to a lever, while each row represents
an empirical contrast. Because there is no need to provide identical contrasts across different
configurations of the operant chamber, a basis was selected that more intuitively represented the
qualitative distinctions among operanda, according to the following scheme:
u1 = (Levers close to the floor) vs. (Levers far from the floor)
u2 = (Levers close to the food) vs. (Levers far from the food)
u3 = (Levers on the subject’s left) vs. (Levers on the subject’s right)
u4 = (Levers close to the door) vs. (Levers far from the door)
u5 = Opposing diagonal corner interaction
u6 = Left-to-right diagonal interaction
u7 = Front-to-back diagonal interaction
Figure 10.1 shows the sensitivity and bias parameters across all subjects in Experiment 2.
These distributions are largely consistent with the parameters observed for the eight-lever con-
dition in Experiment 1: a mean α of 0.40 (compared to a mean of 0.46 in Experiment 1), and
a mean bias vector of κ◦ = [0.61, 0.55,−0.21,−0.13, 0.15, 0.05,−0.47,−0.55] (compared to κ◦ =
[0.39, 0.56,−0.28,−0.09, 0.08, 0.10,−0.39,−0.38] in Experiment 1). In these regards, behavior in
Experiments 1 and 2 were similar, despite differing in their degree of counterbalancing and their
use of different subjects.
An important additional test is to consider whether a single α parameter is appropriate. As
noted in Chapter 5, each predictive factor ui in an ILR-transformed matrix can support its own
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Figure 10.1: Molar parameter estimates for Experiment 2. (Left) Kernel density estimate of sensitiv-
ity (α) across the 12 subjects. (Right) Box-and-whisker plots of the distributions of CLR-transformed
bias parameters (κ◦).
exponent αi. Consequently, a regression may be performed on every contrast individually, obtaining
bias and sensitivity for each. In an eight-alternative context, this increases the number of free
parameters from 8 to 14, but permits the question of whether the contrasts are equivalent to be
addressed.
Figure 10.2 shows boxplots of the distributions of sensitivities for each of the contrasts. It
appears to imply that the contrast u1 (proximity to the floor) tended to engender somewhat
higher sensitivity than the rest, while u3 (handedness) tended to yield less sensitive discrimi-
nation. Figure 10.2 also suggests that subjects tended to show more varied parameters for the
diagonal interactions (especially u5). Given the differences in variance, a nonparametric Friedman
test (Quade, 1984) was performed, and a significant difference in the sensitivities was identified
(χ2 (2) = 13.4, p < .002). Post-hoc multiple comparisons test (Rhyne & Steel, 1965) found signif-
icant differences only between u1 and u3 on the one hand, and u1 and u6 on the other; all other
differences were non-significant.
Although a difference in the contrasts was found, the single-α model nevertheless has the advan-
tage of parsimony. To determine whether a model with multiple α parameters would be appropriate,
Akaike’s corrected information criterion (AICc) (Hurvich & Tsai, 1989) was computed for three
models: An “intercept only” model acting as a null hypothesis, a “single α” model, and a “multiple
α” model based on the contrasts in the matrix U8 above. Table 10.2 shows these AICc scores for
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Figure 10.2: Molar sensitivity estimates calculated for each orthonormal contrast in Experiment 2.
each subject and each model. In every case, the single α model yields the lowest score (and thus
the best fit of the three). Consequently, a single-α model appears preferable as a default approach.
The number of change-points detected per phase is plotted in Figure 10.3. As in Experiment 1,
early phases appear to engender more frequent changes; however, unlike Experiment 1, the present
data consist only of eight-lever configurations. A rank-transformed (Conover & Iman, 1981)
mixed-model ANOVA was performed, with phase as a fixed effect and subject ID as a random
effect. Significant differences were found both with respect to phase (F (7, 77) > 12.6, p < .0001)
and subject ID (F (11, 77) > 3.3, p < .001). Consequently, even when limiting the focus to eight
levers, subjects appear to make more frequent changes to their strategies during the earliest phases
of their experience, and make fewer changes later on, a pattern consistent with the hypothesis that
early responding is characterized by a more dynamical strategy, whereas later responding consists
mainly of small corrections to a general pattern.
As in Experiment 1, change-point analysis was used to detect changes in the conditional response
probabilities of subjects, and these were used to obtain trial-specific estimates of their stationary
distributions. Given the time-specific stationary distribution and the correcting for bias, trial-
specific estimates of sensitivity were obtained. The mean of these estimates across subjects is
plotted in Figure 10.4. Although subjects consistently achieved a high sensitivity in the first phase,
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Figure 10.3: Number of change-points detected per phase in Experiment 1.



















Figure 10.4: Mean sensitivity (α) estimate across subjects for each of the first 3,500 trials in each
phase. The blue dashed line indicates sensitivity conditional on having just received a reward, while
the red line indicates sensitivity otherwise. Thin lines indicate one standard error of the mean.
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Subject Intercept Only Single α Multiple α
1 115.82 34.45 51.99
2 99.52 -0.98 16.98
3 91.24 -13.52 -3.61
4 90.98 -9.72 7.21
5 98.46 -1.80 15.55
6 105.69 30.67 41.39
7 82.43 40.04 46.32
8 94.85 -28.36 -22.65
9 114.57 -18.17 -6.98
10 95.28 -10.94 0.41
11 82.22 0.15 5.12
12 86.78 16.39 29.74
Table 10.2: Akaike’s corrected information criterion (AICc) for each molar model in Experiment 2.
The lowest score for each subject is highlighted in green.
their subsequent parameters consistently failed to rise to a similar level, a similar result to the
eight-level condition in Experiment 1.
Figure 10.5 shows the mean reward rate, also computed on a per-trial basis using each subject’s
first-order contingency table. As in Experiment 1, rates were relatively invariant, showing a small
improvement over the first 3,500 trials of each phase, shifting by at most a few percentage points.
Reward rate did not appear particularly well correlated with sensitivity: Lower rates were observed
in phases 8-5 and 8-7, despite those phases displaying comparable levels of sensitivity.
Figure 10.6 shows the change in the the mean entropy rate (Equation 9.5) across subjects, as
derived from their first-order contingency tables. Unlike sensitivity (which showed a marked change
at the onset of each new phase, due to the change in the reward schedule), entropy rates seemed
relatively unaffected by the transition between schedules. Instead, a gradual decrease was observed
over the duration of the experiment.
This trend is even more evident in the mean divergence rate (Equation 9.7), shown in Fig-
ure 10.7. As in Experiment 1, the default transition matrices for each were subject were estimated
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Figure 10.5: Mean rewards earned per response for each of the first 3,500 trials in each phase (as
estimated based on 100,000 simulated responses using a subject’s first-order contingency table at
that time). Thin lines indicate one standard error of the mean.

























Figure 10.6: Mean entropy rate (Equation 9.5) estimated across subjects for each of the first 3,500
trials in each phase. The blue dashed line indicates sensitivity conditional on having just received a
reward, while the red line indicates sensitivity otherwise. Thin lines indicate one standard error of
the mean.
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Figure 10.7: Mean divergence rate (Equation 9.7) estimate across subjects for each of the first 3,500
trials in each phase. The blue dashed line indicates sensitivity conditional on having just received a
reward, while the red line indicates sensitivity otherwise. Thin lines indicate one standard error of
the mean.
(reported in Appendix C), and each subject’s trial-by-trial divergence from that default strategy
was estimated. By the third phase, subjects had generally settled on a stable divergence rate of
0.2 bits per response, on average. This low rate suggests that the adaptation shown by subjects
fell within a narrow informational radius around each subject’s default transition biases.
10.3 Discussion
A group of 12 rats replicated the first 5 phases of Experiment 1, following which they completed
three additional phases to receive fully counterbalanced experience of the schedule. Both with
respect to molar and molecular analyses, this replication yielded equivalent results to those observed
in Experiment 1.
The more fully counterbalanced account of behavior permits test of whether making use of
different sensitivity parameter for different orthonormal contrasts was valid. According to this
analysis, some differences were detected. For example subjects tended to be more sensitive to the
contrast of low levers vs. high levers than they were to the contrast of left levers vs. right levers. On
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this basis, it is reasonable to suppose that an apparatus that exaggerated these sources of bias even
further might also yield corresponding differences in sensitivity. However, the differences observed
were small and (given the sample size), were not sufficient to justify favoring the more complex
model when considered in terms of an information criterion. Thus, although it is reasonable to
assume that differences in sensitivity to various contrasts may be achieved by manipulating their
physical characteristics, it is also reasonable to assume that these effects are not substantial in this
apparatus.
As in Experiment 1, subjects began the experiment using a relatively complex strategy. Their
early performance is also marked by a higher sensitivity parameter. This was gradually replaced
by the more simplistic strategy over the course of the first two phases. By the third phase, most
subjects consistently displayed a divergence rate of less than 0.4 bits per response, a low rate that
generally persisted for the rest of the experiment.
Because Experiment 2 counterbalanced across a wider range of schedule configurations, it also
presumably provides a better estimate of the ‘transition bias’ matricesQ0 andQ1 (see Appendix C),
upon which the calculations of the divergence rate depend. Identifying these matrices in an accurate
way is a general problem for this approach, as samples of behavior that are too small (or unbalanced)
will yield biased results. The similarity of these matrices in the present experiment to those observed
in the eight-lever condition of Experiment 1 provides some support for the notion that the two
experiments made use of adequately counterbalanced data.
Because the same subjects are used in Experiment 3, described in the following chapter, further
discussion of the results are presented there.
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Chapter 11
Counterbalancing of Four Alternative
Choice
A difficulty with Experiment 1 is that it is not obvious a priori that the four levers selected for use
in that experiment provided an appropriate basis upon which to generalize about four-operandum
performance in general. It is conceivable, for example, that dramatic differences in performance
might arise as a result of the levers selected.
To address this concern, the subjects from Experiment 2 immediately continued in another
experiment during which several configurations of four levers were provided.
11.1 Methods
11.1.1 Subjects & Apparatus
The same subjects used in Experiments 2 and 3. They transitioned immediately from Experiment
2 to 3 without interruption of the running schedule. Unless otherwise noted, subject care protocols
and the experimental apparatus were identical to those described in Experiment 1.
11.1.2 Procedure
As in previous experiments, the Turn-Based Foraging paradigm (Algorithm 1) was employed to
provide subjects with concurrent schedules or reward. The probabilities used in each of 18 phases
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Phase Lever 1 Lever 2 Lever 3 Lever 4 Lever 5 Lever 6 Lever 7 Lever 8
1 (Four Levers A) – – .0178 .0417 .0774 .1131 – –
2 (Four Levers A) – – .1131 .0774 .0417 .0178 – –
3 (Four Levers A) – – .0417 .1131 .0178 .0774 – –
4 (Four Levers B) – – – – .1131 .0417 .0178 .0774
5 (Four Levers B) – – – – .0178 .1131 .0774 .0417
6 (Four Levers B) – – – – .0417 .0774 .1131 .0178
7 (Four Levers C) – – .0774 .0178 – – .0417 .1131
8 (Four Levers C) – – .1131 .0417 – – .0178 .0774
9 (Four Levers C) – – .0178 .1131 – – .0774 .0417
10 (Four Levers D) .1131 .0178 .0417 .0774 – – – –
11 (Four Levers D) .0417 .1131 .0774 .0178 – – – –
12 (Four Levers D) .0178 .0774 .1131 .0417 – – – –
13 (Four Levers E) .1131 .0178 – – .0774 .0417 – –
14 (Four Levers E) .0774 .0417 – – .1131 .0178 – –
15 (Four Levers E) .0178 .1131 – – .0417 .0774 – –
16 (Four Levers F) .0774 .0178 – – – – .0417 .1131
17 (Four Levers F) .0417 .0774 – – – – .1131 .0178
18 (Four Levers F) .1131 .0417 – – – – .0178 .0774
Table 11.1: Schedule probabilities in Rat Experiment 3
in Experiment 3 are described in Table 11.1. These 18 phases made use of six different configurations
of the levers, each persisting for three phases before being changed.
Because of the variety of different possible configurations in the experimental chamber, phases
only last five sessions apiece, instead of the ten previously used. This was done to ensure that
subjects did not become too advanced in age before completing the experiment.
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CLR-Transformed Bias, Across Phases, Sorted By Lever










Figure 11.1: Molar CLR-transformed bias estimates (κ◦i ) for Experiment 3. (Left) Estimates drawn
each configuration separately, sorted by lever. (Right) Parameter estimates obtained by triangulation
across conditions.
11.2 Results
Figure 11.1 (Left) shows the CLR-transformed bias parameters across the six conditions, sorted
by lever. These do not provide the means for a formal comparison, as each parameter is only
strictly interpretable in terms of other parameters. For example, the estimated CLR-transformed
bias parameter for Lever 1 can be expected to be closer to zero in Phase 4 than in Phase 6, because
Phase 4 compares four levers that are expected to be preferred more overall than the subset in
Phase 6.
These bias parameters may, however, be used to obtain a ‘triangulated estimate.’ Since Ex-
periment 3 was counterbalanced, the geometric mean of a subject’s (untransformed) compositional
bias parameter for a given alternative combines the information from each subset. For example,
κL1 was estimated at 0.311, 0.367, and 0.349 in phases 4, 5, and 6 respectively (such that g (κL1)
= 0.341), whereas κL8 was estimated at 0.181, 0.205, and 0.177 in phases 2, 3, and 6 (such that
g (κL8) = 0.187). When one such geometric mean is computed per alternative, and the results are
CLR-transformed, the “triangulated” bias (Figure 11.1, Right) appears very similar to the patterns
obtained in previous experiments.
Figure 11.2 shows the sensitivity estimated in each of the phases. A significant difference was
detected between these using the Friedman test (χ2 (5) = 20.33, p < .002), although post-hoc
tests only revealed significant differences between Phase 1 and Phase 2 in one case, and Phase 2
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Figure 11.2: Molar sensitivity (α) estimates for each configuration in Experiment 3.
and Phase 5 in another. Another noteworthy characteristic of these data is that the sensitivity
parameter was generally lower in this experiment than in the eight-lever condition described in
Experiment 2, despite both experiments involving the same subjects. This replicates the finding
from Experiment 1 that subjects tended to display a higher sensitivity parameter when using a
larger number of alternatives.
Figure 11.3 plots the number of change-points identified in each phase. These counts are
generally low, consistent with the hypothesis that subjects later in training only make small mod-
ifications to a well-established transition matrix. However, configuration C seemed to engender a
higher rate of changes, and higher variability in scores. To test this non-parametrically, the data
were rank-transformed (Conover & Iman, 1981) and subjected to a mixed-model nested ANOVA, in
which configuration and phase were treated as fixed effects, phase was nested within configuration,
subject ID was treated as a random effect, and subject ID and configuration were permitted to
interact. The fixed effects were significant, with the effect of configuration being most pronounced
(F (5, 55) > 9.9, p < .0001), followed by the effect of phase (F (12, 132) > 3.1, p < .001). Although
a significant interaction was seen between subject ID and configuration (F (55, 132) > 1.7, p < .01),
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Figure 11.3: Number of change-points detected per phase in Experiment 3.
there was not a significant effect for subject ID (F (11, 55) = 1.73, p = .09).
Figure 11.4 shows the estimated sensitivity per trial, based on the time-series analysis of con-
ditional change-points described in Chapter 9. Unlike previous plots of this kind, the analysis
is limited to the first 2,000 trials of each phase, as the shorter phase durations resulted in some
subjects emitting fewer responses than in previous experiments. As in past experiments, different
conditions engendered different levels of sensitivity among subjects. Although a few configurations
(4B-1, 4C-3, 4E-3) yielded almost entirely insensitive behavior, subjects nevertheless tended to fall
in a range of low α values comparable to their performance of subjects in Experiment 1.
Figure 11.5 shows the reward per trial, also for the first 2,000 trials of each phase. Consistent
with earlier results, reward rate was relatively invariant (shifting over a narrow range), and also
poorly correlated with sensitivity, consistent with the theme that the calibration of behavior based
on differential reward rates is unlikely to provide an adequate explanation for behavior.
Figure 11.6 shows the mean entropy rate for the first 2,000 trials of each phase. Both during
rewarded and unrewarded trials, subjects displayed relatively uniform entropy rates despite the
changes in the configurations of the levers.
As in previous experiments, the default transition matrices were estimated for each lever config-
uration, and are provided in Appendix C. Although the mean divergence rates (Figure 11.7) were
also generally low, the onset of a change in the configuration of the levers sometimes engendered
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Figure 11.4: Mean sensitivity (α) estimate across subjects for each of the first 2,000 trials in each
phase. The blue dashed line indicates sensitivity conditional on having just received a reward, while
the red line indicates sensitivity otherwise. Thin lines indicate one standard error of the mean.




















Figure 11.5: Mean rewards earned per response for each of the first 2,000 trials in each phase (as
estimated based on 100,000 simulated responses using a subject’s first-order contingency table at
that time). Thin lines indicate one standard error of the mean.
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Figure 11.6: Mean entropy rate (Equation 9.5) estimated across subjects for each of the first 2,000
trials in each phase. The blue dashed line indicates sensitivity conditional on having just received a
reward, while the red line indicates sensitivity otherwise. Thin lines indicate one standard error of
the mean.
a temporary increase. Notable brief periods of elevated divergence took place at the beginning of
phases 4C-1 and 4E-1, both scenarios where all four levers were placed on the same wall.
Figure 11.8 shows the average sensitivity in each phase on the y-axis, and the average mismatch
index (denoted as Island, Equation 9.8) on the x-axis. Because Experiments 2 and 3 made use of the
same group of subjects, both experiments are plotted together to facilitate comparison. In general,
the same weak correlation between the two was observed. However, three distinctive outliers are
apparent. The first is the highest sensitivity. This corresponds to the first phase of Experiment 2.
In both Experiments 1 and 2, performance was very high in the first phase relative to other phases,
so this may be the result of an as-yet uncontrolled-for effect of either age or order of experience. The
other two points correspond to sensitivities below zero, seen in phases 4B-1 and 4C-3 of Experiment
3. The reasons for these anomalously low sensitivities, seen consistently across subjects, are not
clear.
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Figure 11.7: Mean divergence rate (Equation 9.7) estimate across subjects for each of the first 2,000
trials in each phase. The blue dashed line indicates sensitivity conditional on having just received a
reward, while the red line indicates sensitivity otherwise. Thin lines indicate one standard error of
the mean.
11.3 Discussion
Experiment 3 provided a continuation of the work done with the subjects initially used in Exper-
iment 2. Rather than merely replicating the results from Experiment 1, however, this experiment
was more ambitious in two respects. The first was its much more involved counter-balancing of
different four-lever configurations, and the second was the use of shorter phases (5 sessions per
phase, as compared to the previous ten).
Truly systematic counterbalancing of the operant chamber was not feasible. Given eight possible
positions, there are 1,680 different possible configurations of the levers. Even assuming that various
forms of symmetry may be considered redundant, the minimum number of potentially interesting
configurations remains in the hundreds. The six configurations that were used therefore only scratch
the surface of the possible arrangements, and the possibility exists that some noteworthy effects
might have been missed. Nevertheless, those variations that were included suggest that changing
the spatial configuration gives rise to corresponding changes in the behavior.
However, the second issue (namely, the use of shorter phases) presents both promise and diffi-
culty in interpreting these results. On the one hand, it appears as though some degree of consistency
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Sensitivity vs. Schedule-Transition Mismatch
4 Levers
8 Levers
Figure 11.8: Degree of mismatch between transition matrices and schedules in Experiment 2 (black
points) and Experiment 3 (white points). Error bars correspond to standard errors.
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in parameter estimates can be obtained over shorter intervals, which is important because natu-
ralistic scenarios may not give an organism hundreds of opportunities to adjust its behavior. On
the other hand, however, parameter estimates were noisier than those obtained in Experiments 1
and 2, and it is unlikely that subjects achieved “steady state” responding of the same sort they
did in those earlier experiments. Of particular concern is the estimation of the default transition
matrices Q0 and Q1, which are essential to evaluating both the divergence rate and the degree of
mismatch between the schedules and the behavior. In practice, these shortened phases were forced
to some degree by the objectives of the experiment: if each of the 18 phases required two weeks of
time to run, then Experiment 3 would take 36 weeks, in addition to the 16 weeks already elapsed
in Experiment 2. This is a long enough period of time that aging effects necessarily contribute to
some effects, but the possibility of subjects dying due to natural causes begins to also be a source
of concern. This is one reason why many of long-term behavioral experiments have used pigeons
instead of rats, since pigeons can easily live for over a decade in captivity. Pigeons are also relatively
physically uniform throughout adulthood, as opposed to rats, who tend to continue to grow over
the course of a lifetime unless food-restricted (Masoro et al., 1982).
Nevertheless, with these considerations in place, the overall story presented jointly by Exper-
iments 2 and 3 is consistent with the hypothesis put forth to explain the results Experiment 1.
During the early trials (in this case, those during the first sessions of Experiment 2), subjects
engaged in an overall strategy that was more complex than the strategies observed in subsequent
sessions, measured in terms of entropy. Over this period, a set of ‘transition biases’ materialized
that explained the broad strokes of behavior, with only small adjustments required to exploit the
experimental task in a consistent fashion. This approach continued into Experiment 3, although
the physical re-arrangement of the chambers may have briefly forced the strategy into a more cog-
nitively demanding mode. A consistent pattern was observed over this interval that, in general,
subjects displayed higher sensitivities when their preferred patterns of transition yielded reasonable
affordances with the arrangement of the schedules.
Several potential confounds remain. The most important of these is the order of experience
which has been uniform across subjects in all experiments discussed up to this point. As previously
mentioned, age effects are best understood as continuous over the life span in rats, and it is plausible
that the very high sensitivity observed in first phases experienced by each subject reflects a more
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juvenile strategy. Order effects may also matter independent of aging, insofar as an animal’s current
strategy may be more or less suited to the subsequent schedule of rewards.
One final confound that has not received consideration thusfar is the reward rate. Power law
models are, by their nature, scale-invariant, so if the purest forms of the generalized (Eq. 1.8)
and barycentric (Eq. 1.12) matching equations are correct, then performance should yield similar
baselines of sensitivity regardless of the schedule richness. There are several reasons to think,
however, that schedule richness might yield shifts in behavior. Previous studies of concurrent
choice in animals have reported observing impacts from reward rate (Fantino et al., 1972; Elliffe &
Alsop, 1996). Though such results do not in principle invalidate the compositional approach, they
suggest at the very least that the relationship between scheduled rewards and observed responses
may not be scale-invariant.
On the basis of these considerations, another experiment was performed that provided counter-
balancing between three factors: the number of alternatives (8 vs. 4), the order of experience, and
the richness of the schedule. This experiment is described in the following chapter.
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Chapter 12
Possible Confounding Effects of
Subject Age and Schedule Richness
Although Experiments 2 and 3 examined the effects of more thorough counterbalancing, they
failed to take into consideration one of the most important types of counterbalancing: Order of
experience. The experiments described in previous chapters all made use of a uniform sequence of
phases, rendering a rigorous test of the effects of time impossible to disambiguate from other effects
of the manipulation.
Another consideration not adequately addressed by previous experiments is whether the overall
frequency of rewards has an impact on the model parameters. The reward rate used in Experiments
1 through 3 was relatively high, as compared to results published elsewhere in the literature, so
using a leaner schedule might reveal the effects observed thus far as peculiar to the rich schedules
employed.
In order to address these concerns, an experiment was performed that counterbalanced both of
these factors. All subjects were exposed to either four or eight levers, doing so under the auspices
of either a relatively rich schedule (approx. 20% of responses rewarded) or a relatively lean one
(approx. 10% of responses rewarded).
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12.1 Methods
Experiment 4 followed an ABBA/AABB design for lever count and richness, spread across sixteen
phases. In all cases, subjects began with one lever count (either four or eight levers available
concurrently), then switched to the other count after four phases, and finally switched back again
after a total of twelve phases. Additionally, every subject began with one schedule richness (rich or
poor), switched to the other after eight phases. Between these two factors, the overall experiment
changed every four phases. Given four different groupings of the subjects, this ensured that every
subject experienced every condition, and that every condition was sampled during every quartile
of the experiment.
12.1.1 Subjects & Apparatus
Subjects were a new set of 12 male albino Sprague-Dawley rats (Charles River, NY), weighing
450-650 g. Unless otherwise noted, subject care protocols, training prior to the beginning of the
experiment, and the experimental apparatus were identical to those described in Experiment 1.
12.1.2 Procedure
Experiment 4 made use of 16 different ‘conditions,’ each of which is described in Table 12.1.
Although every subject experienced every condition, they did not do so in the same order. Instead,
each subject was assigned to one of four groups, experiencing the conditions according to their
group’s prescription. The order experienced by each group is described in Table 12.2
As in Experiment 3, phases consisted of only 5 sessions apiece. However, between phases 8 and
9, subjects experienced a four-week hiatus, during which time they continued to receive restricted
food access according to the experimental protocol, but did not engage in any experimental activity.
Consequently, the interval of time running from the beginning Phase 1 to the end of Phase 16
covered a span of 20 weeks.
12.2 Results
In examining the parameters of the matching equation, the most important consideration is con-
sistency. In this spirit, the first analysis was a comparison of the bias parameters. Figure 12.1




Schedule Lever 1 Lever 2 Lever 3 Lever 4 Lever 5 Lever 6 Lever 7 Lever 8
4PA Four, Poor – – .0209 .0387 .0089 .0566 – –
4PB Four, Poor – – .0089 .0209 .0566 .0387 – –
4PC Four, Poor – – .0387 .0566 .0209 .0089 – –
4PD Four, Poor – – .0566 .0089 .0387 .0209 – –
4RE Four, Rich – – .1131 .0774 .0178 .0417 – –
4RF Four, Rich – – .0774 .0417 .1131 .0178 – –
4RG Four, Rich – – .0178 .1131 .0417 .0774 – –
4RH Four, Rich – – .0417 .0178 .0774 .1131 – –
8PI Eight, Poor .0049 .0179 .0309 .0276 .0114 .0081 .0211 .0033
8PJ Eight, Poor .0211 .0033 .0114 .0081 .0309 .0276 .0049 .0179
8PK Eight, Poor .0179 .0309 .0081 .0049 .0276 .0211 .0033 .0114
8PL Eight, Poor .0033 .0114 .0276 .0211 .0081 .0049 .0179 .0309
8RM Eight, Rich .0162 .0422 .0065 .0617 .0357 .0227 .0552 .0097
8RN Eight, Rich .0552 .0097 .0357 .0227 .0065 .0617 .0162 .0422
8RO Eight, Rich .0617 .0162 .0422 .0357 .0097 .0065 .0227 .0552
8RP Eight, Rich .0227 .0552 .0097 .0065 .0422 .0357 .0617 .0162
Table 12.1: Schedule probabilities in Rat Experiment 4
shows the bias parameters obtained from molar analysis of responses made in each condition. This
shows that bias was somewhat more extreme in the 4-lever condition, but was similar with respect
to the richness of the schedule. This was formally tested using the ‘absolute ui contrast’ approach
described in Chapter 9. The orthonormal contrast U from Equation 9.2 was again used, with a
focus on u1, u2, and u3. Table 12.3 shows the result of the mixed-model analysis comparing these
factors.
Comparing the fixed effects in this analysis, u1 tended to show the greatest absolute contrast
(µ = 0.5089) compared to u2 (µ = 0.2311) and u3 (µ = 0.1304). The four-lever condition elicited
greater contrasts (µ = 0.3921) than the eight-lever condition (µ = 0.1885). The additional signifi-
cant interaction term arises because u1 is comparatively larger in the four-lever case (β = ±0.1090),
while u3 is comparatively larger in the eight-lever case (β = ±0.1179).
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4-Lever Bias (Poor vs. Rich)











8-Lever Bias (Poor vs. Rich)
Figure 12.1: Molar CLR-transformed bias estimates (κ◦i ) for Experiment 4. For each lever, the
left-hand boxplot corresponds to the poor schedule, while the right-hand boxplot corresponds to the
rich schedule. (Left) Bias parameter estimates in the 4-lever conditions, sorted by lever. (Right)
Bias parameter estimates in the 8-lever conditions, sorted by lever.









Figure 12.2: Molar sensitivity (α) estimates for each configuration in Experiment 4.
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Order Group One Group Two Group Three Group Four
1 4PA 8PI 4RE 8RM
2 4PB 8PJ 4RF 8RN
3 4PC 8PK 4RG 8RO
4 4PD 8PL 4RH 8RP
5 8PL 4PD 8RP 4RH
6 8PK 4PC 8RO 4RG
7 8PJ 4PB 8RN 4RF
8 8PI 4PA 8RM 4RE
9 8RO 4RG 8PK 4PC
10 8RM 4RE 8PI 4PA
11 8RP 4RH 8PL 4PD
12 8RN 4RF 8PJ 4PB
13 4RF 8RN 4PB 8PJ
14 4RH 8RP 4PD 8PL
15 4RE 8RM 4PA 8PI
16 4RG 8RO 4PC 8PK
Table 12.2: Groupwise order of experience in Rat Experiment 4
Figure 12.2 shows the mean sensitivity per subject in each of the four conditions. Subjects in
the 8-lever condition evidently showed elevated sensitivity compared to the four-lever condition,
and possibly a further elevated sensitivity in the 8-lever poor schedule. To test this, a mixed model
analysis of variance was performed, the results of which are presented in Table 12.4. In addition
to number of levers and richness of the schedule, the order of experience was also included as a
continuous factor. A significant effect of number of levers was detected, but it did not interact signif-
icantly with schedule richness, consistent with the results from previous experiments. Additionally,
a substantial effect of time was observed.
Figure 12.3 shows the number of change-points detected in each phase chronologically, mixed
across groups. This paints a picture consistent with the hypothesis that behavior becomes more
stable over time, but glosses over effects of the number of alternatives. Because phase and config-
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Factor Sum Sq. df Mean Sq. F p
Contrast 3.6863 2 1.8431 20.76 <.0001
# of Levers 1.4919 1 1.4918 16.81 .0001
Richness 0.0001 1 0.0001 0.00 .9708
Contrast*Levers 1.2410 2 0.6205 6.99 .0013
Contrast*Richness 0.1145 2 0.0573 0.65 .5264
Levers*Richness 0.2044 1 0.2044 2.30 .1317
Subject(Random) 1.6060 11 0.1460 1.64 .0943
Error 10.9184 123 0.0888
Total 19.2626 143
Table 12.3: Mixed-model analysis of variance comparing absolute ILR-transformed bias contrast
as a function of contrast, number of levers, and schedule richness (all fixed effect) and individual
subjects (random effects).
uration are no longer nested, these data are considered analytically below.
Because Experiment 4 counterbalanced order of experience, this significant effect of time com-
plicates subsequent visualization of the data. The data may either be sorted by condition (without
regard to time), or sorted chronologically (without regard to condition). As a compromise, both
methods are presented below. First, the analyses are presented chronologically. This provides in-
sight into the consistent concern from previous experiments that some lifetime effect might be at
work.
Figure 12.4 shows sensitivities estimated on a trial-by-trial basis, averaged across subjects
chronologically without regard to condition (thus, intermixing both 4- and 8-lever conditions and
also rich and poor schedules). Plotted in this fashion, a consistent within-phase effect is seen,
embedded within a more general downward trend across the entire experiment. With each new
schedule, subjects begin near α = 0 but tend to rise to a lower mean level in each subsequent
phase, as has consistently been observed in previous experiments. However, sensitivities tend to
reach lower and lower maxima as trials persist. Because each phase only lasted for five sessions, it is
unclear from this experiment whether subjects were merely improving more slowly, or approaching
a lower asymptote; however, in light of previous experiments that made use of longer phases, it
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Figure 12.3: Number of change-points detected per chronological phase in Experiment 4. An outlier
of 104 was also observed in the 5th phase.



















Figure 12.4: Mean sensitivity (α) estimate across subjects for each of the first 1,500 trials in each
phase, averaged across groups in chronological order. The blue dashed line indicates sensitivity
conditional on having just received a reward, while the red line indicates sensitivity otherwise. Thin
lines indicate one standard error of the mean.
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Factor Sum Sq. df Mean Sq. F p
# of Levers 0.0906 1 0.0906 5.70 .0231
Richness 0.0469 1 0.0469 2.95 .0956
Levers*Richness 0.0189 1 0.0189 1.19 .2840
Time (Continuous) 0.2132 1 0.2132 13.41 <.0001
Subject(Random) 0.1644 11 0.0150 0.94 .5167
Error 0.5089 32
Total 1.0429 47
Table 12.4: Mixed-model analysis of variance comparing sensitivity estimates as a function of number
of levers, schedule richness (fixed effects), dummy-coded time (continuous fixed effect) and individual
subjects (random effects).
seems reasonable to assume the latter.
This gradual decrement in sensitivity did not have a substantive effect on overall rewards, as
plotted in Figure 12.5, also plotted chronologically, across groups. Since these plots intermix the
rich and poor schedules, they are plotted with particularly wide error bars; this is, of course,
misleading, as the data are more properly described as bimodal (as will be shown in a subsequent
figure).
A similar downward trajectory can be seen in mean entropy rates over time, plotted in Fig-
ure 12.6. In general, the complexity of observed behavior gradually decreased as a function of time.
This confirms the earlier suggestion that subjects tend to grow more stereotyped as a result of
either experience or aging.
A more pronounced effect is seen in the mean divergence rate, plotted in Figure 12.7. Following
an early peak during their most juvenile sessions, the divergence rate quickly dropped to its standard
floor value of around 0.2 bits per response, spiking upward at intervals that were marked by
substantial shifts. In the transitions between phases 4 and 5 (on the one hand) and phases 12
and 13 (on the other), every animal either switched from a 4-lever to an 8-lever task, or visa versa.
The smaller increase in divergence rates between phases 8 and 9 can be attributed to the month-long
gap in the experiment that subjects experienced during that interval. These results are important,
because they suggest that the divergence rates are not ‘burned in’ by a subject’s early experiences.
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Figure 12.5: Mean rewards earned per response for each of the first 1,500 trials in each phase (as
estimated based on 100,000 simulated responses using a subject’s first-order contingency table at
that time), averaged across groups in chronological order. Thin lines indicate one standard error of
the mean.

























Figure 12.6: Mean entropy rate (Equation 9.5) estimated across subjects for each of the first 1,500
trials in each phase, averaged across groups in chronological order. The blue dashed line indicates
sensitivity conditional on having just received a reward, while the red line indicates sensitivity
otherwise. Thin lines indicate one standard error of the mean.
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Figure 12.7: Mean divergence rate (Equation 9.7) estimate across subjects for each of the first 1,500
trials in each phase, averaged across groups in chronological order. The blue dashed line indicates
sensitivity conditional on having just received a reward, while the red line indicates sensitivity
otherwise. Thin lines indicate one standard error of the mean.
Instead, subjects appear to resume responding in a more sophisticated and flexible way when the
physical configuration of their environment is changed. Implications of this finding are pursued in
the discussion below.
Figure 12.8 plots the number of change-points identified for each phase type, disregarding
chronological order. These plots are based on identical data to those in Figure 12.3, merely ordered
with respect to a different variable.
The analysis of the number of detected change-points is quite complex, as the data continue
to display heteroskedasticity (necessitating a non-parametric approach to the ANOVA), but at
least three independent factors potentially contribute to the observed effect: The lever count, the
schedule richness, and the chronological order. Thus, the data were rank-transformed, as in previous
experiments, and a mixed-model ANOVA was performed that treated each of the above factors as
fixed effects. Additionally, chronological order was treated as a continuous (rather than categorical)
effect, as it was only partially counterbalanced. The additional effect of specific phase configuration
was jointly nested within lever count and schedule richness. Lever count and schedule richness were
allowed to interact. Finally, subject ID was included as a random effect, as were the interactions of
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Figure 12.8: Number of change-points detected per phase type in Experiment 4. An outlier of 104
was observed in phase 8PL.
Subject ID with lever count and schedule richness. Lever count had the most substantial significant
effect (F (1, 11) > 71.3, p < .0001), followed by chronological order (F (1, 142) > 15.7, p < .0002) and
schedule richness (F (1, 10.3) > 13.8, p < .005). The interaction of lever count and schedule richness
was also significant (F (1, 142) > 5.9, p < .02). The nested effects of phase were not significant
(F (13, 142) = 1.23, p = .26), nor was the main effect for subject ID (F (11, 13.1) = 0.53, p = .84).
However, the interactions of subject ID with lever count (F (11, 142) > 2.4, p < .01) and richness
(F (11, 142) > 2.1, p < .02) were both significant.
Overall, this analysis paints a picture consistent with the impressions given by Figures 12.3
and 12.8: More change-points arose when more levers were available and when schedules of reward
were poorer. The observed interaction of lever count and schedule richness suppressed these effects
in the four-lever case while enhancing them in the eight-lever case. Throughout the experiment,
change-points were detected more often early (rather than late) in training.
Averages were also computed with respect to particular phases, intermixed with respect to
time. These tended to display considerably more variability, on account of the counterbalancing:
Condition 4PA, for example, was experienced as the first, eight, tenth, or fifteenth phase, depending
on which group a subject belonged to, so the values for any given condition are influenced to differing
degrees by the effects of time.
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Figure 12.9: Mean sensitivity (α) estimate across subjects between trials 1,201 and 1,500 in each
phase, averaged across groups in chronological order. The blue dashed line indicates sensitivity
conditional on having just received a reward, while the red line indicates sensitivity otherwise. Thin
lines indicate one standard error of the mean.
Figure 12.9 shows the mean sensitivity for all subjects in trials 1,201 to 1,500 of a particular
condition, averaged across disparate time points. Because of the general decrease in sensitivity as
a function of time, this yields much higher variability (and correspondingly larger standard errors).
Nevertheless, the general pattern depicted in Figure 12.2 manifests in a similar fashion, with 8-
lever sensitivity appearing generally higher than 4-lever sensitivity, and a hint (although far from
definitive) that poor schedules may, under some circumstances, yield higher sensitivities.
A much more dramatic difference is observed when the mean reward rates are plotted in a
similar fashion, as shown in Figure 12.10. As previously noted, the rich vs. poor schedules yielded
rates of income that clustered around two different centers of mass. Incomes were highly consistent,
yielding reward in a uniform range for each level of richness, regardless of the number of response
alternatives.
The mean entropy rate (Figure 12.11) resembled earlier 4 vs. 8 lever comparisons: The 8-lever
condition yielded higher entropy rates than the 4-lever condition, although not dramatically so. The
divergence rates (Figure 12.12) in particular were fairly uniform across conditions, as the confound
of order is at least somewhat counterbalanced in this plot. For both information-theoretic measures,
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Figure 12.10: Mean rewards earned per response between trials 1,201 and 1,500 in each phase (as
estimated based on 100,000 simulated responses using a subject’s first-order contingency table at
that time), averaged across groups in chronological order. Thin lines indicate one standard error of
the mean.

























Figure 12.11: Mean entropy rate (Equation 9.5) estimated across subjects between trials 1,201 and
1,500 in each phase, averaged across groups in chronological order. The blue dashed line indicates
sensitivity conditional on having just received a reward, while the red line indicates sensitivity
otherwise. Thin lines indicate one standard error of the mean.
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Figure 12.12: Mean divergence rate (Equation 9.7) estimate across subjects between trials 1,201 and
1,500 in each phase, averaged across groups in chronological order. The blue dashed line indicates
sensitivity conditional on having just received a reward, while the red line indicates sensitivity
otherwise. Thin lines indicate one standard error of the mean.
the manipulation of schedule richness did not yield results appreciably different from those observed
in Experiment 1. In general, subjects could be expected to approach a divergence rate of between
0.2 and 0.3 bits per response, regardless of task complexity.
As in previous experiments, a relationship between the transition matrix Q0 was tested for its
degree of mismatch with the schedules of reward using the Island metric. The means for these are
plotted in Figure 12.13. For the most part, these follow a similar pattern to that reported in previous
case, with the exception of two of the four-lever conditions (4PB and 4RH). As in Experiment 1,
a mixed-effects regression model predicting sensitivity confirmed a continuous relationship with
Island (F (1, 178) > 4.5, p < .04), as well as a fixed effect for number of levers (F (1, 178) > 5.7, p <
.02). The effect size of these effects were η2 = .02 and η2 = .03, respectively, smaller than those
reported in the previous experiment. The random effect for individual differences was not significant
(F (11, 178) > 1.4, p = .29). Consequently, the previously-observed relationship appears to hold:
A weak correlation between mismatch and sensitivity, and an only marginally stronger effect of
number of alternatives.
In order to obtain more precise parameter estimates, an omnibus analysis of all four- and eight-
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Figure 12.13: Degree of mismatch between transition matrices and schedules in Experiment 4. Four-
lever phases are marked in white, whereas eight-lever phases are marked in black. Poor schedules are
marked as circles, whereas rich schedules are marked as squares. Error bars correspond to standard
errors.
lever phases in all four experiments was performed. The result was a pool of 594 observations
(90 from Experiment 1, 312 from Experiments 2 and 3, and 192 from Experiment 4) drawn from
34 subjects. The means for each phase, as well as the best-fitting lines and confidence intervals,
are plotted in Figure 12.14. The range of effects were similar to those reported in the individual
analyses: A continuous relationship with Island (F (1, 558) > 18.7, p < .001), as well as a fixed
effect for number of levers (F (1, 558) > 14.1, p < .001). The effect size of these effects were
η2 = .03 and η2 = .02, respectively. The random effect for individual differences was not significant
(F (33, 178) = 0.99, p = .49). Also plotted in Figure 12.14 are lines representing the best-fitting
parameter estimates obtained by this mixed model analysis. These lines are estimated to have a
slope of 0.294 (SE = 0.068) and intercepts of 0.005 for the four-lever case and 0.090 for the eight
CHAPTER 12. POSSIBLE CONFOUNDING EFFECTS OF SUBJECT AGE AND
SCHEDULE RICHNESS 147

















Figure 12.14: Degree of mismatch between transition matrices and schedules for four- and eight-lever
phases across all experiments. Four-lever phases are marked in white, whereas eight-lever phases
are marked in black. The lines represent the best-fitting parameter estimates of association for four
levers (gray) and eight levers (black).
lever case (SE = 0.11 in both cases).
12.3 Discussion
Experiment 4 brought several potentially important confounds under direct examination. Twelve
subjects were divided into four groups, who experienced both four- and eight-lever conditions in
a counterbalanced order. In addition, the richness of the schedule was manipulated to compare
reward rates of approximately 10% with those closer to 20%. Although these manipulations had
substantive impacts on the behavior, these contributions were not enough to erase the effects
observed in previous experiments.
Experiment 4 provides the study’s first rigorous examination of the effect of subject age, counter-
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balanced for other experimental factors. In general, subjects showed a global decrease in sensitivity
over time, despite also showing the more typical increase within a particular phase. As noted in the
results, this is not especially surprising, given the ways in which a rodent’s size and level of physical
activity change as a function of normal aging. That said, it is not obvious from this experiment
alone what the contributions of various possible correlates of aging might be.
A consistent effect in all experiments up to this point has been a period of adaptation during
the earliest phases, as measured by the divergence rate of behavior from its eventual stationary
baseline. This was seen clearly during the first phase of this experiment, but also appeared in
cases where the number of alternatives changed, such as the transition from phase 4 to phase 5
(Figure 12.4). These later periods of adaptation were either not seen in in previous experiments,
or were not as pronounced (depending on how generous one wishes to be with interpretation).
Notably, the transition of phases 4 to 5 and 12 to 13 mark the only cases when a subset of subjects
transitioned from 4 levers to 8 levers, and it is these six subjects who, in each of these cases is
responsible for the momentary increase in the divergence rate. This can be seen by comparing the
change in divergence rate immediately prior to and following the transition. In transition from
phases 4 to 5, subjects going from 4 levers to 8 increased their divergence rate by a mean of 0.66
(σ = 0.27), while those going from 8 to 4 showed a mean increase of only 0.05 (σ = 0.11), a
significant difference according to Wilcoxon’s ranked sum test (p < .005). When the same subjects
switched back in the transition from phases 12 to 13, it was the opposite group who went from 4
to 8, and this time it was they who show the larger difference (µ = 1.02, σ = 0.67 going from 4 to
8, µ = 0.30, σ = 0.51 going from 8 to 4, significantly different at p < .04).
This has the important implication that transitions from more complex scenarios to less complex
ones do not necessarily result in the the same kind of ‘representational remodeling’ that switching
in the other direction does, particularly when the scenario is simplified only by removing elements.
Insofar as the steady-state transition matrix (from which current behavior is thought to diverge)
can be seen as a kind of exploitation strategy, these transitions point to a very different sense of
the explore/exploit tradeoff than is normally discussed. Because it is computationally inexpensive,
steady-state transition biases should be considered to be exploitation strategies, even if they yield a
wide-roving pattern of movement through the space. It is when subjects are forced to re-appraise the
ways in which to make those transitions that the behavior can be seen as strategically exploratory.
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Not many effects of schedule richness were seen, and these few can also be accounted for largely
in terms of transitions. Since responses immediately following a reward are less sensitive to the
schedule (a consistent effect across all experiments), then it stands to reason that a richer schedule
will consist of a mixture of trials that skew more heavily toward those following a reward than in
the case of the poorer schedule. However, while this is a plausible possibility, any net effect on
behavior itself was sufficiently small that it failed to be statistically detectable in most cases. For
the most part, variations in schedule richness over the range examined in these experiments did
not appear to have a substantive impact on the character of behavior.
Finally, although the transition/schedule mismatch hypothesis continues to fit with the evidence
obtained, the efficacy of the Island metric at providing a proper index for the degree of mismatch
is questionable. Qualitatively, one can consider a strategy ‘well-matched’ to the environment if
every response alternative transitions to at least one comparatively rich schedule. Characterizing
this intuition quantitatively, however, is complicated both by operationalizing richness and by
accommodating all transitions (and not merely the few that are rhetorically convenient). Producing
a reasonable measure for a mismatched environment is even more problematic, because the metric
must be sensitive to rich alternatives connected only to poor alternatives, as compared to rich
alternatives connected to only a single rich alternative. Put another way, a single good alternative is
‘sufficient’ for the organism’s next choice to be effective. A better justified metric would considerably
clarify the situation in the eight-lever case, as the complexity of even first-order models are such




CHAPTER 13. GENERAL DISCUSSION 151
Chapter 13
General Discussion
Over the course of four experiments, three cohorts of rats made repeated choices among four, six,
or eight levers. Each lever had a corresponding schedule of rewards, and each prepared rewards
for collection in secret, only delivering the reward upon the next visit to that lever. This yielded
a system of feedback, whereby the optimal strategy was not to reside exclusively at the highest-
paying lever, but instead to visit each lever with a frequency proportional to the relative richness
of its schedule.
In an extensive existing literature, the degree to which subjects have been able to adapt their
responding to ‘match’ the proportions of rewards earned has been characterized using a power
law, most commonly identified as Baum’s 1974 generalized matching law (Equation 1.8). This
log-odds approach provides an excellent description of overall proportions of responses made to two
alternatives, and it can be extended to a broader sample space using the barycentric matching model
(Equation 1.12, Jensen & Neuringer, 2009). However, for reasons described in the Introduction,
obtaining unbiased parameter estimates for the barycentric model is not straightforward.
These parameters were obtained using compositional analysis, whose basic operations and as-
sumptions are described in Part I. The resulting parameters for multiplicative bias (κ) and expo-
nential sensitivity (α) have the same interpretation as those reported in other power law models, and
across both the present experiments and the re-analysis of previously published data, this method-
ology yields parameter estimates that are consistent (in that they display good convergence) and
reasonable (in that they yield results congruent with the existing literature).
Among the most pressing questions that this approach allows us to entertain is the following:
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“Do decisions among many alternatives resemble decisions among few alternatives?” Although the
instinct to simplify in an experimental context is seductive, it is often the case that the jump to a
multivariate problem space introduces new complications and tradeoffs that cannot be appreciated
in the simple case, as is evident in arithmetic generalizations of log-odds that turn out to be
inconsistent (e.g., Equation 1.10) or in ALR transformation (Equation 4.1). Using the tools of
compositional analysis, this basic question was examined in detail across a series of experiments.
In every case, a surprising finding emerged: Subjects achieved higher levels of sensitivity to task
demands in the eight-lever case than in the four- or six-lever cases. Two broad classes of theory
have been developed to describe behavior under these conditions (i.e. cognitive vs. behavioral
theories) and neither predicts this result. The central aim of this dissertation is to provide an
account of why this result was obtained, and how it can be reconciled with what is already known
about learning and decision making.
13.1 Response Structure in Repeated Choice
The adoption of compositional methods is not merely useful as a means of fitting the matching
parameters. It also provides easy compatibility with the extensive set of tools available for analyzing
stochastic systems that display the Markov property. Although the premise of “steady-state”
processes has come under a degree of criticism in recent years (Fründ et al., 2011), using them
to describe operant decision making has historically been deemed appropriate. This consensus is
largely due to the apparent long-term behavioral stability of animals performing foraging tasks (as
observed, for example, in Figure 9.6).
In this dissertation’s experiments, two pieces of information proved crucial to understanding
choice as an ongoing process. The first was the identity of the previous response, while the second
was whether the previous response had been rewarded. The latter case is unsurprising because
the food delivery trough was positioned in such a way that a behavioral bias resulted from its
position. Somewhat more surprising was the level of response structure that was discovered in
strings of consecutive non-rewarded responses. Subjects displayed very high levels of response
structure, and these structures were very consistent, persisting throughout the multiple phases of
each experiment associated with a given configuration of levers. This consistently favored set of
CHAPTER 13. GENERAL DISCUSSION 153
transitions is encoded in the default transition matrix, denoted by Q. As noted in the experiments,
it was necessary to distinguish between Q1 (responses following a reward delivery) and Q0 (all other
responses), because the delivery of food constitutes an ‘interruption’ that influences the behavior.
However, for the sake of discussion, the fundamental premise of a default transition matrix need
only concern itself with Q.
Surprisingly, the general consistency of these patterns of transition did not correspond to insen-
sitive behavior. Rather than being locked in a steady-state response script, subjects were able to
calibrate their behavior in spite of these transition biases. If the first-order conditional probabilities
of transition from Lever i to Lever j is represented as a matrix, these calibrations took the form
of adjustments to only one row of the matrix at a time. Because the reward schedule is largely
insensitive to the patterning of behavior (the current odds of reward on a given lever do not depend
on some specific sequence of prior responses), a superficial treatment of the topic might suggest
that subjects were needlessly encoding a contingency table of size (D × D) when only a single
composition of size D need be represented. A subject maintaining the representation of an optimal
steady-state stochastic strategy would need only 2.7 bits to encode the stationary distribution of
behavior for the eight-lever schedules described in Experiment 1.
Of course, although a transition matrix may describe the outputs of a process, it does not reveal
the nature of the process itself. Detailed description of behavior is, however, the first step toward
characterizing the underlying process, and the results from the described experiments provide a
number of clues. It is telling, for example, that the default transition matrix was highly consistent,
and seemed to place considerable constraint on the resulting adaptation. It is also telling that
change-point analysis determined that rows of the contingency tables changed at different times.
These clues point to an underlying mechanism that engages in ongoing calibration, and does not
require dramatic paradigm shifts to make adjustments.
There is no reason to suppose that an entire matrix is maintained in working memory during
behavior. For example, almost every transition favored by any given animal consisted of movement
to some adjacent lever along one of the chamber walls, a typical style of movement in rodents
(Treit & Fundytus, 1988). In this way of thinking, an animal’s ‘default transitions’ might result
from simple decision rules, corresponding to very low levels of cognitive effort. Insofar as these
transitions are governed by the physical configuration of the levers and the corresponding effort
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or discomfort associated with different transitions, they are not flexible in the face of changing
feedback. Thus, successful adaptation requires making slight modifications to the original transition
matrix. Based on the information-theoretic measure of the ‘divergence rate’ (Equation 9.7), which
measured how much ‘extra’ information is needed, the ongoing cognitive load associated with this
supplementary representation was very low, on the order of less than half a bit per response.
That said, it is important to distinguish between the observed transition matrices and ‘fixed
action patterns’ in the traditional ethological sense. Although the default transition matrix may
be to some extent hard-wired (insofar as it arises as a result of deeply-rooted physiological and
instinctual constraints), it does not necessarily follow that the resulting behavior is strictly reflexive.
Measures of α, whether they are estimated globally across large datasets (Figure 9.4) or estimated
instantaneously (Figure 9.10), denote a degree of adaptation to feedback from the task. Only in
cases where α ≈ 0.0 under all task conditions can the organism’s behavior be characterized as
reflexive. In all other cases, the factors that give rise to the default transition matrix are merely
a part of a system of hierarchical control, with additional cognitive machinery shaping behavior
within the confines of the organism’s repertoire.
Although the heuristic of making slight modifications to an otherwise static set of transition
preferences was broadly effective and cognitively inexpensive, it was vulnerable to failure states
under those conditions in which relatively rich alternatives were ‘surrounded’ by relatively poor
alternatives. Put another way, subjects did not reliably discover the most objectively efficient
strategies for foraging in the operant context if those strategies involved making transitions that
were not normally within their repertoire. Instead, subjects traveled between rich alternatives by
way of the poor ones that lay along an indirect route, resulting in excessive visits made to these
poorer alternatives.
In the present apparatus, this scenarios of ‘isolation of rich alternatives’ was more likely to
arise when there were fewer available levers, and thus fewer candidate transitions. Consequently,
it appears as though the observed differences in the global sensitivity parameter are the result of
the phases whose reward schedules were severely mismatched with the default behavior of sub-
jects. Note that even in two-alternative concurrent choice, however, severe schedule/transition
mismatches are possible. For example, if subjects have a powerful bias toward switching (as rats
in the present study did), then sensitivity will tend to be low if one schedule is consistently much
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richer than the other. Changeover delays are often used in the animal literature to reduce switch-
ing behavior (Fantino et al., 1972). Although changeover delays routinely increase sensitivity, they
arguably do so artificially, because they impose specific constraints intended to shape the very
behavior the procedure is intended to study. Furthermore, there is very little consistency in how
changeover delays are implemented from one study to the next, making it difficult to draw any
general conclusions about what their influence on the literature has been. In light of the present
research, the use of changeover delays in the literature appears increasingly to paper over more
complicated problems of choice as a process.
Of course, schedule/transition mismatch is not the only factor that impacts sensitivity. Through-
out the reported results, other main effects have presented themselves (such as the systematic de-
crease in sensitivity seen as a result of the age of the rats). Consequently, low sensitivity should not
automatically be taken as evidence of a schedule/transition mismatch. It does, however, appear to
explain the systematic differences seen in the experiments in this study.
13.2 Temporal Structure in Reward Delivery
Throughout the present work, the Turn-Based Foraging paradigm (Algorithm 1) has been used
to schedule rewards. As the name suggests, this approach to scheduling rewards in an uncertain
manner proceeds one turn at a time, as if the subject is playing a kind of solitaire. Superficially,
this appears to differentiate it from the more commonly-used Variable Interval (VI) approach, in
which the uncertain process that governs reward availability is the passage of time quite separate
from a subject’s behavior. However, the Turn-Based Foraging paradigm has more in common with
VI than it does with another common schedule, the Variable Ratio (VR). Indeed, subjects who are
concurrently confronted with a Turn-Based Foraging schedule and a VI schedule are unable to dis-
tinguish the two so long as responding persists at a constant rate MacDonall (1988). Consequently,
the optimal strategy in both of these cases is to engage in generalized matching (Equation 1.12).
The implication of these schedules is somewhat different, however, in the context of a process
that unfolds over time. For example, if a single response is very effortful to make, but waiting
is neither aversive nor costly, extended periods of waiting will be an effective strategy in the VI
schedule but not in the Turn-Based Foraging schedule. Similarly, if the response alternatives are
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spaced far enough apart that travel time becomes a moderate investment of time (as, for example,
in Aparicio & Cabrera, 2001), then the time needed to move from one alternative to another will
count against the various elapsing reward intervals.
A similar scenario of some interest arises in the Turn-Based Foraging scenario when there is
a schedule/transition mismatch. Consider a schedule with per-trial reward setup probabilities of
[0.1, 0.0, 0.1, 0.0], with the two rich alternatives on opposing corners. Using Equation 9.1, we can
conclude that alternating between the two richest options yields a continuous rate of 0.19 rewards
per response, since each alternative has had two trials to set up alternatives and therefore 1 −
(1− 0.1)2 = 0.19. In the case where subjects instead travel in a circle around the four alternatives,
each of the rich alternatives is visited half as often but is allowed two more trials to set up rewards.
Thus, when selected, their probability of reward has grown to 1 − (1− 0.1)4 = 0.3439, but being
only selected half as often, the overall rate is 0.17195 rewards per response. The important point
here is that although the ‘insensitive’ strategy yields a lower rate of reward, the rate is not much
lower, because even the ‘ineffective’ responses to the non-rewarding alternatives serve to advance
the schedule’s implicit clock.
This raises an important line of theoretical inquiry: If the differences in reward rates differ so
little between these two extremes of behavior, then what motive do subjects have to ‘optimize’
their responding, rather than merely maintaining a satisfactory income from engaging in behavior
that is merely adequate? Put another way, why is any adaptation at all observed, given that the
relationship between strategy and rewards seems tenuous?
There is no definitive answer to these questions (and indeed, they are well worth investigating
empirically), but several possibilities nonetheless suggest themselves. One important point to recall
is that subjects do not have privileged knowledge of task parameters, which might change at
any time. A somewhat sensitive strategy has a reasonable chance of detecting and exploiting
opportunities as they arise, whereas an insensitive one has the potential to be hugely wasteful.
The benefits of moderate sensitivity are most clearly seen when a very large number of alter-
natives are available and when considerable asymmetry exists in the distribution of the richness
of reward schedules. Consider a scenario in which hundreds of response alternatives were avail-
able, all concurrently setting up rewards according to Turn-Based Foraging schedules. If most had
no probability of reward, and a handful had a setup probability of 0.1 per trial, then repeatedly
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cycling through all the many choice alternatives would give the few non-zero alternatives many
opportunities to make a reward available, but those few would only be visited once in a great while.
The comparative benefit of confining most responses to the few alternatives that provide rewards
is much greater in this case, and more appropriately resembles a naturalistic environment where
most objects an animal encounters can’t be converted into metabolic energy.
If the compositional approach is valid, then a symmetric model that retains a high sensitivity
given an enormous range of responses is in principle possible, and such a model would then retain
that sensitivity in all observed subsets of alternatives as well. This gives rise to a counterintuitive
possibility: Rather than high sensitivity being a consequence of the simplicity of the two-alternative
case (which, precisely because of its simplicity, does not require much sensitivity to obtain an
effective result), it may instead be the case that high sensitivity is a characteristic of behavior ideally
suited to large number of alternatives (because it permits subjects to minimize their investment in
lost causes). Put another way, a behavior that is ‘needlessly precise’ in simple scenarios may rely
on an algorithm much better suited to complex scenarios.
13.3 Bias, Sensitivity, and the Transition Matrix
It is important to distinguish the default transition matrix Q from the particular transitions ob-
served in any given phase. The two are related but not identical. When keeping this distinction in
mind, it is useful to consider the difference between an organism’s ‘preference’ and its ‘bias.’
Bias (as formally defined by κ) corresponds to the behavior expected from the animal when
all reward rates are equal. It also corresponds to the barycenter of all the strategies displayed by
that animal. That is, if every variation in the schedule of rewards is imbalanced to an equivalent
degree (as measured by the Aitchison distance in Equation 3.8), then the behaviors associated with
those imbalances is expected to be centered on a compositional mean located at the coordinates
κ. However, bias is not equivalent to preference. The preference refers strictly to the observed
proportion of behavior. This may be captured intuitively by first asking someone whether they
would like to walk or to drive to a nearby location. If they reply that they would rather walk, then
inform them that it is currently raining. It is quite likely that the same person would switch their
answer to a preference for driving, and this is not seen as a sign of irrationality. Thus, preference
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is always a function of the specific conditions under which the behavior is exhibited, while bias is
always an invariant quantity. The relation between the two, according to the barycentric matching
model, is that preference is a consequence of three factors: the bias, the particulars of the schedule,
and the sensitivity to those particulars.
In the same way, the default transition matrix Q is also presumed to be invariant over time.
It is not merely analogous to the bias κ, but in the present hypothesis, it represents the more
fundamental process that gives rise to κ. Interestingly, based on the reported results, Q also gives
rise to the sensitivity parameter α, at least to some extent. Consequently, the present model is
incomplete in an important way, because we have not yet identified the more fundamental process
that corresponds to an organism’s interpretation of feedback from the environment.
A candidate for such an approach would be a form of Bayesian updating. Under such an
approach, the outcome of each response would be treated as evidence used to compute a posterior
expectation of relative value. Low sensitivity might correspond to each observation yielding only
a small reduction in uncertainty (a ‘discrimination’ problem), or might result from an especially
strong prior (a ‘stubbornness’ problem). Specifying such a model formally, however, hinges entirely
on how the matrix Q is represented by the organism, and whether Q changes over time as a
function of experience. If Q is essentially static, then the organism must maintain some memory
of the perturbation ⊕qi appropriate for modifying each row i in Q, presumably updating these
perturbations when an error detect mechanism signals that the current modification is not effective.
On the other hand, if Q changes dynamically, it likely does so much more slowly, leading to the
ongoing modification of both the short-term modifier qi and a long-term conditional strategy Qi.
When both quantities are interpreted in terms of a subject’s representations, correctly identifying
changes in both qi and Qi over time is a significant challenge. However, if Qi is taken to reflect
physical constraints of the space (as opposed to the modification qi, which reflects the representation
of the current schedule), then an experiment manipulating both the schedule and the physical
environment in a controlled fashion (e.g. by changing the distance between levers, or changing the
force required to depress them) could potentially track how each set of probabilities changes over
time.
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13.4 Adaptation & Stability in Conditional Behavior
Setting aside the appropriateness of the model in the abstract, a particularly acute problem facing
the analyst is that of estimation. While there is usually little doubt as to the behavior of the
organism (insofar as that behavior was operationalized), a theory reliant on Q for its description is
only effective when a good estimate of Q can be obtained. The behavior, however, is in a state of
constant flux, as a consequence of the organism’s ongoing adaptation. Some forms of adaptation are
relatively easy to track because they are connected to a measurable event in the world (as in the case
of rewards delivered), while others are opaque and correspond to convenient constructs imposed
on the organism that may not be well understood (such as hunger or motivation). The property
that renders Q particularly difficult to estimate is its dimensionality: The matrix associated with
n alternatives has n(n− 1) degrees of freedom. Given how often behavior changes, it is difficult to
obtain samples of steady-state behavior that persist for long enough periods of time to be able to
say with some certainty what the full matrix Q in that interval was.
A common approach for molar analyses is to average over many sessions, sometimes doing so
over periods of weeks or months, in order to obtain estimates that converge on stable values. Such
methods not only assume that behavior is entirely stable over those periods, but also make short-
term changes (such as the transitions between schedules) impossible to study directly without
engaging in other kinds of averaging. Thus, a method was sought that simultaneously allowed
reasonable estimates to be obtained while also trying to limit such estimates to stable epochs of
responding in order to avoid having to blindly assume stability.
One of the important observations in time-series analyses of the present experiment was that
the conditional probabilities of response appeared stable over relatively long intervals (that is, long
enough to obtain reasonable estimates), but that these conditional probabilities changed, often
abruptly, at different times from one another. Each set of conditional probabilities can be thought
of as a row in a transition matrix, so change-point analysis was used to identify when changes
in conditional probabilities were observed, updating only the row that changed. This ensured
that each row in the current transition matrix was estimated from as wide a window of time as
possible, while also providing a principled demonstration that the behavior within that window
could reasonably be considered ‘stable.’
Such a method has intrinsic limits. All change-point analyses will display a tradeoff, such that
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smaller changes will take correspondingly more data to reliably detect. This tradeoff becomes
more demanding as the number of alternatives increases: A change from [0.4, 0.6] to [0.5, 0.5]
can be detected after a smaller number of trials than a change from [0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.6] to
[0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5]. Consequently, the frequency with which change-points are detected for any
given conditional probability will be lower for tasks with more alternatives. At the same time,
however, more complex tasks also have more conditional probabilities to consider. Consequently,
although the method is likely to break down at very large scales (e.g., dozens of response alterna-
tives), it appears to be effective when the number of alternatives is less than ten.
Insofar as subjects are also considered to be obtaining parameter estimates about the relative
rates of reward, they experience constraints very similar to those experienced by the analysts
studying them. They too must use the sparse feedback of uncertain events as best they can. Under
experimental conditions, the ability of both humans (Gallistel et al., 2014) and animals (Kheifets
& Gallistel, 2012) have been compared to those of a ‘statistically ideal observer.’ Consistently,
organisms in these studies display remarkably fine-tuned sensitivity of changing task demands,
sometimes adjusting their behavior before having made even a single mistake. While it is safe to
rule out the possibility that organisms have the ability to see into the future, even non-human
organisms prove to be adept at detecting changes in their environment in the very recent past.
13.5 Cognition & Behavior: The Environment as Memory
An observer with a satirical sensibility might caricature ‘cognitivism’ and ‘behaviorism’ as lying at
opposite ideological extremes. In the cognitive account, the world is remote from our experience,
reaching us only through the intermediary form of ‘representations.’ A caricature of this position
would propose that the world effectively does not exist, and that all we experience is instead a kind
of ‘virtual reality’ constructed from whole cloth by crafty heuristics applied to unreliable sensory
inputs. Meanwhile, the behaviorist perspective takes the opposite extreme: It posits that the
‘self’ and its corresponding feelings are the epiphenomena, and that what governs our behavior is
the world. Put simply, cognitive theory explains psychological phenomena solely in terms of the
contents of the mind’s ‘black box,’ while behaviorism loudly speculates that the box itself might
nearly be empty.
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These caricatures are extreme and are easily dismissed as hyperbole. It is important to remem-
ber, however, that such extremity is remarkably easy to find in print. For example, the following
quotation captures the common sensibility among members of the cognitive orthodoxy that the
world has no ‘reality’ beyond the heavily processed form it takes as a representation:
Before learning can take place, an organism must be able to perceive the world, and
preferably take advantage of the fact that the information from the range of sensory
channels is likely to be correlated. Objects have not only visual and spatial character-
istics, but are likely also to have associated tactile features, and quite possibly to have
a characteristic smell and taste. It seems likely that perceiving and integrating these
various sources of information would benefit from at least a temporary form of storage,
both to allow for extended processing, and also for the fact that the evidence from the
various channels may not always be available simultaneously. Indeed in some cases,
such as the subsequent taste of an orange, or the sound emitted by cat, information on
one channel such as vision, may arrive substantially before that of others.
–Baddeley (1992, p. 281)
The ultimate conclusion of Baddeley’s logic is that any stimulus that elicits a behavior is encoded
in some representational form, whether it be a part of the ‘phonological loop’ or the ‘visuo-spatial
sketchpad’ (both of which are invoked in the article from which the above quotation is drawn).
Considered from a philosophical perspective, however, this ‘representatively rich’ approach to
behavior clashes violently with behaviorism’s extreme views about what a behavior’s ‘cause’ might
be. For example, writing on the subject of the Holocaust:
...it is important to emphasize that the real causes [of Hitler’s order to exterminate the
Jews] lay in the environment, because if we want to do anything about genocide, it
is to the environment we must turn. We cannot make men stop killing each other by
changing their feelings. Whatever UNESCO may say to the contrary, wars do not begin
in the minds of men. The situation is much more hopeful. To prevent war we must
change the environment.
–B. F. Skinner, writing in Blanshard & Skinner (1967, p. 331)
Skinner’s position is clearly meant to be provocative, and mainstream psychologists are quick to
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distance themselves from claims of this kind today. A hard-nosed analysis, however, reveals that
both of these perspectives suffer from serious problems. Although Baddeley’s statement seems the
more reasonable of the two, it relies on its own long list of assumptions that, in practice, may not be
tenable. Many cognitive constructs, being post-hoc inventions based mainly on observed behavior,
may in reality arise from simple distributed algorithms.
The limitation of cognitive theorizing that neglects underlying mechanisms is elegantly demon-
strated by ‘Braitenberg vehicles’ (Braitenberg, 1986). Braitenberg described a host of very simple
machines composed only of sensors, actuators, and very simple wiring:
We will talk only about machines with very simple internal structures, too simple in fact
to be interesting from the point of view of mechanical or electrical engineering. Interest
arises, rather, when we look at these machines or vehicles as if they were animals in
a natural environment. We will be tempted, then, to use psychological language in
describing their behavior. And yet we know very well that there is nothing in these
vehicles that we have not put in ourselves.
–Braitenberg (1986, p. 2)
The most famous of these vehicles is a box with two light sensors on the front, and a wheel on each
side. Each sensor generates an analog signal linearly related to the intensity of light, and each is
wired directly to one of the wheels (causing it to turn as a speed proportional to that intensity).
No other interconnections are made. When such a vehicle is released into a natural environment
with variable levels of light, it will engage in one of two behaviors: it will either move towards
light sources or away from them, depending on which sensor is wired to which wheel. If these light
sources are moving, the vehicle will immediately adjust its behavior. The temptation to attribute
goals, temperaments, and even beliefs to these reactive devices is powerful. If each robot has a light
source on its back, they will either gather together into chains and groups, or else scurry about
trying to avoid one another. Nevertheless, all that is required for these vehicles to display complex
(and even social) behavior is a suitably complex and dynamic environment. No representations
or beliefs are required; indeed, in the case of Braitenberg’s vehicles, not even a nervous system is
necessary.
This lesson is not a new one. The same cautionary note can be seen in the original imprinting
results reported by Lorenz: The ‘follow’ behavior of a group of goslings appears to require a
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sophisticated cognitive capacity, but can be described much more simply as a fixed action pattern
that becomes inflexibly associated with certain kinds of moving stimuli. As in the case of the
Braitenberg vehicles, appealing to the ‘obvious’ characteristics of an imagined mental representation
may be inappropriate if a less sophisticated algorithm can yield the same behavior. Indeed, it is
only their extreme simplicity that persuades us that Braitenberg vehicles are too primitive to have a
‘psychology.’ As a consequence, ethology was dominated by strict skepticism regarding the mental
life of animals for much of the 20th century (reviewed in Klopfer, 2005).
Despite this intense skepticism, there is now ample evidence that organisms (human and oth-
erwise) do indeed make use of cognitive machinery (reviewed in Zentall & Wasserman, 2012).
However, although the radical portion of radical behaviorism has been discredited, many of the
core lessons of behaviorism are nevertheless essential, particularly with respect to understanding
the context in which behavior is observed. The heuristic proposed here, in which a default transi-
tion matrix Q is modified by additional feedback, can be interpreted as a hybrid of the cognitive
and behaviorist viewpoints. This default matrix then acts as the foundation, and additional learn-
ing processes may provide continuous adjustments to behavior as a function of feedback from the
environment.
It is not definite from the reported results, however, to what degree such a default matrix is a
representation (as per Baddeley) or an emergent phenomenon (as per Braitenberg). For example,
the early divergence rates plotted in Figures 9.14, 10.7, and 12.7 all suggest that each subject’s
initial behavior is not well represented by the default matrix, and the gradually diminishing values
over the learning history correspond to better and better alignment with the default matrix. These
early responses might capture a more dynamic, exploratory response that supplements the default
matrix, and the diminishing divergence would reflect subjects discovering more and more efficient
strategies. In this view, the default matrix is given a priori by the physical properties of the
environment and the limitations of the subject, carrying no cognitive load beyond those of basic
sensation. On the other hand, the early period may display little structure precisely because no
default matrix has yet been identified. If such a matrix is instead more like a representation, then
it must be built up and maintained by a gradual learning process working beneath the more rapid
learning rules used to adapt to the changing schedules.
Several lines of evidence suggest that a more dynamic interpretation of Q is more likely to be
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correct. Any organism will necessarily have some physical limits, so the emergent interpretation
must in some sense be true. This does not rule out the possibility of the cognitive interpretation,
however, and does not signal to what degree each interpretation contributes to the final process. A
clue towards resolving this ambiguity is provided by Experiment 4: Subjects making a transition
from a 4-lever configuration to an 8-lever configuration show a brief rise in their divergence from
the default matrix, even when they have an established history with the task and have encoun-
tered 8-lever scenarios previously. Subjects transitioning from 8 levers to 4 levers do not show a
corresponding change in their divergence rates. These results lend some support to the cognitive
interpretation, as it suggests that the 8-lever transition matrix is not ‘stamped in’ by the original
exposure, and that a shift to a more complex task induces a brief period of exploratory behavior.
Another potentially relevant cognitive approach is that of the mental set, originally proposed
by Jersild (1927). According to this framework, organisms not only learn particular sets of facts
associated with current task demands, but also form ‘mental sets’ that encode how those facts
relate to one another, and what the corresponding appropriate behaviors would be to exploit those
facts. Although quiescent during the height of behaviorism, this approach has found new life in the
context of ‘task-switching’ paradigms (Avdagic et al., 2013), in which subjects must make sudden
transitions between tasks with different (or conflicting) demands. Task-switching paradigms have
been invoked in the service of theories of hierarchical cognitive control (Kleinsorg & Heuer, 1999)
and motor planning (Rogers & Monsell, 1995), as well as in studies of cognitive decline (Clapp et
al., 2011) and impairment (Gu et al., 2008). The default transition matrix Q could provide a partial
measure of a subject’s mental set for the present task. Testing this hypothesis would entail training
subjects with different initial conditions and then testing them with an ambiguous novel task. If Q
primarily reflects the physical constraints of the task, then subjects should be relatively unaffected
by prior training; if, however, their prior experience has resulted in procedural knowledge about
the task, this would be expected to yield stable patterns of behavior heavily influenced by prior
training.
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13.6 Compositional Analysis in Applied Contexts
PARADOX: A statement that reduces the matter at hand to complete obscurity while
clarifying it.
–Wolfe (1992, p. 237)
A substantial human literature has arisen around the idea of a ‘paradox of choice,’ wherein
participants report less satisfaction and also reportedly make poorer choices when presented with
large number of alternatives. Although meta-analysis suggests that the global effect size is nearly
zero (Scheibehenne et al., 2010), the idea of ‘choice overload’ is a resilient trope in the choice
literature. One of the seminal studies was reported by Iyengar & Lepper (2000), presented passing
customers with free samples chosen either six flavors of jam or from 24 flavors. Participants were
found to be less likely to approach the samples when fewer were offered, but were much more
likely to purchase jam. Although other studies reporting similar results differ in their particulars,
two dominant themes distinguish these experimental designs from the studies undertaken in basic
research.
First, most experiments in this vein unfold without any opportunity for the participants to learn
from their choices. Participants are assumed to be näıve when the experiment begins and to largely
remain so when the experiment has concluded. Consequently, these are not studies of learning or of
memory. If anything, they provide rough population measurements of the factors that contribute
to momentary prejudices and impulsive action. Noticing that choice performance is poor when
overwhelming options are coupled with no opportunity for feedback is hardly paradoxical.
Secondly, the priority of many of these experiments is to manipulate behavior, typically with
a profit motive. This is not to say that all such studies have mercenary motives; indeed, a major
application of this research is to identify policy approaches that save consumers money (e.g., in
selecting a healthcare plan, Johnson et al., 2013). Nevertheless, the motives of applied work are not
always aligned with those of basic research, as the degree of precision necessary for a result that is
‘good enough for government work’ often is not sufficient to build a robust theory describing the
phenomenon.
Applying the present animal work to these applied domains, then, is less obvious than it might
initially appear. Perhaps the most important rapprochement between the basic research and the
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applied work, then, is to understand the gap between näıve performance and expert performance.
Rather than presenting participants with single choices and then leaving them to ponder the un-
explored counterfactuals, such research should be of central interest to researchers who hope to
discover how to train smarter decision makers (e.g., Milkman et al., 2009).
13.7 Future Directions
Further development of this broad class of problems suggests a range of different experimental
possibilities. There is always a need for straightforward replication of the described effects given
variation in the physical configuration, the scheduling of rewards, and the characteristics of sub-
jects (age, gender, species), but most of these variations are obvious, and would serve mainly to
validate or disconfirm the conclusions already presented. Thus, while replication and generalization
experiments are important, I instead describe below several lines of inquiry that have the potential
to build substantially on the existing conclusions, extending the model’s generality and expanding
the range of experimental preparations to which it can be applied.
13.7.1 Fixation and Symmetry
Throughout the experimental sciences, ‘bias’ has a bad reputation, and nearly all experimental
designs implicitly seek to minimize it. This is understandable in physics and statistics (where the
word usually corresponds to the misbehavior of a tool designed to provide precise measurement
of some other process), but somewhat peculiar in psychology, where the ‘misbehavior’ is a part of
the behavior being studied. Nevertheless, the study of choice and decision-making is replete with
techniques for cleverly negating the effects of bias. These include the Findley switch key (Findley,
1958), the randomized telephone survey (Troldahl & Jr., 1964), the radial arm maze (Olton &
Samuelson, 1976), and forced-choice adaptive procedures (Jesteadt, 1980).
The oldest and most widely used technique, however, is that of the visual fixation point (Dodge,
1900). Dating back to experimental psychology’s early roots in perceptual psychophysics, fixation
points remain widely used today as a way to eliminate confounding variables, particularly in the
eye-tracking paradigms used in brain imaging and electrophysiology. By forcing the subject to
return to some original starting point, fixation point paradigms ensure that the initial conditions of
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every trial are as similar as possible. Fixation procedures are not limited to eye-tracking paradigms;
they may also be implemented as “start buttons” in touch-screen tasks (e.g., Basile & Hampton,
2010).
Importantly, however, no experimental procedure can account for every form of bias. For
example, a fixation point does not prevent a subject from displaying a bias in one direction or
another. Instead, it minimizes bias arising from the prior location of gaze. In practice, human
eye movements show considerable bias independent of the content of the visual field, in a manner
similar to a default transition matrix (Tatler & Vincent, 2009). Furthermore, even in cases of
‘simple gaze’ (were no choice is implied), participants display a bias that favors the center of the
display screen (Tatler, 2007).
What we mean when we say that a fixation point task is unbiased is that it seeks to render
trials uniform in time and symmetrical in space, with fixation acting as the point of reflection. Any
biases displayed by subjects are then presumed to describe characteristics of the subject (memory,
muscular asymmetry, etc.) and not characteristics of the experiment.
However, the present experiments suggest that not only does ‘bias arising from process’ con-
tribute substantially to behavior, it may also (in the form of the default transition matrix) provide
an efficient heuristic that subjects can exploit to achieve adaptive success. Because naturalistic
scenarios are not governed by symmetries of experimental control, the role of process must be
understood before a general theory of choice can be approached.
This observation yields two interesting, but competing hypotheses. On the one hand, because
a heuristic that depends on process does poorly in cases where a mismatch between the default
transition matrix and the particulars of the schedule is observed, it is reasonable to suppose that
replicating the present experiments with a design with much more pronounced radial symmetry
should cause this failure state to disappear. Under these circumstances, estimates of a global
sensitivity parameter (as in Figure 9.4) may or may not show an effect of number of alternatives,
while trial-by-trial estimates (as in Figure 9.10) may rise to more consistent asymptotic levels than
were observed in the present experiments.
On the other hand, the remarkable informational efficiency of possessing a default transition
matrix may break down if all conditional probabilities are forced by the task to have a similar
character. We get a hint of this in the present experiments when considering the sensitivity on
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trials immediately following reward delivery, which is generally lower than sensitivity during the
other trials. Collecting the reward effectively acts as biased fixation, as the conditional probabilities
of response are much more consistent than those observed otherwise. If this reduced sensitivity
is a general property of behavior (rather than being a local consequence of having just collected
a reward), the sensitivity in a fixation-based paradigm might be substantially lower than in the
free-responding paradigm presently used.
If using fixation to enforce response symmetry generally hurts performance, it would strengthen
the claim that the process-based model of learning is the favored heuristic in the species under
consideration. This in turn provides a different way in which to approach the question of what
drives differences in performance between species. For example, as noted by Baum (1979), pigeons
routinely display much higher sensitivities to reward than rats under similar schedules. To say
that this seems reasonable for evolutionary reasons (given the pigeon’s relative mobility) is vague
and post-hoc, and it would be far more interesting if it were to transpire that rats favor a process-
oriented heuristic while pigeons favor a more classical heuristic that weighs every alternative. While
this is merely conjecture at the present time, tools have now been developed to begin to ask these
questions in a more mechanism-based way.
13.7.2 Compositional Reinforcement Learning
As noted above, the working conclusion of the present research is incomplete. While a heuristic
based on a default transition matrix appears to involve a minimal computational load (measured
in information-theoretic terms), it remains to be determined how the learning component of such
heuristic could be implemented. The challenges of working in compositional space become partic-
ularly acute in consideration of this question.
A promising possibility is afforded by renewed interest in drift diffusion models (Bogacz et al.,
2006; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008), often shortened to ‘diffusion models’ or called ‘bounded accumu-
lator models.’ Although originally developed as physical models of particles undergoing Brownian
motion, diffusion models have proved to be highly effective at modeling many other uncertain pro-
cesses. At its most basic, such a model supposes that a hypothetical point lies on a number line
and, following each unit of time t, is moved by an amount drawn from a Gaussian distribution. If
this Gaussian is at all offset from zero, then the drift will favor one direction over the other. In all
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cases, the average distance from the starting point is always expected to increase over time, as a
result of the random walk. At the moment the point has passed some threshold in either direction,
a decision is triggered, the identity of which is determined by the direction in which the point ended
up traveling. Remarkably, models of this kind not only provide good descriptions of proportions of
choice, but also of reaction times and of subjective confidence ratings (Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010;
Drugowitsch et al., 2012).
Given the description above, it is not difficult to draw a parallel with conventional log-odds
models. The line along which a point is thought to travel in the above description is, in most
cases, directly analogous to a 1-simplex, and the additive movements of the diffusion Gaussian
correspond exactly to perturbation operations (Equation 3.3) applied in log-transformed space.
However, although a compositional generalization of a diffusion model appears to follow directly
from this observation, the particulars are complex and have yet to be adequately studied (although
see Churchland et al., 2008, for a 4-alternative model).
For example, in a two-alternative forced choice system, evidence for one alternative yields
symmetric information relative to evidence against the other. This symmetry breaks down in
the three-alternative case, instead yielding a simplex in which ‘evidence against’ is ambiguous,
distributed in some fashion among the other alternatives. At least four models present themselves.
On the one hand, a strictly additive model (using only the ‘evidence for’) would yield a pattern of
diffusion resulting from the sum of many random vectors (one per alternative, radially symmetrical
with respect to a common barycenter). A similar (but not identical) model would arise making use
of only ‘evidence against.’ A more complex model would include both evidence for and evidence
against, doing so in potentially uneven amounts. Finally, a model could be employed that simply
encodes the drift as a multivariate normal distribution (which may or may not display sphericity).
Determining which of these possibilities is the ‘correct’ model is a substantial challenge, and
depends critically on the process for which the model seeks to provide a description. For example,
it is rather common for mathematically sophisticated researchers to point out that because certain
statistical computations are computationally costly or intractable, their theoretical generality may
be suspect (e.g., Courville et al., 2006). This is a näıve view of the brain, however, which ignores
the massively parallel way in which information is processed. To take an extreme case, it is
clearly impossible for a photon to ‘perform computations,’ because photons have no moving parts;
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nevertheless, the path integrals followed by photons appear to calculate integrals of stupefying
complexity at the speed of light. This capability is merely an emergent property of their interaction
with innumerable other quantum fields. It is not the photon that does the computation, but rather
that the computation is a consequence of the system. It is on this premise that ‘quantum computing’
could theoretically be performed (Kok et al., 2007). In a similar fashion, distributed computing by
vast networks can represent intractable probability distributions to arbitrary precision, provided
the desired distribution is the consequence of the relevant network. Put more succinctly: Neurons
need not encode a value of π to display behavior well-described by a Gaussian distribution, even
though an analyst must know π to high precision to evaluate the equation.
Although a variety of competing models of neuronal behavior have been put forward in recent
years, it can be shown that many of them are reducible in one form or another to diffusion models
(Roxin & Ledberg, 2008). Meta-analysis and simulation using these various models both suggest
that although no clear winner has emerged as providing the best model of behavior, it is never-
theless likely that decisions arise from processes characterized by competition among alternatives
(Teodorescu & Usher, 2013). Classical econometric model, in which the value of each alternative
is evaluated independently and the results are compared, yield less precise predictions than those
in which alternatives must in some sense fight among themselves, and many of the models that
display this property can be described in terms of diffusion.
13.7.3 Fixed Transitions, Random Subjects
One of the analytic problems with the described method for estimating a transition matrix is that it
relies on obtaining a representative sample of behavior across at least moderately counterbalanced
conditions. This renders the approach untenable when fewer than several thousand responses
collected over at least three (but ideally four or five) different schedules. While this is a reasonable
approach in the context of a long-term behavioral experiment using animals, it isn’t as feasible
with (for example) a pool of human participants.
Fortunately, the default transition matrices observed in behavior throughout these experiments
displayed a great deal of consistency. Although differing somewhat in the particulars, a general
pattern of preferred transitions was observed, arising in unsurprising ways given a behavioral phe-
notype common among rodents. In cases where consistency of this kind is seen across subjects,
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mixed models can be used to pool data from multiple subjects to identify the ‘fixed effects’ common
across the groups, while simultaneously taking the ‘random effects’ of individual differences into
account (Fitzmaurice et al., 2004).
The fixed-effects default transition matrix that would result from such an analysis requires
a slightly different theoretical stance than does a matrix estimated for a particular individual.
Although a transition matrix pooled across subjects could still be used in a calculation of the
divergence rate, this divergence can be expected to display inflated values, because its failure to
account for the additional divergence between the fixed-effect matrix and the random effect of each
subject’s individual default transition matrix (which may not be estimable given a small behavioral
sample).
Provided this caveat is properly taken into account, a mixed-model approach could be used
to obtain effective population estimates from experiments with much shorter durations. Such a
method could, in turn, permit a larger subject pool to be examined in a cost-effective way, and to
achieve much higher levels of statistical power when making claims about population-level effect
(Button et al., 2013).
13.7.4 Compositional Prospect Theory
Given the possibility of the mixed-model analytic method described above, one of the first domains
in which the compositional model can be extended is that of human decision-making. As reviewed
in the introduction, the compositional paradigm has extensive implications for the theories of utility
and prospects that arose in the second half of the 20th century.
The first among these is that strict preference and stochastic dominance are neither theoreti-
cally reasonable nor empirically justified in the study of the actual behaviors emitted by organisms.
A probabilistic model that permits ‘preference reversals’ is entirely within the reach of econometric
theory, provided the analyst can endure a paradigm shift away from treating axioms of rational-
ity as prescriptive. The driving force behind behavioral economics has been this recognition that
decision making is heuristic rather than mathematically rational. What remains to be done is to
achieve greater rapprochement between behavioral economics and ethology, recognizing both that
animal decision making is likely more sophisticated than has been given credit by economists, and
human decision-making less deliberative. However, it is not enough to attack the obvious deficien-
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cies of classical economics, which are widely agreed upon. The contribution of a compositional
methodology to this discussion is a set of constraints that change the manner in which feedback
from the environment must be understood.
For example, a model built using compositional tools is almost obligated to consider sources of
gain independently of sources of loss, with the integration of the two coming only at the end of
the process. The reason for this is simple: The closure constraint is only consistently defined when
all items share the same sign (that is, when they are either all positive or all negative). Closure,
as defined, does not coherently accommodate components that make up a ‘negative percentage’ of
the total. Furthermore, operations like perturbation and powering cannot ever move a coordinate
within the simplicial geometry outside of its confines. Consequently, the most reasonable approach
is to work in two isolated simplexes (one for gains and one for losses), working to yield a final
composite value. The resulting composite value for overall gains can then be compared to the
composite value for losses, these presumably lying on an unbounded ratio scale.
Additionally, a third class of options is compositionally distinct from gains and losses: Those
whose value is precisely zero. Closure formally requires that all components in a composition be
non-zero, as any structural zeros trap a point within a facet of any larger compositional structure.
It therefore stands to reason that zeros are also dealt with during the final accounting stage.
This change in the order of operations has the potential to explain many ‘irrational’ behaviors in
a fashion that is more mathematically consistent and analytically tractable than existing methods,
and that scales to large numbers of alternatives more efficiently. Not only does the segregation of
gains and losses appear discontinuous (as has been suggested by many experimental results), but
that discontinuity may manifest as a considerable gulf in cases where outcomes with a value of zero
are likely to occur.
The most direct tests of the compositional hypothesis take the form of ‘multi-armed bandit’
paradigms (Robbins, 1952), which have been studied both in strictly abstract terms (S. Zhang
& Lee, 2010) and experimentally (Steyvers et al., 2009). These tasks are essentially identical
to concurrent choice paradigms, and may be implemented using nearly identical schedules (e.g.,
Kangas et al., 2009). Of course, it is important to distinguish the temporal dynamics of the
schedule involved (such as whether rewards are ‘held’ in secret or not; Jensen & Neuringer, 2008);
in almost all studies of human decision-making, rewards are strictly probabilistic and, as such,
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the optimal strategy is exclusive selection of the best alternative. Although they are understudied
in human paradigms, schedules that involve the continuous balancing of all response alternatives
are very likely to yield more interesting results than the ‘exclusive-choice’ optimizations typical in
the decision-making literature. The Turn-Based Foraging paradigm described by Algorithm 1, in
particular, requires participants to make use of mixed strategies, while also giving rise to reward
hazard functions that facilitate rigorous quantitative analysis.
13.7.5 The Psychophysics of Probability and Value
Although much of the literature on human decision making (particularly in econometrics) has
confined itself to rationality axioms inspired by the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorems, there
is a rich literature suggesting that, in addition to primary sensory modality, many of our other
subjective experiences display ‘psychophysical’ properties. Brunswik was among the first to suggest
that subjective probability might be experientially important in animal behavior (Brunswik, 1939)
and in human psychophysics (Brunswik & Herma, 1951), whereas Attneave (1953) was among the
first to examine human self-report of the ‘feeling’ of a probability in terms of a power law, consistent
with contemporaneous work on power-law psychophysical functions (Stevens, 1957).
Despite this early work, there was little cross-talk between econometricians and psychometri-
cians (although see Edwards, 1962; Galanter, 1962) prior to the advent of prospect theory. However,
the rise of behavioral economics has yielded considerable work seeking to identify psychophysical
functions of value and probability. These experimental investigations initially focused on econo-
metric themes such as consumer spending (Christensen, 1989) and the characterization of utility
functions (Tversky & Fox, 1995; Brandstätter & Brandstätter, 1996), but more recent work has
drawn from a broader domain of experimental paradigms, including behavior analysis (Gallistel et
al., 2014), motor coordination (Trommershäuser et al., 2008) and neuroscience (Vlaev et al., 2011).
The sophistication of these results, as well as their inconsistency with rationality axioms, has led to
something of a crisis of confidence in experimental econometrics, resulting in an increased emphasis
on rigorous experimental design (Angrist & Pischke, 2010).
With respect to the problem of subjective value, the heart of the matter is discriminability. As
Figure 1.3 makes clear, models that assume participants can perfectly discriminate between exact
outcomes yield aberrant predictions, while models that can reasonably represent ambiguity do not.
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Although cognitive models like prospect theory have proposed that gambles undergo an “editing”
process prior to valuation, there is unlikely to be a universal algorithm across all individuals that
governs all such editing. The dream of uncovering the one true editing algorithm is almost certainly
a Quixotic one.
An alternative approach is to develop a more flexible descriptive model that permits the assess-
ment of differing degrees of discriminability. Reiger & Wang (2008) describe a method by which
continuous probability distributions (like that in Figure 1.3, bottom) can be interpreted, but also
suggest a computationally straightforward process of converting traditional discrete gambles into
continuous functions using a form of kernel density estimation. In their framework, the probability
density function associated with each discrete outcome is converted from a mixture of degenerate
point distributions into a set of overlapping step functions, each of which has a width parameter
ε, as in kernel density estimation (Silverman, 1986). Their logic is that because similar outcomes
cannot be distinguished from one another, they should be pooled into a common cluster whose
density is characterized by the sum of their individual step functions. The closure constraint may
then be applied with a normalizing factor equal not to the sum of the transformed probabilities,
but instead to the integral of the resulting continuous distribution. Figure 13.1 (top) displays this
process, using a uniform kernel with width ε = 1.5, as applied to the subdivided gamble previously
depicted in Figure 1.3.
This approach yields two problems. The first is that there is considerable evidence that nu-
merical judgments generally fall on a ratio scale, such that the contrast between $1 and $10 is
considerably more salient than the contrast between $74 and $83. The second is that because
their domain of outcomes necessarily covers the range from −∞ to ∞, their approach must either
abandon the distinction between gains and losses, or predict paradoxical behavior. In the latter
case, the paradox arises whenever an objective outcome has a value of $0, as in Figure 13.1. An
outcome of $0 is converted by the kernel to cover the range from –ε to ε, leading to a mixture of
both positive and negative expectation. If, consistent with the empirical evidence, losses are more
salient than gains, then the expectation from a $0 outcome should integrate to a negative value.
Put another way, an objective outcome of $0 will only have a subjective value of $0 under this
paradigm if gains and losses are exactly symmetrical.
A better approach reflects the psychophysical uncertainty of numerical judgments, as well as the
























































































Figure 13.1: The subdivided lottery in Figure 1.3 is modified in two different ways that reflect the
uncertainty of mental representation. In one case (top), a continuous distribution is build using the
strategy outlined by Reiger & Wang (2008), using uniform kernels with a width of ε = 3. This yields
much less distorted subjective expectations. In a psychophysically-motivated account (bottom), the
five non-$0 lotteries are combined by summing log-normal distributions with a consistent coefficient
of variation equal to 0.15 (generalization), and the resulting composite is treated as categorically
distinct from the $0 outcome (discrimination). The resulting influence of α and β yields a prediction
that much more reasonably approximates the non-subdivided expectation in Figure 1.3 (top).
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distinction between generalization and discrimination. In Figure 13.1, the five non-$0 outcomes are
each converted to log-normal distributions all having a coefficient of variation cv = 0.15, consistent
with the psychophysics of numerosity reported by Whalen et al. (1999). These are then summed to
produce a joint density estimate, in a manner similar to the strategy outlined by Reiger & Wang
(2008). Because the resulting density function is a coherent cluster, it is generalized into its own
discrete category, discriminated from the degenerate probability density at $0. Thus, when α and
β are applied, they are applied to the clustered outcomes. This yields a very reasonable prediction
of expected value, that is broadly consistent with Figure 1.3 (top).
While this general strategy goes a long way toward providing a template for characterizing the
editing process of different individuals, it suffers from several procedural ambiguities. For example,
what constitutes ‘discriminably distinct’ groupings of outcomes? One extreme would be to always
use three distinct categories: gains, losses, and ‘zeroes’ (this last as a way to accommodate the
interpretation of value belonging on a ratio scale). A compromise might be to set a threshold for
shared variance by harkening to set theory (e.g. in the style of Bush & Mosteller, 1951).
A subtle consideration lies in the relationship between the coefficient of variation cv = 0.15 and
the model exponents α and β. Reiger & Wang take the position that uncertainty regarding the
density function of expectation should be further modified by the distortion of probabilities; that is,
that ε and α interact directly. It may be the case, however, that α (which governs the subdivision
of distinct outcomes in Figures 1.2 and 1.3) acts independently of a coefficient of variation cv
(which governs the interpretation of ambiguity). Given the research on ‘ambiguity aversion’ (Fox
& Tversky, 1995), treating α and cv as parameters whose impact is orthogonal to one another is
appealing.
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Here, D+ corresponds to the subset of outcomes with a positive expectation and D− to those with
a negative outcome. This leaves p∅, which corresponds to the probability of an outcome with zero
value. At a minimum, this model has three free parameters: α, β, and cv; in that case, α = α
+ = α−
and β+ = β−. In order for gains and losses to be accounted for differently, either α or β must be
split into distinct parameters. In the interest of parsimony, β appears to be a better candidate,
because it has no involvement with p∅.
Although Equation 13.1 appears unwieldy, its structure is both mathematically and psychologi-
cally justified. Because its treatment of probabilities consistently respects the closure constraint, its
final calculated value is represented in the units of the objective problem. Furthermore, represent-
ing outcome uncertainty in terms of log-normal distributions with a uniform coefficient of variation
cv is consistent with reports that implicit judgments of numerical quantities display scale-invariant
error.
13.7.6 Moving Away From Strict Preference Ordering
Despite emphasizing a violation of the rationality axioms of expected utility, the various forms of
prospect theory are primarily concerned with the ‘normative’ behavior of a ‘rational’ agent (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1981). Although this approach introduced a level of subjectivity not considered by
classical economic models, it nevertheless assumed a strict preference ordering, such that ‘rational’
behavior consists of always choosing the alternative with the higher subjective value. In practice,
choice behavior of both by human participants and in animal models appears to be fundamentally
(and functionally) probabilistic (Neuringer & Jensen, 2012). Thus, in addition to parameters that
characterize sensitivity to probability (α), value (β), and ambiguity (cv), a decision function D()
is needed to describe the odds structure for choice frequency of each lottery. Given a set of X
lotteries, the decision to choose lottery A would depend on the function:
D (A) = P (A|LA,LB, · · · ,LX) (13.2)
Typically, D() takes the form of a probability distribution.
Among the most successful and enduring alternatives for D() is Luce’s choice axiom (Luce,
1959, 1977), which takes the following form:
D (A) = LA∑
i∈X Li
(13.3)
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Of the decision functions in the literature, the above is the most psychologically motivated; despite
this, it has received very little direct empirical testing (Stott, 2006). This function is trivially iden-
tical to the closure constraint (Equation 1.1), providing further justification for the compositional
approach.
Since Equation 13.3 asserts that the decision function is effectively compositional, following
that logic to its conclusion leads to the following straightforward formulation for weight and value:
B∗ = k∗ + δ · L∗ (13.4)
Here, the probability of a behavior Bi in the set B = [B1, · · · , Bn] is a function of the set of sub-
jective values L = [LA, · · · ,Ln]. This decision function has a vector of free parameters associated
with biases not otherwise accounted for k, and a sensitivity to lottery values δ.
13.7.7 Navigational Constraint as Compositional Choice
Although multi-armed bandit tasks have a long history of study, the simplicity that makes them
analytically appealing also undermines their face validity. In particular, multi-armed bandit tasks
are memoryless, resetting conditions to the same starting point on every trial in exactly the fashion
described in the above section on fixation. Consequently, much could be gleaned from an exper-
imental approach that explored choice into a less artificial context. At the same time, that very
artificiality is what controls for extraneous factors and so permits parametric analysis.
In light of this, a broad class of video games provide a potent middle ground. Although games
are often highly abstract and artificial in the degree to which they constrain choices, most also
permit players to pursue the game’s constrained objectives in a fashion that can be examined at
multiple levels of analysis. Consider, for example, the classic arcade game Pac-Man (Iwatani, 1980).
In each of the game’s levels, the player has a high-level strategic goal of visiting each point in a
maze, consuming ‘pellets’ to mark progress. However, because a number of antagonists (‘ghosts’)
also patrol the maze, the player must also play the game in a tactical fashion, adapting to short-
term cues. At its most global, Pac-Man is about adaptive strategies for tracing least-distance paths
through complex environments while avoiding dynamic obstacles; at its most reductionistic, it’s
about one turn in the labyrinth after another.
A simplified version of this kind of labyrinthine game could be used to implement a version
of the experiments presented to rats in the present study. Participants would be tasked with
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collecting as many rewards as possible by traveling through a labyrinth. Participants are made
aware periodically that new rewards are available, but are not told where those rewards have been
hidden. Furthermore, although participants can always see the layout of the labyrinth, they can
only see rewards which lie within the line-of-sight of their in-game avatar. This forces the player
to continuously explore and forage. Different unlabeled ‘regions’ of the maze would have differing
probabilities of having rewards available, and the layout of the maze could be manipulated to vary
the ease of transitions between those regions.
Such an experimental design would allow the process-based hypothesis put forward here to
be directly tested in a human participant pool. The prediction is that humans, acting under
time pressure, would fail to optimize their time spent exploring each region of the maze in the
cases where islands of relatively rich reward are relatively isolated, having only poor regions for
neighbors, but would perform considerably better in cases where every region had at least one
profitable neighboring region.
Despite a flood of tools for making simple games, relatively few modern studies have made
use of maze paradigms, unless the word ‘maze’ is reduced to the absolute minimal sense of a T-
intersection or a figure 8 (although see Simon & Daw, 2011). Presumably, human decision making
routinely operates at a much higher level of abstraction, and only tasks with enough complexity to
allow decision-making processes to unfold will provide a reasonable test of whether a process-based
hypothesis is plausible outside a narrow laboratory context.
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Chapter 14
Conclusions
No quantitative problem in science can be satisfactorily resolved without understanding the sample
space within which the data reside. Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that a great deal
can be achieved by modeling repeated choices in compositional terms. An interdisciplinary review
of repeated choice suggests that different lines of empirical evidence converge toward compositions
as a possible unifying framework. If successful, this line of inquiry points toward heuristics for
subjective value and subjective probability that underly basic decision making in multiple species.
The systematic treatment of compositional methods in Part I reveals them to be suitable to a
wide range of problems. Rather than suggesting a single model, compositions permit families of
models to be specified. The most fundamental of these models is the barycentric matching model
(Equations 1.12, 5.1), which provided a highly successful model of the relationship between response
proportions and scheduled rewards in the experiments performed for this project (Chapters 9
through 12). In the event that different response alternatives are difficult to discriminate from
one another, the model’s complexity need only be slightly increased to consider different contrasts
between the alternatives, as described for the re-analysis of existing data in Chapter 8.
Although the barycentric matching model provides a good description of molar behavior, that
description was surprising: Subjects adjusted their behavior in a manner that was more sensitive to
the schedule parameters when there were more response alternatives. To explain this finding, the
compositional framework was further extended to include change-point analysis over conditional
time series.
From this analysis, a working hypothesis was developed that has substantial implications. Sub-
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jects familiar with the task display very substantial response structure regardless of the schedule
parameters, a set of conditional probabilities called the ‘default transition matrix.’ Once this
pattern is stable, subjects make only small deviations from it in response to feedback from the
environment, incurring a very low computational load. This suggests that the so-called ‘paradox of
choice’ (whereby complex tasks result in cognitive overload) does not apply to this kind of repeated
choice. Indeed, rodents using this strategy displayed considerable adaptability.
At the same time, strategies that rely on computationally inexpensive deviations from a default
transition matrix are fragile when the best alternatives become isolated from one anther. In the
present study, this led to an effect quite reversed from the conventional idea of cognitive overload, in
which it was the simpler tasks that engendered insensitive behavior. Understanding compositional
choice as an ongoing process provides an explanation for this surprising result, and points to a
variety of experimental designs that will further illuminate these effects.
In the end, both experimentalists and theorists are advised to take Einstein’s immortal advice
into careful consideration:
It can scarcely be denied that the supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible
basic elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate
representation of a single datum of experience.
–Albert Einstein, the Herbert Spencer Lecture, Oxford University, June 10, 1933.
Crucially, the goal here is not to simplify the datum of experience! Although experimental control
often demands that we begin with a simple case, it is only by gradually considering more and more
complex data that we are able to determine whether our theory is too simple. In this respect, the
study of choice is no different, and must build on existing methods to test theory against tasks of
increasing complexity. Doing so will not only yield new and interesting phenomena, but it is the
only way in which the disparate threads of choice and decision making can hope to be woven into
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Appendix A
Glossary of Symbols and Equations
Although the compositional paradigm provides a powerful and consistent method for dealing with a
sample space that is unfamiliar to many, the corresponding notation will also be unfamiliar to those
readers. This appendix provides a glossary of the key symbols and operators needed to understand
compositional data, as well as a digest of all numbered equations appearing in the text.
A.1 Symbol Glossary
Data
x Vector. If x = C (x) (Equation 1.1), then x is also a composition (Equation 3.1).
x@ An additive log-ratio (ALR) transformation of x (Equation 4.1).
x◦ The centered log-ratio (CLR) transformation of x (Equation 4.3).
x∗ An isometric log-ratio (ILR) transformation of x (Equation 4.5).
Compositional Operation
C (·) The ‘closure’ operation, which converts a vector to a composition.
⊕ The ‘perturbation’ operator (Equation 3.3), analogous to addition.
 The ‘powering’ operator (Equation 3.3), analogous to multiplication.
	 The ‘anti-perturbation’ operator (Equation 3.5), analogous to subtraction.
⊕·
· The ‘perturbation-linear combination’ (Equation 3.10).
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〈·, ·〉a The ‘Aitchison inner product’ (Equation 3.6), analogous to the inner product 〈·, ·〉.
‖·‖a The ‘Aitchison norm’ (Equation 3.7), analogous to the Euclidean norm ‖·‖.
da (·, ·) The ‘Aitchison distance’ (Equation 3.8), analogous to Euclidean distance d (·, ·).
Model Parameters
α Exponent used for powering, typically estimating ‘sensitivity’ (Equation 1.12).
κ Composition used for perturbation, typically estimating ‘bias’ (Equation 1.12).
B An estimated stationary Markov chain describing behavior over some interval.
Q A ‘default transition matrix,’ estimated across multiple behaviors B.
Special Utility Matrices
U An orthonormal basis (Equation 4.6) for use in ILR transformation.
B A bifurcation matrix (Equation 4.10) used to construct a valid U matrix.
$ and ω Balancing terms (Equation 4.9) used in converting B to U.
%dj A vector of length d, in which element j equals 1 and all other elements equal zero.
Prospects & Lotteries
LA The objective expected value of a lottery A (Equation 1.2).
LA The subjective expected value of A, in the same units as LA (Equation 1.5).
L+A and L−A LA subdivided into gains (+) and losses(-) (Equation 13.1).
A.2 The Menagerie of Equations
Throughout this dissertation, the reader is referred to a great many equations, many of which are
only fully clear in the context of the surrounding text. The following list redundantly lists each
of the numbered equations in the text, providing a brief description and the page number of its
original appearance. Rather than including a list of equations in the Table of Contents, this section
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is intended to provide the reader with a condensed reference. A reader who wishes to re-examine an
equation in its original context may do so, but retracing that garden path is not required for those
readers who merely need to refresh their memories or for whom that context is already familiar.










• Equation 1.2, P. 8 – The expected value of a discrete outcome of a lottery A, as a function of





• Equation 1.3, P. 9 – The expected utility of a discrete outcome A, modifying Equation 1.2 with





• Equation 1.4, P. 10 – The subjected weighted expected utility of a discrete outcome A, modi-
fying Equation 1.2 with a coefficient α of subjective probability and β of subjective reward value
(Karmarkar, 1978):
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• Equation 1.5, P. 10 – The subjected expected value, obtained by translating Equation 1.4 into












• Equation 1.6, P. 13 – Herrnstein’s matching law, comparing proportion of a response behavior
Bi on alternative i to obtained reinforcers Ri on that alternative (Herrnstein, 1961):
B1
B1 +B2 + · · ·+Bn
=
R1
R1 +R2 + · · ·+Rn
(1.6)
• Equation 1.7, P. 13 – Herrnstein’s hyperbolic model of asymptotic response rate, modifying
Equation 1.6 to represent one response, while adding an error term re, a bias term ki, and a rate









• Equation 1.8, P. 13 – The Generalized Matching Law, relating the ratio response behavior Bi
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• Equation 1.10, P. 15 – A compositionally inconsistent attempt to extend Equation 1.8 to more










• Equation 1.11, P. 16 – A version of Equation 1.8 using the centered log-ratio transformation
(Equation 4.3) (S. M. Schneider & Davison, 2005):
B◦ = k◦ + s ·R◦ (1.11)
• Equation 1.12, P. 16 – The Barycentric Matching Model, another form of Equation 1.11 that
emphasizes the distinct values of ki (Jensen & Neuringer, 2009):
k1 · (R1)s
B1




• Equation 1.13, P. 22 – Cumulative Prospect Theory, which predicts that gains (+) and losses













• Equation 3.1, P. 31 – Formal definition of the conditions under which a vector qualifies as a
composition; here, the closure constant ð is effectively arbitrary, and is taken to equal 1.0 unless
otherwise specified (Aitchison, 1986):




xi = ð > 0 (3.1)
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• Equation 3.2, P. 31 – The principle of subcomposition, whereby any two vector x and y may
be combined into a composition z, where ðx and ðy correspond to the overall proportion of z made
up by each subcomposition (Aitchison, 1986):
z = C (ðx · C (x) ,ðy · C (y)) (3.2)
• Equation 3.3, P. 35 – The perturbation operation, which is the analog of addition in the
compositional sample space (Aitchison, 1986):
x⊕ y = C (x1 · y1, x2 · y2, . . . , xD · yD) (3.3)
• Equation 3.4, P. 35 – The powering operation, which is the analog of multiplication in the
compositional sample space (Aitchison, 1986):
α x = C (xα1 , xα2 , . . . , xαD) (3.4)
• Equation 3.5, P. 35 – The anti-perturbation operation, which is the analog of subtraction in
the compositional sample space (Aitchison, 1986):
x	 y = x⊕ ((−1) y) (3.5)
• Equation 3.6, P. 35 – The Aitchison inner product, which the analog of the inner product in
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• Equation 3.7, P. 36 – The Aitchison norm, which the analog of the norm in the compositional
sample space (Aitchison, 1986):
‖x‖a = 〈x,x〉a (3.7)
• Equation 3.8, P. 36 – The Aitchison distance, which the analog of Euclidean distance in the
compositional sample space (Aitchison, 1986):
da (x,y) = ‖x	 y‖a (3.8)
• Equation 3.9, P. 36 – Formula for a ‘simplicial line’ in the compositional sample space (Aitchison,
1986):
y = κ⊕ (α x) (3.9)
• Equation 3.10, P. 37 – The perturbation-linear combination, analogous to linear combination




(αj  xj) = (α1  x1)⊕ · · · ⊕ (αD  xD) (3.10)
• Equation 4.1, P. 39 – The additive log-ratio (ALR) transformation, denoted by a superscript
@, which can be applied to any composition x (Aitchison, 1986):
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• Equation 4.2, P. 40 – Generalized Matching (Equation 1.8) recast in terms of the ALR trans-
formation (Equation 4.1):
y@ = κ@ + α · x@ (4.2)
• Equation 4.3, P. 41 – The centered log-ratio (CLR) transformation, denoted by a superscript
@, which can be applied to any composition x (Aitchison, 1986):












• Equation 4.4, P. 41 – The anti-CLR transformation, which converts CLR data back into a
compositional form:
x = C (exp (x◦)) (4.4)
• Equation 4.5, P. 43 – The isometric log-ratio (ILR) transformation, denoted by a superscript
∗, which can be applied to any composition x through the joint use of the CLR transformation
(Equation 4.3) and an appropriate orthonormal basis U (Equation 4.6) (Egozcue et al., 2003):
x∗ = [U (x◦)ᵀ]ᵀ , x◦ = (x∗) U (4.5)

















u1,1 · · · u1,d u1,D


||u1|| = · · · = ||ud|| = 1
〈ui,uj〉 = 0, i 6= j
(4.6)
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• Equations 4.9 and 4.10, P. 47 – Formula for converting a bifucation matrix B (of size d by D)
into an orthonormal basis (Equation 4.6) (Egozcue & Pawlowsky-Glahn, 2006):
$i =
∑
{j ∈ bi|j = 1} , $i > 0
ωi = −
∑













if bi,j = −1
0 otherwise
(4.9 and 4.10)
• Equation 4.11, P. 47 – Alternative ILR transformation using the eigenvectors W obtained from
a principal component analysis.
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• Equation 5.1, P. 49 – A compositional formulation of the Barycentric Matching Model (Equa-
tion 1.12):
y∗ = κ∗ + α · x∗ (5.1)
• Equation 5.2, P. 50 – Matrix form for Equation 5.1 to facilitate construction of dummy variables.











• Equation 5.3, P. 51 – A compositional extension of the Barycentric Matching Model (Equa-
tion 1.12) to incorporate both probabilities of reward xR and magnitude of reward xM :
y∗ = κ∗ + αR · x∗R + αM · x∗M (5.3)
• Equation 5.4, P. 56 – A compositional extension of the Barycentric Matching Model (Equa-










 [κ∗1, . . . ,κ∗c , α]ᵀ (5.4)
• Equation 5.5, P. 56 – A compositional extension of the Barycentric Matching Model (Equa-
tion 1.12) in which different sensitivities
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• Equation 5.6, P. 58 – A compositional extension of the Barycentric Matching Model (Equa-
tion 1.12) in which each orthonormal contrast is assigned a different sensitivity











• Equation 5.7, P. 59 – A compositional extension of the Barycentric Matching Model (Equa-
tion 1.12) to systematic multivariate regression:








h = (1, . . . , 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n ones
, αi = (α1, . . . , αd)
(5.7)
• Equation 6.1, P. 61 – A rule-of-thumb for replacing rounded zeros in order to avoid marginal
compositions (Mart́ın-Fernández et al., 2011). Note that δi = 0.55 is considered suitable in cases
where the raw data are discrete counts, as per Sanford et al. (1993):




δi if Bi = 0
Bi if Bi > 0
(6.1)
• Equation 6.2, P. 63 – Explanatory factor for centered multinomial logistic regression:
κn,i = κn + (α1,n · x1,i) + . . .+ (αM,n · xM,i) (6.2)
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yi,n = 1 (6.3)
• Equation 6.4, P. 64 – Simplification of the Softmax using the ILR transformation (Equation 4.5)




(ui,n · κn,i) (6.4)
• Equation 8.1, P. 71 – Matching model predicting the proportions of responses B in terms of the
frequency of reinforcers R and the magnitude of reinforcers M, extending Baum’s matching model
(Equation 1.8) and representing it in terms of the ALR-transformation (Equation 4.1) (Elliffe et
al., 2008):
B@ = κ@ + αR@ + βM@ (8.1)
• Equation 8.2, P. 74 – The contingency discriminability model for two choice alternatives. Here,
λ acts as a bias factor and ρ corresponds to a factor of the confusability of the two scheduled of
reinforcement. ω is a correction term that enhances the subjective contrast between the schedules




R1 − ρR1 + ρR2 − ω
R2 − ρR2 + ρR1 − ω
(8.2)
• Equation 8.3, P. 76 – Two orthonormal bases (Equation 4.6) used for ILR transformation
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• Equation 9.1, P. 80 – Probability of reward delivery in the Turn-Based Foraging paradigm
(Algorithm 1, p. 81), predicted according to a geometric distribution as a function of trials since
last visit t (Jensen & Neuringer, 2008):
Pr (Reward|Ci) = 1− (1− Pi)ti (9.1)
• Equation 9.2, P. 84 – Orthonormal basis (Equation 4.6) used for ILR transformation (Equa-
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• Equation 9.3, P. 87 – Silverman’s ‘rule of thumb’ for bandwidth selection in Gaussian kernel























r,j , π = πB (9.4)
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• Equation 9.5, P. 98 – Entropy rate in one step of a stationary Markov chain (McMillan, 1953):
H (B) = −
∑
i,j∈D
πi · Pr (i|j) · log2 (Pr (i|j)) (9.5)
• Equation 9.6, P. 101 – Kullback-Leibler divergence between an observed distribution P and a










• Equation 9.7, P. 102 – The divergence rate per step in a stationary Markov chain, achieved as

















• Equation 9.8, P. 104 – Metric for the degree of mismatch between a default transition matrix
Q (a stationary Markov chain) and the relative schedule richness among the alternatives R:
Island = D2 ·
D∑
i,j
Qi,j · πi ·Ri ·Rj given C (R) (9.8)
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• Equation 13.1, P. 176 – Compositional Prospect Theory, rendered in terms of subjective ex-
pected value, given a compositionally consistent weighting function and an integrated ratio scale
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Appendix B
Change-Point Analysis: The CPR
Algorithm
One of the consistent challenges in working with times series is that summary statistics (such as
mean response rate) are calculated across blocks of time during which those summary statistics
are presumed to be consistent. For example, most studies examining choice under the influence of
concurrent schedules omit the trials (or sessions) that immediately follow a change in the schedule,
in order to perform an analysis on ‘steady-state’ behavior. Typically, the steadiness of behavior
is assumed (e.g. when a study uses ‘the last five sessions in each phase’) without being examined
empirically.
There are, however, many quantitatively rigorous ways to determine when and how behaviors
change over time. One such class of methods is ‘change-point analysis,’ which divides a time series
into segments that are determined to be internally consistent, but also to differ measurably from
one another (Polunchenko & Tartakovsky, 2012).
The change-point analyses in this dissertation are performed using the ‘Conjugate Partitioned
Recursion’ (or CPR) algorithm (Jensen, 2014 (projected)). This method uses basic concepts in
Bayesian statistics to identify an unknown number of abrupt discontinuities in a time series.
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B.1 Bayes’ Theorem
Bayes’ Theorem describes one of the fundamental operations in probability theory: How an existing
model M (whose parameters θ are described by a probability distribution) is updated on the basis
of new observations x. Typically, the theorem takes the following form:
Pr (θ|x,M) =






f (x|θ,M) Pr (θ,M) dθ
(B.1)
This equation color-codes the four essential parts of the equation. A prior probability distribution
Pr (θ,M) (in green) reflects the range of plausible values for the model parameters θ in the model
M . This distribution is the convolved with a likelihood function f (x|θ,M) (in yellow), which
reflects the odds associated with the observations x given the prior parameters. This convolution
changes the shape of the distribution, reflecting the new information provided by x. Because
the convolved distribution rarely integrates to 1.0, it must be divided by a normalizing constant
m (x,M) (in blue). As indicated, the normalizing constant is simply the integral of all possible
values for θ. When these three elements are combined in this manner, the result is a posterior
probability distribution Pr (θ|x,M) (in red), which is the new distribution of possible values for θ
once x has been taken into account.
B.2 Marginal Model Likelihood and Conjugate Priors
For many Bayesian methods, the normalizing constant m (x,M) is treated as a nuisance variable
and is omitted entirely. For example, because m (x,M) does not depend on θ at all, it is not
needed to determine the value for θ that is most likely given the likelihood function (the ‘maximum
likelihood’ estimator) or given the posterior distribution (the ‘maximum a posteriori’ estimator).
However, m (x,M) is an effective metric for parsimonious model selection. Given two models,
M1 and M2, the model that provides a better overall fit to the data will have a larger normalizing
constant. However, if the model M1 has more parameters than the model M2, its normalizing
constant will be smaller (all else being equal). For this reason, m (x,M) is also called the marginal
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model likelihood (or MML). Because it captures the principle of parsimony in a quantitatively
rigorous way, it is reasonable to favor a model whose marginal model likelihood is higher than its
competitors (Wasserman, 2000)
Unfortunately, m (x,M) is often difficult to calculate. Even in cases where the prior distribution
and the likelihood function are known, the MML often has no closed-form solution. While sophisti-
cated numerical methods have arisen that yield precise approximations, these can be prohibitively
intensive to compute.
If an analyst is willing to constrain the posterior distribution to a particular family of distribu-
tions, it can be shown that both the prior and posterior distributions are described by distributions
whose sufficient statistics are closely linked. In these cases, the prior distribution is known as a
conjugate prior. Conjugate priors can (under the right circumstances) make computing the values
of each element in Equation B.1 a matter of simple arithmetic.
In the cases described in this dissertation, proportions of response are described by multinomial
distributions. For example, given n observations made across 4 alternatives (such that the data x














The conjugate prior of the multinomial distribution is the Dirichlet distribution, whose normalizing








Like all marginal model likelihoods, Equation B.3 does no depend on the particular values of the
model parameters θ. Instead, it depends on hyperparameters, which are the sufficient statistics
necessary to specify the prior and posterior sampling distributions. In the case of a multinomial
model, the counts of observations xi are the appropriate hyperparameters. Since the values for xi
can be determined trivially from examining the data, computing the value for m (x,multinomialD)
is equally straightforward.
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B.3 Change-Point Detection As Model Selection
In change-point detection problems, the objective is to identify plausible discontinuities in a time
series without either missing too many real discontinuities or making too many false positives.
Parsimony is an essential criterion in this process, because every change-point effectively increases
the complexity of the model. This is captured automatically by marginal model likelihoods: All
else being equal, the marginal model likelihood of one uninterrupted time-series (m (x,M)) will be












The CPR algorithm uses marginal model likelihoods as a means of evaluating whether the
current evidence supports adding change-points. This is done recursively, using a divide-and-
conquer method. Given some segment of data, if the average MML for all possible positions of a
change-point is greater than that of a no-change model, a change-point is added at the point which
displays the maximum likelihood of being a change. This partitioning process is then repeated
recursively on each of the resulting sub-segments, until no new change-points are identified.
Consider the following hypothetical data:
Lever 1: 0 1 2 0 2 3 2 2 6 4 5 5 4 8 1 2 1 1 1 0
Lever 2: 2 2 0 2 2 6 4 4 3 5 3 4 5 2 5 2 1 2 4 3
Lever 3: 2 4 4 3 3 1 3 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 5 3 4 4
Lever 4: 6 3 4 5 3 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 3 4 3 4 1 3
Here, each row corresponds to a number of observations, while each column corresponds to a block
of ten responses1. The prior hyperparameters x are set to (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5), as these have been
known to be relatively uninformative. Then, to calculate the MML for the no-change model M0,
the posterior hyperparameters x′ are obtained by adding the sums of all observations for each
alternative. This yields x′ = (50.5, 61.5, 44.5, 45.5). Thus, the MML for the no-change model is as
follows:
m (x,M0) =
Γ (50.5) · Γ (61.5) · Γ (44.5) · Γ (45.5)
Γ (202)
= exp (−280.69)
1The compression of the data into block of ten is done here merely for the sake of brevity; under normal circum-
stances, every trial would receive its own column, allowing for a more granular analysis.
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The MML associated with placing a change-point at a given interval in this time-series can be
computed by calculating the summary statistics before and after that interval and multiplying
the resulting MMLs. For example, for a change-point between the 5th and 6th blocks of data,
x1:5
′ = (5.5, 8.5, 16.5, 21.5) and x6:20
′ = (45.5, 53.5, 28.5, 24.5). Thus:
m (x,M1:5:20) = m (x1:5,M0) ·m (x6:20,M0)
=
Γ (5.5) · Γ (8.5) · Γ (16.5) · Γ (21.5)
Γ (52)
· Γ (45.5) · Γ (53.5) · Γ (28.5) · Γ (24.5)
Γ (152)
= exp (−65.77) · exp (−205.07) = exp (−270.84)
= exp (−270.84)
The ratio between two MMLs constitutes a Bayes Factor in favor of one hypothesis over the other.
Thus, since exp(−270.84)exp(−280.69) = 19, 057 these data appear to overwhelmingly support a change-point
between block 5 and block 6. However, the determination of whether to add a change-point depends
on average ratio over all possible change-points. This is because the position of the change-point
is itself a free parameter that the computation must integrate over. Thus, the Bayes Factor K for











m (x1:c,M0) ·m (xc+1:20,M0)
19 ·m (x,M0)
= 2, 880
In order to make a decision whether to add a change-point, the Bayes Factor K must be considered
with respect to the prior odds ratio with respect to a change, denoted by p1p0 . The CPR algorithm
begins with the assumption that the prior odds for a change in any given interval is pc =
1
n−1 , and
it can be shown that the prior odds ratio for any interval of length n is pc · (n− 1). As additional
change-points are identified, the value of pc is adjusted to equal pc =
# of CPs
n−1 . This yields the













· [pc · (j − i)] (B.4)
Given some decision criterion τ (which, by default, was set to 10 for all change-point analyses in this
2Equation B.4 requires an additional small-sample correction, without which the contributions of data near the
edges of the segment are unduly inflated. This additional calculation is omitted here for the sake of brevity, but is
taken into consideration in the calculations that follow. See Jensen (2014 (projected)) for further details.
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dissertation), a change-point is added to any segment if
p′1
p′0
> τ . The position of that change-point
is selected based on which MML ratio is largest within the segment.
Returning to the example data introduced above, the evidence overwhelmingly favors a change-
point, and the interval between block 5 and block 6 had the largest ratio. Thus, the first subdivision





0 1 2 0 2
2 2 0 2 2
2 4 4 3 3
6 3 4 5 3
3 2 2 6 4 5 5 4 8 1 2 1 1 1 0
6 4 4 3 5 3 4 5 2 5 2 1 2 4 3
1 3 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 5 3 4 4
0 1 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 3 4 3 4 1 3
The algorithm is then repeated on the two resulting segments, x1:5 and x6:20. When the algorithm
is applied to the first of these segments, no additional change-points are identified, but when applied





0 1 2 0 2
2 2 0 2 2
2 4 4 3 3
6 3 4 5 3
3 2 2 6 4 5 5 4 8
6 4 4 3 5 3 4 5 2
1 3 4 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 2 1 0 0
1 2 1 1 1 0
5 2 1 2 4 3
1 2 5 3 4 4
3 4 3 4 1 3
Because x1:5 has already been ruled out, the algorithm now recursively examines the segments x6:14






0 1 2 0 2
2 2 0 2 2
2 4 4 3 3





6 4 5 5 4 8
3 5 3 4 5 2
0 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 2 1 0 0
1 2 1 1 1 0
5 2 1 2 4 3
1 2 5 3 4 4
3 4 3 4 1 3
These are the last change-points identified.
For further details regarding the implementation of the CPR algorithm, see Jensen (2014 (pro-
jected)).
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Appendix C
Default Transition Matrices
In each case, the default transition matrices are estimated by the procedure described in Chapter 9.
Because each subject’s behavior consisted of two matrices (Q1 for responses following reward de-
livery, and Q0 for all other responses), the matrices listed below always present Q0 on the left and
Q1 on the right. In order to facilitate visual inspection of the matrices, each element is color-coded
with an intensity of red identical to its value. So, for example, the proportion of 0.40 would have a
background color RGB(255,153,153) , the proportion 0.00 would have a color RGB(255,255,255),
and the proportion 1.00 would have a color RGB(255,0,0) .
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0.12 0.58 0.01 0.29
0.53 0.02 0.37 0.08
0.02 0.28 0.22 0.48





0.02 0.01 0.43 0.55
0.02 0.02 0.63 0.33
0.02 0.02 0.67 0.29












0.01 0.47 0.45 0.07
0.36 0.03 0.58 0.02
0.05 0.44 0.01 0.50





0.00 0.00 0.07 0.92
0.01 0.00 0.12 0.87
0.00 0.02 0.16 0.82












0.02 0.66 0.19 0.13
0.26 0.05 0.54 0.15
0.15 0.21 0.24 0.40





0.00 0.00 0.04 0.96
0.00 0.00 0.13 0.86
0.00 0.00 0.07 0.93












0.01 0.50 0.02 0.47
0.60 0.01 0.36 0.03
0.04 0.62 0.01 0.34





0.01 0.01 0.03 0.95
0.02 0.01 0.15 0.81
0.02 0.02 0.39 0.56












0.00 0.72 0.14 0.13
0.11 0.01 0.63 0.25
0.01 0.29 0.14 0.55





0.01 0.01 0.56 0.42
0.01 0.02 0.58 0.39
0.01 0.07 0.43 0.49












0.04 0.38 0.23 0.36
0.42 0.02 0.29 0.27
0.05 0.48 0.03 0.44





0.01 0.00 0.76 0.22
0.02 0.01 0.94 0.04
0.00 0.01 0.25 0.74












0.01 0.39 0.10 0.50
0.64 0.04 0.26 0.06
0.01 0.50 0.02 0.48





0.01 0.01 0.11 0.87
0.02 0.02 0.09 0.88
0.01 0.02 0.47 0.50












0.01 0.56 0.06 0.37
0.59 0.01 0.20 0.20
0.01 0.45 0.06 0.48





0.00 0.01 0.57 0.42
0.00 0.00 0.42 0.57
0.00 0.00 0.70 0.30












0.09 0.51 0.02 0.38
0.60 0.22 0.13 0.05
0.01 0.29 0.21 0.50





0.01 0.02 0.07 0.89
0.01 0.03 0.08 0.89
0.00 0.01 0.45 0.54













0.04 0.52 0.05 0.38
0.58 0.08 0.27 0.06
0.08 0.09 0.07 0.77





0.00 0.01 0.50 0.49
0.01 0.01 0.87 0.11
0.01 0.01 0.39 0.60
0.01 0.00 0.28 0.71












0.10 0.09 0.01 0.14 0.63 0.03
0.06 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.71
0.01 0.32 0.17 0.49 0.00 0.01
0.62 0.01 0.32 0.05 0.00 0.00
0.24 0.47 0.01 0.10 0.09 0.09





0.01 0.00 0.84 0.14 0.00 0.00
0.01 0.01 0.77 0.20 0.00 0.01
0.03 0.02 0.48 0.47 0.00 0.01
0.02 0.00 0.87 0.10 0.01 0.00
0.01 0.01 0.74 0.23 0.00 0.00












0.01 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.54 0.16
0.16 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.36 0.13
0.13 0.40 0.01 0.43 0.01 0.02
0.35 0.01 0.62 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.00 0.33 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.46





0.00 0.00 0.05 0.95 0.00 0.00
0.02 0.00 0.11 0.86 0.01 0.00
0.05 0.00 0.26 0.69 0.00 0.00
0.07 0.00 0.14 0.78 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.04 0.95 0.00 0.00












0.01 0.39 0.25 0.08 0.18 0.10
0.45 0.01 0.29 0.04 0.05 0.16
0.09 0.26 0.13 0.28 0.01 0.23
0.30 0.02 0.64 0.02 0.02 0.00
0.01 0.53 0.08 0.22 0.08 0.08





0.00 0.00 0.05 0.94 0.00 0.00
0.01 0.00 0.11 0.87 0.01 0.00
0.01 0.00 0.25 0.72 0.01 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.51 0.48 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.95 0.01 0.00












0.01 0.18 0.01 0.21 0.59 0.01
0.16 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.66
0.01 0.65 0.02 0.29 0.00 0.02
0.41 0.02 0.54 0.02 0.01 0.00
0.00 0.67 0.02 0.26 0.01 0.03





0.01 0.00 0.04 0.94 0.00 0.00
0.01 0.04 0.35 0.59 0.00 0.01
0.03 0.07 0.36 0.52 0.01 0.01
0.01 0.02 0.23 0.74 0.01 0.00
0.01 0.01 0.04 0.94 0.00 0.00












0.00 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.82 0.05
0.22 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.12 0.55
0.01 0.36 0.16 0.45 0.01 0.01
0.43 0.03 0.40 0.05 0.09 0.00
0.00 0.08 0.06 0.46 0.03 0.36





0.01 0.00 0.67 0.32 0.00 0.00
0.01 0.00 0.48 0.49 0.01 0.01
0.01 0.03 0.51 0.43 0.00 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.90 0.08 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.65 0.34 0.00 0.00
0.01 0.00 0.68 0.29 0.01 0.01












0.05 0.11 0.14 0.21 0.16 0.33
0.44 0.01 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.20
0.12 0.46 0.01 0.33 0.01 0.07
0.29 0.04 0.59 0.01 0.04 0.01
0.02 0.01 0.12 0.55 0.04 0.26





0.01 0.00 0.70 0.28 0.00 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.91 0.06 0.00 0.01
0.00 0.02 0.29 0.67 0.00 0.01
0.00 0.00 0.85 0.14 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.01 0.60 0.37 0.01 0.00












0.02 0.18 0.01 0.12 0.51 0.16
0.60 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.23
0.04 0.50 0.03 0.42 0.00 0.00
0.29 0.02 0.65 0.01 0.03 0.00
0.01 0.26 0.01 0.49 0.02 0.21





0.01 0.01 0.05 0.91 0.01 0.01
0.02 0.01 0.09 0.87 0.00 0.01
0.02 0.03 0.46 0.48 0.00 0.00
0.01 0.01 0.25 0.72 0.00 0.00
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.96 0.00 0.00












0.02 0.37 0.04 0.31 0.25 0.02
0.31 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.51
0.00 0.34 0.12 0.51 0.00 0.02
0.35 0.01 0.62 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.03 0.38 0.05 0.47 0.03 0.04





0.00 0.00 0.58 0.41 0.01 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.52 0.46 0.01 0.01
0.00 0.00 0.76 0.23 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.01 0.51 0.48 0.00 0.01
0.00 0.00 0.39 0.61 0.00 0.00












0.02 0.18 0.01 0.19 0.43 0.17
0.29 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.54
0.02 0.34 0.20 0.44 0.00 0.00
0.23 0.04 0.63 0.09 0.00 0.00
0.02 0.37 0.02 0.20 0.03 0.36





0.02 0.01 0.08 0.88 0.01 0.00
0.01 0.02 0.10 0.86 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.01 0.55 0.43 0.00 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.27 0.70 0.00 0.00
0.01 0.01 0.08 0.89 0.01 0.01













0.01 0.23 0.01 0.20 0.52 0.02
0.22 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.62
0.02 0.32 0.07 0.56 0.00 0.02
0.29 0.07 0.49 0.12 0.03 0.01
0.00 0.52 0.02 0.34 0.02 0.09





0.00 0.02 0.56 0.41 0.01 0.00
0.01 0.01 0.90 0.07 0.01 0.01
0.00 0.02 0.71 0.27 0.00 0.00
0.01 0.01 0.34 0.64 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.03 0.59 0.36 0.00 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.86 0.11 0.00 0.01












0.14 0.11 0.01 0.19 0.53 0.01 0.00 0.01
0.20 0.05 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.55 0.00 0.00
0.02 0.14 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.04
0.15 0.01 0.25 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.52
0.22 0.29 0.02 0.29 0.12 0.05 0.00 0.01
0.51 0.05 0.34 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01
0.03 0.18 0.07 0.53 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.10





0.63 0.26 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.34 0.59 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
0.12 0.81 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
0.20 0.76 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.41 0.39 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.67 0.26 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.09 0.86 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00












0.02 0.44 0.02 0.10 0.28 0.08 0.03 0.04
0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.36 0.38 0.20 0.01
0.26 0.17 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.33
0.28 0.05 0.12 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.36 0.12
0.01 0.22 0.04 0.42 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.15
0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.49 0.02 0.41 0.01
0.28 0.06 0.00 0.28 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.29





0.17 0.65 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.00
0.06 0.55 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.20 0.01 0.01
0.02 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.32 0.02 0.01
0.04 0.75 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.01 0.01
0.46 0.28 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.02
0.10 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.15 0.01 0.02
0.01 0.71 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.23 0.01 0.01












0.09 0.29 0.03 0.01 0.27 0.04 0.03 0.24
0.20 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.28 0.34 0.01
0.16 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.10
0.51 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.27
0.19 0.32 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.25
0.26 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.42 0.02
0.13 0.02 0.01 0.67 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.09





0.09 0.48 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.10 0.01 0.02
0.17 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.26 0.01 0.00
0.04 0.85 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01
0.35 0.50 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.01
0.06 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.11 0.00 0.00
0.20 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.26 0.01 0.01
0.11 0.73 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.00












0.01 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.74 0.01 0.00 0.06
0.31 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.50 0.02 0.00
0.01 0.21 0.01 0.27 0.00 0.01 0.47 0.01
0.26 0.01 0.23 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.44
0.01 0.33 0.01 0.35 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.25
0.55 0.03 0.25 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.02
0.02 0.42 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03





0.45 0.41 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.01
0.07 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00
0.03 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.01
0.10 0.87 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.05 0.83 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.01
0.28 0.35 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.25 0.00 0.01
0.01 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00












0.05 0.13 0.02 0.22 0.54 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.23 0.08 0.21 0.01 0.05 0.38 0.03 0.00
0.04 0.09 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.01
0.28 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.42
0.07 0.40 0.02 0.33 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.02
0.37 0.05 0.31 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.06 0.01
0.06 0.27 0.01 0.53 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06





0.54 0.35 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01
0.29 0.66 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.49 0.43 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.40 0.55 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.24 0.65 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.51 0.34 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.02
0.48 0.44 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00
0.59 0.34 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02












0.04 0.14 0.05 0.32 0.29 0.08 0.02 0.07
0.22 0.03 0.25 0.05 0.10 0.30 0.03 0.02
0.04 0.19 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.28 0.32
0.07 0.15 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.32 0.26
0.03 0.33 0.04 0.36 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.07
0.45 0.03 0.26 0.04 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.03
0.05 0.48 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.27





0.60 0.32 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.18 0.73 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01
0.76 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.59 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.10 0.77 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00
0.64 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.01
0.65 0.28 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00












0.03 0.06 0.01 0.20 0.58 0.11 0.00 0.02
0.38 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.05 0.39 0.01 0.00
0.03 0.14 0.04 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.51 0.07
0.11 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.61
0.03 0.15 0.02 0.42 0.09 0.25 0.00 0.04
0.42 0.04 0.30 0.02 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.01
0.03 0.49 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.12





0.74 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.01
0.19 0.63 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.00
0.23 0.56 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.01
0.09 0.59 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.04
0.47 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.22 0.11 0.01 0.01
0.60 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.14 0.00 0.01
0.07 0.79 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.01












0.02 0.40 0.01 0.15 0.28 0.05 0.00 0.09
0.10 0.03 0.19 0.02 0.14 0.52 0.01 0.01
0.02 0.03 0.01 0.62 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.12
0.10 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.46 0.36
0.05 0.50 0.01 0.23 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.12
0.21 0.03 0.40 0.02 0.29 0.02 0.02 0.02
0.01 0.74 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.04





0.54 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.33 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.21 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.41 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.39 0.02 0.01 0.02
0.29 0.42 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.05 0.01 0.01
0.32 0.24 0.01 0.01 0.38 0.03 0.01 0.01
0.31 0.26 0.00 0.01 0.37 0.04 0.00 0.01
0.05 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00












0.03 0.17 0.01 0.29 0.44 0.05 0.00 0.01
0.38 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.33 0.01 0.01
0.01 0.16 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.47 0.15
0.06 0.06 0.26 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.42
0.09 0.35 0.01 0.29 0.06 0.16 0.01 0.02
0.41 0.08 0.19 0.06 0.18 0.04 0.03 0.01
0.04 0.30 0.02 0.32 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.25





0.26 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.03 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00
0.03 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
0.04 0.89 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
0.07 0.85 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.08 0.81 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01
0.02 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00













0.04 0.23 0.02 0.01 0.40 0.05 0.02 0.23
0.14 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.54 0.20 0.01
0.10 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.23 0.21 0.10
0.01 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.57
0.02 0.45 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.33
0.38 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.19 0.04 0.32 0.01
0.02 0.01 0.00 0.67 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.12





0.30 0.47 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.05 0.01 0.00
0.17 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.06 0.00 0.00
0.05 0.82 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.00
0.14 0.35 0.01 0.01 0.47 0.02 0.00 0.01
0.08 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.10 0.00 0.01
0.48 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.26 0.08 0.01 0.01
0.42 0.41 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.01
0.05 0.35 0.02 0.00 0.48 0.07 0.01 0.01


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0.02 0.17 0.01 0.13 0.65 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.22 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.56 0.07 0.00
0.05 0.40 0.02 0.26 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.16
0.16 0.10 0.20 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.40
0.01 0.42 0.01 0.44 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.02
0.30 0.01 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.10 0.24 0.01
0.02 0.15 0.01 0.55 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.20





0.84 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.04 0.81 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.00
0.02 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01
0.85 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.39 0.45 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.22 0.29 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.37 0.01 0.01
0.01 0.94 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00













0.06 0.30 0.02 0.04 0.49 0.04 0.01 0.04
0.21 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.05 0.47 0.06 0.01
0.05 0.03 0.02 0.47 0.02 0.02 0.28 0.11
0.27 0.06 0.19 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.26
0.01 0.59 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.11
0.24 0.01 0.32 0.04 0.15 0.03 0.19 0.03
0.04 0.02 0.01 0.69 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.13





0.64 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00
0.54 0.37 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.00
0.81 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
0.27 0.67 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.26 0.66 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00
0.76 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.01
0.82 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01













0.03 0.34 0.01 0.20 0.41 0.01 0.00 0.01
0.22 0.06 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.53 0.00 0.00
0.04 0.16 0.04 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.02
0.06 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.66
0.03 0.47 0.02 0.42 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.40 0.04 0.43 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00
0.10 0.38 0.02 0.36 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.07





0.78 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.12 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.70 0.24 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
0.73 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07
0.35 0.57 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.44 0.51 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
0.63 0.27 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01













0.03 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.65 0.02 0.01 0.02
0.32 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.57 0.02 0.00
0.02 0.23 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.43 0.06
0.04 0.04 0.30 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.54
0.01 0.34 0.06 0.45 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06
0.49 0.01 0.31 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.01
0.03 0.31 0.01 0.44 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.14





0.72 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.13 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.00
0.19 0.73 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00
0.46 0.46 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.33 0.45 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.01
0.58 0.20 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.00
0.17 0.74 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01













0.03 0.19 0.01 0.10 0.66 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.07 0.03 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.64 0.03 0.01
0.10 0.09 0.02 0.26 0.01 0.02 0.31 0.19
0.36 0.12 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.25
0.04 0.73 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
0.10 0.02 0.62 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.02
0.03 0.04 0.01 0.51 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.31





0.94 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.48 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.93 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.95 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.47 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.72 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01
0.90 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01













0.01 0.25 0.02 0.14 0.48 0.07 0.01 0.01
0.08 0.01 0.23 0.02 0.05 0.56 0.03 0.01
0.16 0.04 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.46 0.12
0.29 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.18 0.36
0.02 0.50 0.03 0.25 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.02
0.12 0.01 0.47 0.07 0.21 0.02 0.06 0.02
0.19 0.08 0.01 0.29 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.39





0.90 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.51 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.00
0.91 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.93 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.70 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
0.66 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00
0.86 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.93 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00













0.01 0.04 0.03 0.16 0.20 0.34 0.07 0.15
0.22 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.31 0.12 0.16 0.07
0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.35 0.44 0.05
0.04 0.02 0.20 0.05 0.23 0.02 0.14 0.30
0.05 0.21 0.03 0.29 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.22
0.22 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.56 0.03
0.03 0.04 0.01 0.46 0.08 0.17 0.03 0.18





0.10 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00
0.66 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.28 0.67 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.43 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00
0.02 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.37 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00
0.08 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00













0.04 0.20 0.03 0.19 0.46 0.06 0.01 0.01
0.23 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.12 0.45 0.01 0.00
0.10 0.06 0.04 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.36 0.18
0.22 0.04 0.29 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.25
0.05 0.24 0.04 0.51 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.01
0.16 0.03 0.58 0.01 0.15 0.04 0.01 0.01
0.09 0.15 0.03 0.31 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.37





0.28 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.05 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.20 0.75 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.06 0.90 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.12 0.81 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.08 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.01
0.18 0.76 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01













0.02 0.22 0.02 0.05 0.56 0.12 0.01 0.01
0.39 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.46 0.02 0.00
0.06 0.12 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.47 0.16
0.23 0.08 0.31 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.13
0.01 0.19 0.08 0.35 0.15 0.20 0.01 0.02
0.35 0.01 0.35 0.05 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.01
0.06 0.25 0.01 0.33 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.24





0.82 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.07 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00
0.49 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.63 0.34 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.47 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01
0.26 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00
0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00













0.02 0.32 0.01 0.07 0.47 0.10 0.00 0.00
0.17 0.01 0.25 0.05 0.20 0.31 0.01 0.00
0.04 0.13 0.01 0.27 0.01 0.00 0.35 0.17
0.03 0.08 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.42 0.29
0.05 0.29 0.01 0.30 0.06 0.29 0.00 0.01
0.06 0.01 0.40 0.20 0.24 0.06 0.02 0.01
0.02 0.35 0.04 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.30





0.94 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
0.63 0.28 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01
0.94 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.93 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
0.87 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00
0.70 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.01
0.91 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01













0.02 0.07 0.04 0.19 0.52 0.09 0.02 0.05
0.18 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.06 0.51 0.02 0.01
0.13 0.16 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.03 0.31 0.19
0.15 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.32
0.02 0.27 0.07 0.29 0.05 0.18 0.04 0.07
0.23 0.01 0.41 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.01
0.15 0.41 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.21





0.56 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.36 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00
0.47 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00
0.91 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.17 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.00
0.61 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.00
0.43 0.50 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00













0.07 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.61 0.02 0.00 0.10
0.13 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.67 0.05 0.01
0.02 0.08 0.04 0.26 0.00 0.04 0.55 0.02
0.10 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.71
0.11 0.41 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.03 0.01 0.20
0.56 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.11 0.02
0.03 0.25 0.04 0.51 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.03





0.52 0.44 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.09 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00
0.33 0.61 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
0.60 0.31 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01
0.19 0.74 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00
0.31 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00
0.39 0.52 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.01
0.49 0.43 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00


APPENDIX C. DEFAULT TRANSITION MATRICES 231












0.07 0.58 0.02 0.33
0.48 0.22 0.26 0.05
0.01 0.40 0.03 0.57





0.00 0.00 0.02 0.97
0.00 0.01 0.94 0.05
0.01 0.00 0.72 0.26














0.07 0.61 0.00 0.32
0.54 0.11 0.33 0.03
0.01 0.33 0.09 0.57





0.92 0.07 0.01 0.00
0.02 0.97 0.01 0.00
0.06 0.92 0.00 0.02














0.16 0.42 0.28 0.14
0.13 0.08 0.04 0.75
0.17 0.48 0.21 0.13





0.27 0.48 0.24 0.01
0.02 0.95 0.01 0.01
0.15 0.60 0.23 0.02














0.08 0.54 0.01 0.37
0.43 0.10 0.46 0.02
0.01 0.23 0.15 0.61





0.97 0.01 0.00 0.01
0.01 0.97 0.02 0.00
0.03 0.95 0.01 0.01














0.05 0.11 0.84 0.00
0.17 0.03 0.01 0.79
0.15 0.79 0.06 0.01





0.98 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.02 0.75 0.00 0.23
0.96 0.01 0.02 0.01














0.23 0.59 0.01 0.18
0.42 0.19 0.38 0.01
0.02 0.12 0.21 0.65





0.99 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00
0.03 0.96 0.01 0.00














0.09 0.64 0.07 0.20
0.44 0.07 0.40 0.09
0.02 0.41 0.03 0.53





0.01 0.01 0.40 0.58
0.01 0.01 0.24 0.74
0.00 0.02 0.34 0.63














0.07 0.65 0.04 0.24
0.46 0.03 0.49 0.02
0.02 0.21 0.02 0.75





0.52 0.46 0.01 0.01
0.53 0.45 0.01 0.01
0.53 0.45 0.01 0.01














0.13 0.45 0.39 0.03
0.19 0.03 0.03 0.75
0.12 0.69 0.06 0.13





0.86 0.09 0.04 0.01
0.23 0.75 0.01 0.01
0.79 0.18 0.02 0.01














0.01 0.56 0.06 0.36
0.49 0.02 0.47 0.02
0.07 0.14 0.02 0.76





0.60 0.38 0.00 0.02
0.25 0.72 0.02 0.00
0.62 0.36 0.01 0.01














0.05 0.18 0.75 0.02
0.66 0.02 0.01 0.31
0.05 0.68 0.16 0.11





0.94 0.04 0.01 0.01
0.26 0.72 0.01 0.01
0.75 0.21 0.02 0.01














0.08 0.62 0.02 0.28
0.70 0.01 0.27 0.01
0.07 0.05 0.13 0.76





0.70 0.30 0.00 0.00
0.21 0.78 0.01 0.00
0.29 0.68 0.01 0.01














0.05 0.57 0.07 0.31
0.45 0.26 0.26 0.02
0.01 0.42 0.08 0.50





0.03 0.02 0.69 0.25
0.03 0.01 0.71 0.24
0.01 0.00 0.64 0.35














0.24 0.46 0.01 0.29
0.57 0.15 0.28 0.01
0.04 0.40 0.10 0.45





0.90 0.09 0.00 0.01
0.22 0.77 0.01 0.00
0.69 0.29 0.00 0.02














0.11 0.31 0.55 0.03
0.11 0.07 0.00 0.82
0.08 0.84 0.04 0.04





0.62 0.35 0.01 0.01
0.35 0.64 0.01 0.00
0.43 0.52 0.03 0.01














0.06 0.58 0.01 0.35
0.50 0.21 0.27 0.02
0.04 0.24 0.04 0.68





0.93 0.06 0.00 0.01
0.07 0.93 0.00 0.00
0.59 0.40 0.01 0.01














0.06 0.23 0.70 0.00
0.31 0.17 0.00 0.52
0.03 0.78 0.19 0.00





0.92 0.07 0.01 0.00
0.13 0.86 0.00 0.00
0.84 0.12 0.04 0.00














0.23 0.58 0.01 0.18
0.55 0.27 0.17 0.01
0.04 0.37 0.03 0.55





0.89 0.10 0.00 0.00
0.14 0.85 0.00 0.00
0.36 0.61 0.01 0.03
0.89 0.09 0.01 0.01














0.05 0.44 0.00 0.50
0.58 0.23 0.02 0.18
0.02 0.66 0.00 0.31





0.01 0.02 0.03 0.95
0.01 0.04 0.14 0.81
0.02 0.15 0.31 0.52














0.14 0.39 0.01 0.46
0.40 0.24 0.32 0.04
0.01 0.48 0.02 0.48





0.59 0.36 0.01 0.04
0.38 0.61 0.00 0.01
0.08 0.92 0.00 0.00














0.08 0.24 0.65 0.03
0.22 0.06 0.02 0.69
0.07 0.76 0.04 0.14





0.71 0.19 0.05 0.05
0.05 0.83 0.05 0.08
0.47 0.27 0.18 0.07














0.03 0.53 0.04 0.41
0.63 0.13 0.22 0.02
0.02 0.45 0.03 0.50





0.51 0.46 0.01 0.03
0.19 0.79 0.01 0.01
0.02 0.94 0.01 0.02














0.03 0.17 0.78 0.02
0.45 0.08 0.01 0.46
0.04 0.87 0.03 0.06





0.78 0.19 0.01 0.02
0.11 0.85 0.01 0.03
0.40 0.55 0.04 0.01














0.09 0.58 0.02 0.31
0.65 0.11 0.23 0.01
0.03 0.37 0.05 0.55





0.76 0.21 0.01 0.02
0.20 0.77 0.01 0.02
0.20 0.78 0.02 0.00














0.10 0.55 0.20 0.15
0.22 0.18 0.47 0.14
0.00 0.37 0.03 0.59





0.01 0.01 0.85 0.12
0.01 0.00 0.70 0.29
0.01 0.00 0.46 0.53














0.02 0.72 0.04 0.21
0.30 0.06 0.62 0.02
0.02 0.03 0.22 0.73





0.24 0.74 0.01 0.01
0.61 0.38 0.00 0.00
0.83 0.15 0.01 0.01














0.07 0.15 0.48 0.31
0.09 0.28 0.26 0.38
0.01 0.15 0.29 0.56





0.13 0.63 0.21 0.02
0.04 0.91 0.04 0.01
0.13 0.73 0.11 0.03














0.12 0.61 0.01 0.26
0.25 0.33 0.41 0.02
0.18 0.13 0.18 0.51





0.85 0.15 0.00 0.00
0.47 0.52 0.01 0.00
0.90 0.09 0.01 0.01














0.12 0.22 0.65 0.01
0.28 0.10 0.01 0.61
0.37 0.54 0.08 0.01





0.96 0.04 0.00 0.00
0.86 0.14 0.00 0.00
0.85 0.15 0.00 0.00














0.26 0.54 0.01 0.18
0.55 0.21 0.23 0.00
0.02 0.07 0.15 0.76





0.98 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.91 0.07 0.01 0.00
0.98 0.02 0.00 0.00














0.01 0.40 0.35 0.24
0.37 0.11 0.37 0.16
0.01 0.40 0.01 0.58





0.02 0.00 0.79 0.19
0.01 0.01 0.89 0.09
0.01 0.01 0.61 0.37














0.02 0.65 0.02 0.31
0.56 0.07 0.33 0.05
0.04 0.08 0.00 0.88





0.23 0.75 0.01 0.00
0.36 0.62 0.00 0.01
0.66 0.33 0.01 0.00














0.09 0.23 0.48 0.20
0.34 0.05 0.05 0.56
0.13 0.46 0.03 0.37





0.55 0.42 0.01 0.02
0.27 0.70 0.02 0.02
0.25 0.69 0.03 0.02














0.03 0.52 0.01 0.44
0.35 0.05 0.58 0.02
0.06 0.26 0.12 0.55





0.56 0.42 0.01 0.01
0.10 0.88 0.02 0.01
0.57 0.40 0.01 0.01














0.10 0.16 0.73 0.01
0.21 0.02 0.04 0.73
0.17 0.71 0.09 0.02





0.94 0.05 0.01 0.00
0.23 0.77 0.00 0.00
0.84 0.16 0.00 0.00














0.13 0.58 0.01 0.28
0.66 0.02 0.32 0.01
0.04 0.24 0.05 0.67





0.95 0.05 0.00 0.00
0.33 0.65 0.01 0.01
0.68 0.29 0.01 0.02
0.86 0.14 0.00 0.00














0.03 0.05 0.04 0.88
0.36 0.36 0.04 0.24
0.03 0.85 0.01 0.11





0.00 0.01 0.15 0.83
0.00 0.01 0.24 0.74
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.99














0.02 0.31 0.03 0.63
0.59 0.09 0.19 0.14
0.04 0.62 0.02 0.33





0.04 0.96 0.00 0.00
0.10 0.90 0.00 0.00
0.02 0.98 0.00 0.00














0.11 0.31 0.51 0.07
0.23 0.17 0.04 0.56
0.10 0.44 0.27 0.18





0.12 0.58 0.27 0.03
0.11 0.72 0.13 0.03
0.02 0.76 0.14 0.08














0.07 0.35 0.05 0.54
0.53 0.12 0.21 0.14
0.03 0.33 0.04 0.60





0.04 0.95 0.00 0.01
0.27 0.72 0.01 0.00
0.40 0.60 0.00 0.00














0.11 0.17 0.46 0.26
0.65 0.15 0.07 0.14
0.21 0.18 0.14 0.47





0.14 0.82 0.01 0.02
0.74 0.24 0.01 0.00
0.40 0.53 0.04 0.04














0.08 0.55 0.03 0.35
0.54 0.26 0.18 0.01
0.05 0.37 0.09 0.48





0.29 0.70 0.00 0.00
0.45 0.54 0.00 0.00
0.08 0.92 0.00 0.00














0.14 0.57 0.05 0.23
0.35 0.26 0.14 0.26
0.03 0.54 0.02 0.40





0.01 0.07 0.15 0.76
0.01 0.02 0.02 0.95
0.00 0.02 0.31 0.67














0.07 0.49 0.01 0.42
0.60 0.12 0.25 0.03
0.03 0.26 0.06 0.65





0.38 0.61 0.00 0.00
0.17 0.82 0.00 0.01
0.31 0.68 0.01 0.01














0.09 0.22 0.59 0.10
0.41 0.14 0.03 0.43
0.10 0.35 0.02 0.53





0.62 0.36 0.00 0.02
0.42 0.53 0.03 0.02
0.72 0.24 0.03 0.02














0.15 0.52 0.02 0.31
0.58 0.12 0.29 0.01
0.04 0.25 0.14 0.57





0.18 0.81 0.00 0.01
0.09 0.91 0.00 0.00
0.19 0.76 0.02 0.03














0.05 0.10 0.75 0.10
0.78 0.07 0.01 0.15
0.10 0.42 0.05 0.43





0.36 0.61 0.02 0.01
0.22 0.78 0.01 0.00
0.12 0.87 0.00 0.01














0.17 0.61 0.02 0.21
0.65 0.11 0.22 0.02
0.03 0.15 0.05 0.77





0.36 0.63 0.00 0.00
0.27 0.71 0.01 0.01
0.70 0.28 0.01 0.01














0.05 0.64 0.10 0.21
0.40 0.06 0.31 0.23
0.03 0.20 0.15 0.62





0.01 0.00 0.76 0.23
0.01 0.01 0.70 0.29
0.00 0.01 0.82 0.17














0.27 0.58 0.04 0.11
0.66 0.02 0.27 0.04
0.24 0.04 0.10 0.62





0.97 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.80 0.19 0.00 0.00
0.92 0.06 0.01 0.01














0.18 0.27 0.33 0.23
0.05 0.12 0.56 0.27
0.02 0.28 0.21 0.50





0.47 0.24 0.25 0.04
0.05 0.88 0.07 0.00
0.15 0.36 0.45 0.03














0.07 0.67 0.02 0.24
0.64 0.07 0.27 0.02
0.17 0.16 0.09 0.58





0.86 0.13 0.00 0.01
0.14 0.84 0.00 0.01
0.84 0.15 0.00 0.01














0.06 0.25 0.65 0.05
0.56 0.04 0.10 0.30
0.11 0.57 0.10 0.21





0.88 0.06 0.05 0.00
0.29 0.68 0.02 0.01
0.81 0.12 0.07 0.00














0.16 0.72 0.02 0.11
0.75 0.07 0.16 0.02
0.12 0.17 0.10 0.62





0.93 0.07 0.01 0.00
0.17 0.83 0.00 0.00
0.94 0.04 0.02 0.00
0.94 0.05 0.01 0.01














0.08 0.46 0.04 0.43
0.52 0.09 0.07 0.32
0.01 0.28 0.07 0.65





0.00 0.00 0.74 0.25
0.01 0.01 0.51 0.47
0.01 0.00 0.77 0.22














0.09 0.67 0.00 0.23
0.64 0.02 0.28 0.06
0.02 0.43 0.12 0.43





0.94 0.05 0.00 0.01
0.83 0.17 0.00 0.00
0.93 0.06 0.00 0.00














0.09 0.31 0.39 0.20
0.46 0.06 0.15 0.33
0.20 0.14 0.08 0.58





0.58 0.39 0.01 0.02
0.65 0.33 0.00 0.01
0.29 0.68 0.01 0.02














0.10 0.51 0.01 0.38
0.76 0.03 0.18 0.03
0.02 0.62 0.08 0.27





0.97 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.75 0.23 0.01 0.01
0.97 0.02 0.01 0.01














0.03 0.26 0.67 0.03
0.44 0.04 0.16 0.35
0.20 0.52 0.10 0.19





0.97 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.60 0.39 0.01 0.00
0.95 0.03 0.01 0.00














0.10 0.61 0.01 0.27
0.75 0.02 0.21 0.02
0.04 0.43 0.10 0.43





0.98 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.66 0.33 0.01 0.00
0.98 0.02 0.00 0.00














0.01 0.37 0.13 0.49
0.49 0.06 0.34 0.11
0.05 0.48 0.06 0.42





0.00 0.01 0.54 0.45
0.00 0.00 0.96 0.03
0.00 0.00 0.80 0.20














0.10 0.46 0.02 0.42
0.53 0.07 0.39 0.01
0.06 0.44 0.07 0.44





0.85 0.15 0.00 0.00
0.42 0.57 0.00 0.00
0.74 0.24 0.02 0.00














0.10 0.25 0.52 0.14
0.28 0.08 0.04 0.60
0.10 0.55 0.11 0.24





0.90 0.07 0.03 0.01
0.03 0.92 0.01 0.04
0.72 0.22 0.05 0.01














0.04 0.44 0.05 0.47
0.42 0.05 0.50 0.03
0.13 0.34 0.08 0.45





0.47 0.50 0.02 0.01
0.35 0.61 0.04 0.01
0.88 0.09 0.02 0.01














0.07 0.16 0.67 0.11
0.47 0.03 0.04 0.46
0.15 0.56 0.08 0.21





0.86 0.12 0.01 0.01
0.31 0.67 0.00 0.02
0.38 0.57 0.01 0.03














0.24 0.44 0.02 0.30
0.57 0.10 0.32 0.01
0.09 0.34 0.09 0.47





0.79 0.20 0.00 0.00
0.32 0.67 0.00 0.00
0.85 0.13 0.01 0.01














0.24 0.31 0.01 0.44
0.65 0.21 0.02 0.12
0.05 0.66 0.10 0.19





0.02 0.02 0.01 0.94
0.01 0.04 0.01 0.94
0.01 0.02 0.04 0.93














0.41 0.25 0.02 0.32
0.71 0.19 0.07 0.03
0.01 0.67 0.10 0.21





0.32 0.67 0.01 0.01
0.15 0.83 0.01 0.00
0.04 0.95 0.01 0.00














0.10 0.14 0.75 0.01
0.09 0.11 0.02 0.78
0.12 0.71 0.14 0.02





0.64 0.34 0.01 0.01
0.26 0.70 0.01 0.03
0.65 0.32 0.01 0.02














0.14 0.54 0.01 0.31
0.48 0.27 0.25 0.01
0.03 0.26 0.14 0.57





0.73 0.26 0.00 0.01
0.26 0.74 0.01 0.00
0.43 0.56 0.01 0.00














0.08 0.24 0.67 0.02
0.21 0.07 0.08 0.63
0.41 0.44 0.10 0.06





0.75 0.24 0.01 0.00
0.30 0.69 0.01 0.01
0.62 0.38 0.00 0.00














0.39 0.40 0.00 0.21
0.55 0.18 0.26 0.02
0.03 0.29 0.08 0.60





0.74 0.25 0.00 0.00
0.26 0.72 0.01 0.01
0.47 0.50 0.02 0.01
0.71 0.27 0.01 0.01


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0.14 0.44 0.31 0.12
0.24 0.13 0.49 0.15
0.06 0.09 0.32 0.53





0.04 0.04 0.29 0.63
0.02 0.03 0.27 0.68
0.00 0.00 0.43 0.56

















0.05 0.81 0.11 0.03
0.09 0.07 0.80 0.03
0.12 0.01 0.19 0.67





0.00 0.00 0.98 0.01
0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.98 0.01

















0.03 0.32 0.02 0.03 0.45 0.14 0.01 0.00
0.13 0.01 0.30 0.02 0.09 0.43 0.02 0.00
0.06 0.03 0.02 0.40 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.26
0.21 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.45
0.03 0.38 0.02 0.09 0.28 0.19 0.01 0.01
0.09 0.03 0.48 0.06 0.19 0.08 0.06 0.02
0.07 0.14 0.03 0.19 0.01 0.02 0.31 0.22





0.68 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01
0.58 0.28 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00
0.44 0.41 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.01
0.28 0.57 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.01
0.64 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01
0.62 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.01
0.28 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.01

















0.01 0.33 0.01 0.01 0.58 0.05 0.01 0.01
0.03 0.01 0.36 0.01 0.06 0.45 0.08 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.10
0.15 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.48 0.29
0.01 0.69 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.01
0.05 0.01 0.48 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.22 0.03
0.03 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.37 0.47





0.94 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00
0.82 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.90 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01
0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01
0.87 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.00

















0.04 0.24 0.17 0.55
0.32 0.04 0.30 0.35
0.13 0.36 0.05 0.46





0.05 0.02 0.44 0.49
0.09 0.12 0.58 0.22
0.01 0.02 0.72 0.25

















0.09 0.31 0.15 0.44
0.05 0.13 0.63 0.19
0.00 0.33 0.25 0.42





0.01 0.00 0.02 0.97
0.00 0.00 0.98 0.02
0.00 0.00 0.98 0.01

















0.06 0.17 0.02 0.24 0.47 0.02 0.00 0.02
0.08 0.04 0.22 0.01 0.11 0.53 0.01 0.01
0.06 0.31 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.22 0.25
0.20 0.14 0.31 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.14 0.15
0.24 0.36 0.01 0.24 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.02
0.21 0.02 0.25 0.03 0.43 0.03 0.01 0.01
0.05 0.24 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.31





0.87 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01
0.01 0.91 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01
0.04 0.80 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.01
0.53 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.30 0.01 0.00 0.01
0.62 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.30 0.03 0.00 0.01
0.03 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.25 0.00 0.01
0.05 0.77 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.01

















0.02 0.15 0.00 0.28 0.50 0.02 0.00 0.03
0.14 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.74 0.04 0.00
0.02 0.32 0.02 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.23
0.11 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.41 0.23
0.08 0.50 0.00 0.32 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.04
0.61 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.12 0.01
0.02 0.47 0.03 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.17





0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.97 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.03 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.96 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00
0.72 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.01 0.00
0.10 0.66 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.01
0.03 0.92 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00
0.92 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00

















0.04 0.52 0.42 0.02
0.46 0.10 0.02 0.42
0.43 0.04 0.06 0.46





0.01 0.02 0.80 0.17
0.01 0.04 0.56 0.39
0.01 0.01 0.89 0.10

















0.01 0.46 0.02 0.52
0.58 0.05 0.34 0.02
0.02 0.51 0.04 0.43





0.01 0.01 0.11 0.87
0.02 0.08 0.28 0.62
0.00 0.00 0.92 0.08

















0.08 0.19 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.52 0.00 0.10
0.13 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.61 0.02 0.05 0.00
0.02 0.22 0.06 0.28 0.03 0.01 0.35 0.03
0.15 0.03 0.18 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.46
0.45 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.01
0.07 0.46 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.19
0.03 0.15 0.04 0.67 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04





0.65 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.01
0.16 0.67 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.00
0.19 0.61 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.01
0.29 0.52 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.03
0.22 0.42 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.04 0.01 0.01
0.29 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.25 0.00 0.00
0.21 0.26 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.08

















0.04 0.21 0.00 0.16 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.16 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.62 0.01 0.00
0.00 0.11 0.02 0.39 0.00 0.04 0.44 0.00
0.12 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.69
0.01 0.57 0.01 0.38 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
0.48 0.02 0.43 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
0.02 0.16 0.01 0.66 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.01





0.88 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.03 0.93 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00
0.49 0.45 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
0.63 0.27 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.43 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.39 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.04 0.69 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.02 0.00
0.28 0.67 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00

















0.02 0.42 0.07 0.50
0.51 0.11 0.31 0.07
0.02 0.36 0.06 0.56





0.01 0.01 0.10 0.88
0.01 0.00 0.12 0.87
0.00 0.00 0.12 0.87

















0.03 0.43 0.05 0.49
0.65 0.02 0.24 0.09
0.05 0.44 0.04 0.48





0.01 0.01 0.16 0.83
0.01 0.01 0.49 0.50
0.00 0.00 0.52 0.48

















0.09 0.18 0.07 0.02 0.49 0.04 0.01 0.10
0.20 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.56 0.06 0.01
0.06 0.16 0.06 0.15 0.01 0.07 0.42 0.07
0.04 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.39
0.06 0.52 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.15 0.02 0.09
0.41 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.15 0.15 0.03
0.04 0.08 0.04 0.49 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.21





0.58 0.24 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.01
0.19 0.65 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.01
0.18 0.67 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01
0.24 0.50 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.03
0.47 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.06 0.00 0.00
0.36 0.51 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.01
0.20 0.58 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.02

















0.02 0.23 0.00 0.08 0.59 0.05 0.00 0.03
0.28 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.06 0.46 0.00 0.01
0.01 0.03 0.01 0.23 0.01 0.08 0.60 0.03
0.16 0.02 0.35 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.41
0.01 0.47 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.10
0.48 0.03 0.31 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.01
0.02 0.06 0.01 0.58 0.01 0.20 0.02 0.11





0.63 0.27 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.01
0.26 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.01
0.26 0.60 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.01
0.80 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03
0.28 0.66 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01
0.40 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01
0.25 0.60 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.02
0.75 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.01

















0.19 0.33 0.12 0.35
0.60 0.08 0.30 0.02
0.01 0.56 0.09 0.34





0.01 0.00 0.39 0.59
0.00 0.00 0.43 0.56
0.00 0.01 0.58 0.41

















0.19 0.33 0.12 0.35
0.60 0.08 0.30 0.02
0.01 0.56 0.09 0.34





0.01 0.00 0.39 0.59
0.00 0.00 0.43 0.56
0.00 0.01 0.58 0.41

















0.13 0.08 0.01 0.29 0.46 0.03 0.00 0.00
0.08 0.03 0.39 0.02 0.04 0.43 0.01 0.00
0.01 0.22 0.11 0.20 0.06 0.07 0.20 0.12
0.03 0.08 0.39 0.03 0.29 0.01 0.06 0.11
0.07 0.40 0.01 0.37 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.00
0.38 0.02 0.19 0.05 0.25 0.08 0.02 0.01
0.01 0.29 0.06 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.33





0.37 0.55 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01
0.01 0.94 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00
0.16 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.04 0.89 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.29 0.62 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01
0.08 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00
0.09 0.81 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00

















0.07 0.13 0.00 0.22 0.54 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.07 0.02 0.20 0.01 0.01 0.66 0.02 0.00
0.02 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.49 0.27
0.18 0.02 0.34 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.23
0.06 0.20 0.01 0.61 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.01
0.56 0.02 0.21 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.01
0.02 0.31 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.46





0.66 0.30 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.14 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00
0.41 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.17 0.79 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.61 0.32 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
0.42 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.26 0.01 0.01
0.15 0.79 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00

















0.15 0.42 0.02 0.41
0.01 0.14 0.63 0.22
0.00 0.22 0.34 0.44





0.00 0.00 0.01 0.99
0.00 0.00 0.61 0.39
0.00 0.00 0.90 0.09

















0.07 0.19 0.24 0.50
0.38 0.07 0.18 0.36
0.15 0.43 0.09 0.33





0.01 0.01 0.13 0.85
0.02 0.01 0.33 0.64
0.01 0.01 0.61 0.36

















0.04 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.77 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.13 0.04 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.67 0.01 0.00
0.01 0.17 0.06 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.43 0.13
0.09 0.03 0.23 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.40
0.03 0.41 0.00 0.28 0.22 0.05 0.00 0.01
0.61 0.04 0.22 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01
0.01 0.27 0.10 0.21 0.00 0.01 0.21 0.19





0.80 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.02 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.01 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.16 0.72 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.01
0.33 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.42 0.03 0.01 0.01
0.06 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00
0.00 0.96 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00

















0.15 0.12 0.03 0.29 0.28 0.11 0.01 0.01
0.27 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.44 0.01 0.01
0.07 0.26 0.06 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.27 0.17
0.06 0.16 0.22 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.26
0.06 0.18 0.05 0.41 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.03
0.49 0.03 0.20 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.02
0.04 0.24 0.07 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.28





0.27 0.54 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.01
0.01 0.93 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
0.00 0.96 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.07 0.88 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.20 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.01
0.16 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.00
0.01 0.93 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.26 0.68 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01

















0.03 0.75 0.20 0.02
0.26 0.19 0.46 0.09
0.27 0.00 0.15 0.57





0.01 0.00 0.44 0.55
0.01 0.01 0.19 0.79
0.01 0.00 0.85 0.14

















0.03 0.76 0.03 0.18
0.47 0.08 0.18 0.27
0.08 0.12 0.03 0.77





0.02 0.01 0.69 0.28
0.01 0.01 0.93 0.04
0.01 0.01 0.91 0.08

















0.03 0.18 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.54 0.02 0.02
0.18 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.65 0.02 0.01 0.00
0.05 0.27 0.03 0.30 0.01 0.00 0.28 0.06
0.08 0.15 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.51
0.53 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.01
0.04 0.55 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.01
0.05 0.23 0.03 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.11





0.87 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
0.14 0.82 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.61 0.36 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.76 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
0.27 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.75 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01
0.57 0.40 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00

















0.02 0.22 0.02 0.11 0.50 0.12 0.00 0.01
0.11 0.06 0.20 0.01 0.03 0.59 0.00 0.00
0.08 0.03 0.01 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.06
0.07 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.69
0.01 0.47 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.33 0.00 0.00
0.18 0.12 0.34 0.02 0.22 0.12 0.00 0.00
0.27 0.07 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.30





0.94 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.13 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00
0.93 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
0.96 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.65 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.27 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.00
0.91 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01

















0.02 0.43 0.01 0.54
0.57 0.08 0.32 0.03
0.00 0.39 0.06 0.54





0.00 0.01 0.15 0.84
0.01 0.00 0.86 0.12
0.00 0.00 0.83 0.16

















0.02 0.19 0.01 0.77
0.67 0.05 0.19 0.09
0.01 0.43 0.04 0.52





0.01 0.00 0.17 0.82
0.00 0.00 0.98 0.02
0.00 0.00 0.80 0.20

















0.04 0.28 0.01 0.43 0.15 0.04 0.01 0.05
0.09 0.04 0.13 0.01 0.29 0.41 0.03 0.00
0.01 0.34 0.04 0.44 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.02
0.03 0.05 0.54 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.26
0.02 0.53 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.04
0.18 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.57 0.01 0.04 0.00
0.02 0.29 0.01 0.54 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06





0.22 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.51 0.06 0.01 0.01
0.02 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.01
0.03 0.83 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.01
0.25 0.38 0.00 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.14 0.23 0.01 0.01 0.54 0.05 0.01 0.01
0.09 0.60 0.01 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.01 0.03
0.02 0.69 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.02

















0.11 0.25 0.02 0.11 0.29 0.02 0.02 0.18
0.15 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.41 0.13 0.00
0.03 0.52 0.07 0.18 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.04
0.08 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22 0.01 0.13 0.27
0.08 0.50 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.16
0.32 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.03 0.35 0.01
0.02 0.23 0.03 0.61 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04





0.62 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.01 0.00 0.01
0.08 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.00
0.16 0.64 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.64 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.23 0.02 0.02 0.02
0.41 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.01 0.01
0.49 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.03 0.01 0.01
0.26 0.52 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.01
0.44 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.01 0.03

















0.13 0.40 0.31 0.15
0.49 0.07 0.40 0.04
0.02 0.30 0.19 0.48





0.00 0.01 0.24 0.75
0.01 0.01 0.43 0.55
0.01 0.00 0.30 0.69

















0.06 0.35 0.37 0.22
0.16 0.08 0.50 0.26
0.04 0.18 0.09 0.69





0.03 0.04 0.54 0.39
0.00 0.02 0.77 0.20
0.00 0.03 0.77 0.21

















0.02 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.75 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.21 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.06 0.51 0.01 0.00
0.04 0.12 0.04 0.35 0.01 0.01 0.35 0.08
0.19 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.16 0.49
0.03 0.55 0.02 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.00 0.00
0.14 0.03 0.62 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.01
0.02 0.11 0.08 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.07





0.62 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.08 0.86 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
0.18 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.76 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.35 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.16 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00
0.18 0.76 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00

















0.02 0.21 0.02 0.15 0.52 0.06 0.00 0.01
0.21 0.04 0.27 0.05 0.05 0.33 0.04 0.01
0.18 0.12 0.05 0.30 0.02 0.01 0.20 0.12
0.41 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.17
0.01 0.57 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.22 0.00 0.01
0.10 0.05 0.55 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.02
0.07 0.08 0.03 0.40 0.00 0.01 0.23 0.17





0.50 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.41 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.08 0.85 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
0.56 0.28 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.01
0.66 0.20 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01
0.15 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.78 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.10 0.52 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.22 0.01 0.01
0.63 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.02

















0.09 0.14 0.29 0.48
0.02 0.02 0.66 0.30
0.00 0.39 0.06 0.54





0.00 0.01 0.08 0.91
0.00 0.00 0.90 0.10
0.00 0.00 0.92 0.08

















0.04 0.10 0.38 0.48
0.17 0.10 0.16 0.58
0.21 0.55 0.08 0.16





0.01 0.01 0.07 0.91
0.06 0.05 0.11 0.78
0.01 0.01 0.82 0.17

















0.02 0.28 0.04 0.12 0.40 0.12 0.01 0.01
0.05 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.26 0.50 0.02 0.01
0.10 0.34 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.20 0.21
0.03 0.24 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.56 0.11
0.02 0.06 0.01 0.61 0.05 0.25 0.01 0.01
0.05 0.06 0.22 0.05 0.50 0.03 0.05 0.04
0.01 0.45 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.42





0.77 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
0.07 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.10 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.83 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.90 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.12 0.74 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.01
0.11 0.86 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00

















0.04 0.15 0.09 0.45 0.08 0.13 0.04 0.02
0.36 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.17 0.23 0.02 0.01
0.10 0.31 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.19 0.13 0.16
0.04 0.44 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.07
0.05 0.19 0.06 0.44 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.03
0.41 0.03 0.21 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05
0.03 0.42 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.21





0.53 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00
0.06 0.89 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
0.08 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01
0.15 0.83 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
0.46 0.47 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.10 0.67 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.00 0.00
0.06 0.87 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
0.21 0.72 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01

















0.03 0.58 0.07 0.32
0.41 0.27 0.29 0.04
0.01 0.37 0.02 0.60





0.01 0.01 0.57 0.41
0.01 0.01 0.44 0.54
0.00 0.00 0.81 0.18

















0.03 0.47 0.40 0.11
0.46 0.23 0.12 0.19
0.37 0.05 0.16 0.43





0.01 0.01 0.55 0.42
0.01 0.01 0.52 0.46
0.00 0.01 0.46 0.53

















0.05 0.20 0.05 0.23 0.39 0.06 0.01 0.01
0.10 0.06 0.37 0.01 0.17 0.27 0.01 0.00
0.06 0.06 0.02 0.33 0.01 0.10 0.14 0.28
0.23 0.02 0.15 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.34
0.10 0.39 0.10 0.23 0.05 0.12 0.01 0.01
0.11 0.06 0.39 0.01 0.38 0.05 0.01 0.01
0.05 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.30 0.13 0.14





0.67 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01
0.39 0.49 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.01
0.50 0.39 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01
0.31 0.61 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01
0.60 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00
0.61 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.01
0.25 0.59 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.02

















0.07 0.35 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.32 0.02 0.08
0.23 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.45 0.04 0.05 0.03
0.04 0.50 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.18 0.05
0.07 0.16 0.26 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.37
0.44 0.09 0.02 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.04
0.05 0.51 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.15
0.08 0.20 0.01 0.46 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.12





0.54 0.36 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02
0.27 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.01
0.22 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.24 0.64 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03
0.32 0.53 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.01
0.37 0.44 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.01
0.20 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00

















0.11 0.52 0.10 0.27
0.59 0.07 0.31 0.03
0.00 0.42 0.02 0.55





0.01 0.02 0.07 0.89
0.00 0.02 0.49 0.48
0.00 0.00 0.80 0.19

















0.25 0.33 0.09 0.33
0.59 0.13 0.23 0.06
0.04 0.18 0.10 0.68





0.03 0.13 0.66 0.19
0.01 0.03 0.82 0.14
0.00 0.01 0.84 0.15

















0.04 0.09 0.01 0.24 0.61 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.14 0.06 0.22 0.01 0.06 0.50 0.01 0.00
0.01 0.25 0.09 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.48 0.02
0.08 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.70
0.02 0.33 0.01 0.50 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.01
0.42 0.03 0.21 0.01 0.30 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.02 0.24 0.01 0.62 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.05





0.64 0.23 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.04 0.92 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.05 0.86 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
0.22 0.65 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.02
0.70 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.01 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00
0.01 0.88 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01

















0.13 0.16 0.02 0.03 0.44 0.08 0.02 0.11
0.20 0.16 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.36 0.09 0.02
0.11 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.04 0.06 0.31 0.05
0.20 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.22
0.06 0.42 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.20 0.03 0.12
0.38 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.05
0.08 0.08 0.03 0.37 0.05 0.02 0.15 0.20





0.53 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.07 0.01 0.00
0.07 0.65 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.18 0.01 0.01
0.48 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.22 0.06 0.01 0.01
0.42 0.19 0.01 0.03 0.29 0.03 0.02 0.02
0.19 0.38 0.01 0.01 0.32 0.09 0.01 0.01
0.09 0.62 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.01
0.39 0.10 0.01 0.12 0.27 0.08 0.01 0.01
0.30 0.20 0.02 0.02 0.28 0.16 0.01 0.02


